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ABSTRACT
This work introduces the importance of similarity and analogy to philosophy, argues that analogy 
should be seen as “similarity based reasoning,” overviews different philosophical discussions to 
illustrate the scope of similarity-based reasoning, and introduces the assumptions for similarity-based 
reasoning that form the central topics of the present work.  It demonstrates that approaches that reduce 
or identify relations to non-relational ontological categories fail primarily through the strategy of 
seeking truthmakers for relational claims.  It takes up the related problems of co-mannered relations, 
substitution instances, individuating relations and similarities.  It attacks the notion that substitution 
instances provide a non-relational account of relations and provides a proof that similarity is a more 
fundamental concept than substitution.  Given, however, that similarity is relational, it argues relations 
are non-reducible to non-relational entities, but that if given the notion of relating in general and of 
similarity, one can construct a non-reductive theory of relations that can individuate all relations, 
including similarity relations themselves.  This provides a workable theory of relations, but does not 
solve problems related to the epistemology of relations and similarity.  Sanskritic debates concerning 
the metaphysical nature of similarity and its knowability are explored through contrasting the views of 
four Indian schools of thought: the Buddhist, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsāka, and Prābhākara 
Mīmāṃsā.  Within the Islamic tradition,  analogy is rejected as a valid tool for legal reasoning by the 
Ẓāhirī school, and this is contrasted with the very tempered defense by the Shāfiʿī school.  The Islamic 
debates bring out more clearly the hermeneutical challenges, but it is argued that these challenges of 
interpretation are bound up in the challenges of the epistemology of relations and similarities. The work 
concludes that an epistemic virtue-theoretic account can help us better understand how analogical 
arguments can be true and non-vacuous, and argues we should cultivate the virtue of similarity and 
relation sensitivity.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPORTANCE AND SCOPE OF ANALOGY AND THE RELATION 
OF SIMILARITY
ANALOGY AS CENTRAL TO ALL PHILOSOPHICAL PURSUITS 
The problem of analogical reasoning is, simply put, the most fundamentally important problem 
in philosophy, and one that straddles the full range of philosophical areas of inquiry—metaphysics, 
epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, logic, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language, and it 
therefore finds itself implicated in every philosophical discussion.  The full complexity of the problem 
is brought to the foreground when one acknowledges that analogical reasoning is simply that which 
depends on the relation and recognition of similarity.  Once we realize that an explanation of analogical 
reasoning requires an explication of the relation of similarity and its recognition, we are forced to 
confront the fact that we must take such reasoning for granted in any attempt to explain it.  
One would be unable to recognize the words on these pages as words one knows if one does not 
have the epistemic ability to detect and cognize similarity; without similarity, we are rendered 
ineludibly mute.  One could not speak of “types of things” since types depend on similarities holding 
between the particulars of that type.  One could not speak of persistence over time since knowledge of 
persistence would depend on the ability to recognize relevant similarity through time.  We would be left 
with a language of proper names (which is no language at all): without the ability to recognize 
similarity diachronically, it would be a language of ever changing names.  In fact, the very ability to 
recognize what you are reading now is the same text as what you were reading moments before, and 
your ability to recognize these words as words you already know, depends on your ability to recognize 
a sameness, and what is sameness if not absolute similarity?  Your ability to find this manuscript, after 
having set it down for a while, and resume reading from where you left off depends on an enormous 
number of operations, an edifice of recognition and reasoning built upon a foundational ability to 
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perceive, to be aware of, and to reason with similarity relations.  Indeed, it is the very sophistication 
with which we as human beings can perform these actions that forms part of our uniqueness as a 
species of “rational animal.”  To group organisms together in taxonomic structures, or to see ideas 
falling under a concept, to recognize something as the same type as another previously experienced 
thing, or to see some particular as belonging to a category all depend necessarily on similarity.  
All philosophizing needs concepts.  There are no concepts without similarity.  Therefore, 
without similarity, there can be no philosophizing.  It further seems that similarity is a necessary feature 
of the universe.  Given any two unique entities, they are similar in that they are both not some other 
third unique entity.  Similarity, then, is a given, but an incredibly significant one.
To claim that “x is like y” demands some specifiable similarity: a particular resemblance, 
something that they are similar in respect to.  This claim differs from, say, literary analogies—similes
—which  Donald Davidson rightly points out are trivially true.1  So love is like a red, red rose sprung in 
June because something can be found in common between any two things (freshness, beauty, et cetera), 
but as Davidson and others before him have pointed out, some commonality can be found between any 
two things.  Hence we have the adage, “Everything is like everything else” or as Stuart Hampshire has 
formulated it, echoing Charles Sanders Peirce, "it is . . . necessarily true that everything resembles 
everything in some respect. Of any two things whatever, there is some respect in which they can be 
said to resemble each other and not to resemble some third thing."2  Douglas Greenlee has argued that 
indeed that this is a necessary and significant truth, whereas Davidson sees it, at least through the lens 
of similes, as a trivial truth.3  Greenlee calls this the Similarity of Discernables principle.  So love is 
like a red, red rose but also like a rotting corpse.  This triviality and generality of the similarity relation 
has cast analogical reasoning in a shadow of doubt and distrust, evident in some of the earliest 
theoretical discussions of the concept up to contemporary considerations.  Semiotician Umberto Eco 
1 Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” Critical Inquiry, 1978, 245–64.
2 Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, vol. 11 (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 31.
3 Douglas Greenlee, “The Similarity of Discernibles,” The Journal of Philosophy, 1968, 753–63.
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has remarked on this suspicion, echoing sentiments we will see were earlier expressed by Plato,  that 
“[the] criterion of similarity displayed an overindulgent generality and flexibility. Once 
the mechanism of analogy has been set in motion there is no guarantee that it will 
stop . . . .  The image, the concept, the truth that is discovered beneath the veil of 
similarity, will in its turn be seen as a sign of another analogical deferral. Every time 
one thinks to have discovered a similarity, it will point to another similarity, in an 
endless progress. In a universe dominated by the logic of similarity (and cosmic 
sympathy) the interpreter has the right and the duty to suspect that what one believed to 
be the meaning of a sign is in fact the sign for a further meaning.4
This triviality, transitivity and universality, though, violates the norms we use in assessing 
analogies.  To illustrate what is meant, consider the old analogy tests from standardized exams: a fish is 
to a school like a tree is to a ______.  There is a specific resemblance between the first set (fish, school) 
and the second set (tree, forest) which one must deduce in order to answer correctly.  Another example 
avoids language altogether.  Consider the set of images.  To correctly answer this visual analogy, it too 
relies on recognizing the relevant similarities.
Fig. 1.  
The visual analogy above is important, because as much as the present work will have to say about 
language and reasoning, it is important to bear in mind the often overlooked fact that mental activity is 
4 Umberto Eco and Stefan Collini, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Electronic (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
163–64.
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also visually as well as linguistically and computationally situated, and a theory of analogy should 
satisfy these different “mediums” of thought.5  
In observing the two analogies above, one cannot help but feel if one were to invoke Hampshire 
or Davidson to the test grader and declare that all the options were correct since “everything is like 
everything else” that the grader would be less than sympathetic to one's position and maybe accuse one 
of “hermeneutic drift” to use the term coined by Eco.6  Moreover, while everything may be like 
everything else, and a truth-conditional analysis of analogies and their literary cousins, similes, may 
reveal them to be trivially true, it cannot be the case that all analogical arguments are trivially true, 
wholesale, just because there is some shared respect between any two objects.  The significance of the 
issue of trivial similarity claims will be addressed in later chapters of the present work.  
Likewise, similarity and analogical reasoning plays an important role in the way we conceive of 
ethics under nearly all popular ethical theories.  Reasoning based on precedent, based on rules or moral 
laws, or based on moral paradigms all depend on determining similarity relations: between the present 
situation and the precedent, the situation alike in such a manner as the same rule would hold, or 
between a moral paradigm and oneself as the subject of moral judgment.  This kind of analogical 
reasoning girds many of our moral theories.  
Moral education is often conceived as the inoculation of virtues or good character through 
moral exemplars or role models.  Here, too, we are confronted with a potential problem stemming from 
similarity: such inoculation of virtue depends, it seems, on imitation.  The very trite, and I will argue 
incorrect, presentation of virtue ethics is, “Find a good person, and do whatever they do.”  Yet we are 
constantly cautioned that imitation is itself a sort of moral failing, a failure to be “authentic,” and that 
by imitating we are somehow less genuine, and run the risk of being “fake.”  Such tension and this 
5 For a detailed exploration of the role of analogy within the field of visual arts in particular see Barbara Stafford's far 
ranging exploration of visual analogy in Visual Analogy: Consciousness as the Art of Connecting (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001).
6 P. Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text: Semiotics, Fiction, Popular Culture, Revised Edition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 132.
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“Faking Problem” was keenly observed by Islamic philosopher and ethicist Abu ʻAli Aḥmad ibn-
Muḥammad ibn-Yaʻqūb Miskawayh (about 932-1030 CE).  In Miskawayh's Fourth Discourse in the 
Tahdhīb al-akhlāq, we are given the example of the man who acts temperately but who is not temperate 
(he is faking). He does not indulge in food, for example, because he doesn't know the pleasure of 
feasting like a shepherd may not, because he is afraid of being talked poorly of, he has been forbidden 
to, perhaps something is wrong with his taste buds so he can't enjoy, an ulcer prevents him from 
drinking wine, or so on.7  All of these lead a man to act as though he is temperate although he is in 
actuality not temperate. The same is assumed of justice (individuals may act as if just but not be just) 
and essentially all other personal qualities, moral or otherwise.8  If ethics are to be understood as a 
likeness with virtuous individuals, and moral education as insisting that individuals act like virtuous 
individuals, does not this insist on individuals faking and faking itself being a seeming vice?
These initial problems that confront us when we begin to think critically about analogy bespeak 
of the difficulties in nailing down just what is “analogy.”  Defining analogy is somewhat problematic 
because it is a word that often means different things in different mouths, and it is used differently by 
the different academic disciplines. This difference finds expression in works from philosophy, law, 
literature, logic, linguistics, history, art theory, political science, cognitive science, and computer 
science.  For the purpose of the present work, it is analogical reasoning that concerns us the most, but 
such reasoning is certainly involved in the simile of literature and the linguist, as well as that of the 
programmer working on image-recognizing robots. Analogical reasoning is generally defined as a type 
of reasoning that involves the use of a known source of information, the “source domain,” to 
understand something else, the “target domain.”  Such reasoning relies on some relevant similarity 
holding between the source and target domains.9   “Analogy” will be used in the sense of analogical 
7 Ibn Miskawayh, Refinement of Character (Tahdhīb Al-Akhlāq), trans. Constantine K. Zurayk (Kazi Publications, Inc., 
2003), 195.
8 Miskawayh, 100.
9 Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony, “Similarity and Analogical Reasoning: A Synthesis,” in Similarity and Analogical 
Reasoning, ed. Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 6–7.
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reasoning in toto, and the author hopes to briefly demonstrate the scope of such uses of analogical 
reasoning by offering several considerations, beginning with Plato and Aristotle and ending with 
computational models, and argue for an expanded scope of what we consider “analogical” to 
encompass reasoning that makes use of similarity relations.  Then the problem of relations in general 
will be introduced independently and taken up in detail in the following two chapters.
ANALOGY IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
The use of analogies in Greek literature predates the philosophers, and the Homeric epics are 
replete with analogies.  Analogies likewise abound in both the works of Plato and Aristotle.  An 
analysis of the use of analogical arguments is found in both Plato's and Aristotle's works with the latter 
giving analogy a more serious logical examination.  Analogical arguments are treated by both with 
some degree of suspicion, but despite expressed misgivings about analogical arguments, both 
philosophers commonly use them, resulting in somewhat of a “do as I say, not as I do” situation.  
Although the relationship with likeness (ὁμοιότης) is acknowledged, in some works the clear 
connections between analogy and similarity are not made.  These explorations of similarity are useful 
to review, for although in what follows the connection between analogical arguments and the 
metaphysics of similarity is not drawn, it gives one a sense of the richness and manifold nature of 
analogy.  In these texts, analogy is not always clearly distinguished from metaphor, but such cases are 
set aside here, and there are some clear considerations of analogical reasoning in relation to paradigms 
(παράδειγμα).  The considerations and problems for analogical reasoning raised are important and 
anticipate much of the later work here.  The aptness of analogy, whether analogies can be 
demonstrative or serve merely as rhetorical devices, the relation to other forms of reasoning such as 
deduction, the potential of analogies to mislead, and the detection of similarities as a skill enhanced by 
practice are all considered by these two philosophers.  
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ANALOGY, SIMILARITY AND REASONING IN PLATO
If there is any Greek philosopher who comes to mind in relation to analogy, it is likely Plato.  
His central work, The Republic, is professed to be an exploration of an analogical relationship that 
exists between the justice of the city and the justice of the soul, and contains one of the most well-
known analogies in the Western tradition, “The Allegory of the Cave” that opens Book VII of The 
Republic, in which we must understand what analogical relationships exist between the cave, its 
shadows and shadow-casters, prisoners, and the outside world. Plato commonly makes analogical 
arguments in which the health of the body is used to illustrate the “health” of the soul (for example, 
Crito 47a9-48b1) or the knowledge of the craftsman is used to illustrate political and ethical knowledge 
(for example, The Republic 488e–489d and Charmides 161d-162b).10, 11  Such arguments' frequency in 
Plato's dialogues is perhaps best attested to in the outcry by Callicles in Gorgias: “By the gods 
[Socrates]!  You simply do not let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and cleaners, cooks and 
doctors, as if our discussion were about them!” 12
It is possible that such arguments are meant to be merely illustrative and show that some 
position or other is tenable.  In the famous “Ship of the State Analogy,” the insight that we would not 
choose a ship captain by his or her persuasiveness but rather should choose the captain by his 
knowledge of the seas and sailing is suppose to show the absurdity of choosing state officials by their 
skill in rhetoric rather than by their knowledge of ethics and statecraft.13  As such, it perhaps merely 
shows the reasonableness of the position rather than demonstrating the truth of the claim being 
advanced.  In light of this distinction, one recalls the discussion between Socrates and Simmias in 
10 Unless otherwise noted, all citations from Plato taken from John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Complete Works of 
Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).
11 For an fuller examination of the analogy from craft to virtue, see R. D. Parry, Plato’s Craft of Justice (State University of 
New York Press, 1996). 
12 Cooper and Hutchinson, Complete Works of Plato, bk. Gorgias, 491a1-491a3.
13 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. The Republic, 488e–489d.
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Phaedo when Simmias provides an argument against the survival of the soul through the analogy of the 
lyre, in which soul is like a harmony and the body is like the lyre held together by strings.14  When the 
lyre comes apart, it is unable to produce a harmony; when the body comes apart, it is unable to produce 
a soul.  Socrates introduces a second analogy, that of the old weaver, in order to further demonstrate 
that these arguments are not demonstrative and cannot prove the truth of either the survival or 
dissolution of the soul, a conclusion that deeply disappoints Socrates' companions.15  The result is that 
Socrates cautions them against becoming misologues, using an analogical argument from the origins of 
misanthropy!16  The general lesson is that analogies, at least in some cases, do not produce deductive 
proofs, but we should not be discouraged.  
Such arguments from likeness may also be downright misleading.  In The Sophist, a visitor from 
Elea has just been recommending what today we would call the “Socratic Method” to his interrogator, 
Theaetetus.17  The visitor says of these questioning people that he is afraid to call them sophists because 
he fears to pay sophists so high an honor.18  When Theaetetus replies that there is a similarity between 
this questioner and the sophist,19 the visitor responds that “And between a wolf and a dog, the wildest 
thing there is and the gentlest.  If you are going to be safe, you must be especially careful about 
similarities, since the type you are talking about is very slippery.”20  The visitor does not go on to 
explicate just how similarity is “slippery” but in Phaedrus we have such an explanation.  The problems 
raised here are central to the study of analogy.
Socrates and Phaedrus are discussing what is here termed the “art of rhetoric.”21   Considering 
14 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedo, 85e-86e.
15 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedo, 87e5-88c.
16 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedo, 89d-91e.
17 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Sophist, 230b-230d4.
18 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Sophist, 230e5-231a3.
19 ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικέ γε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα. Plato, “Sophist (Greek),” Perseus Project, accessed April 17, 
2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg007.perseus-grc1:231. 
20 Cooper and Hutchinson, Complete Works of Plato, bk. Sophist, 231a6-231a8.
“καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν 
φυλακήν: ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος.” Plato, “Sophist (Greek),” Perseus Project, accessed April 17, 2015, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg007.perseus-grc1:231. .
21 In the Gorgias there is an argument that unlike philosophy rhetoric is not an art but simply skill born from experience 
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what makes an artful speaker, they consider the case of the law courts in which an accomplished 
speaker will “make the same thing appear to the same people sometimes just and sometimes, when he 
prefers, unjust.”22   Socrates, using the example of “the Eleatic Palamedes” asks if it is not known that 
“his listeners will perceive the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at 
rest and also in motion?”23  He goes on to note that with rhetoric one can “make out as similar anything 
that can be assimilated, to everything which can be made similar . . . .”24   By moving in small steps, 
one can make opposites seem as if they are instantiated in one and the same thing; by knowing 
“precisely the respects” in which things are similar and dissimilar one can not only detect such 
deceptions but carry them out.25 This observation seems to prefigure Eco's that we observed earlier.  
The problem diagnosed here is monumental, for at least in the context of the Phaedrus it is seen as one 
of the roots of deception.  Socrates summarizes their findings: “. . . the state of being deceived and 
holding beliefs contrary to what is the case comes upon people by reasons of certain similarities.”26   
This accusation is damning, but it is not arguments from similarity qua arguments that is indicted but 
instead the tricky reasoning of “moving in small steps” through similarities. If similarity is taken to be a 
transitive relation, such faulty reasoning looms large.  As will be demonstrated in later chapters, 
restricted similarity claims, that is claims about a certain respect, are not transitive and such faulty 
reason is curtailed.  It may be precisely this danger Plato diagnoses in this dialogue: similarity is a 
relation that trivially holds between any two items, and therefore is transitive.  Yet for reasoning to 
accomplish what it must, and what it does, this transitivity and triviality must be avoided. 
As might be suggested by Plato's own reliance on analogies, his perspective is not entirely 
negative.  This more positive outlook can be seen in his recommendations of paradigms in works such 
(462b-c).
22 Cooper and Hutchinson, Complete Works of Plato, bk. Phaedrus, 261d1-261d3.
23 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedrus, 261d9-261d11.
24 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedrus, 261e3-261e4.
25 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedrus, 262a.
26 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Phaedrus, 262b2-262b4.
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as The Republic, The Sophist, and The Statesman.  The first is so obvious as not to need any further 
discussion, but the recommendations of paradigms as a method of investigation that appear in The 
Sophist and its sequel, The Stateman, warrant some discussion.   The Stateman introduces Socrates's 
namesake to the idea of a paradigm by offering a paradigm of a paradigm!  
A paradigm is a mode of analogical reasoning.  A model is offered instead of a definition.  So, to 
take a simple case, let us say that a basketball is presented, and we are told, “This is a basketball.”  To 
use the paradigm, we are expected to take other objects and compare them to the basketball in order to 
determine if they, too, are basketballs.  Like analogical reasoning, there is room for error (to be 
discussed below).  One might think a soccer ball is similar enough to the basketball model to be 
considered a basketball, too.  As objects are accepted or rejected by the basketball expert, though, we 
get a greater sense of what similarities are relevant between the model and the other objects, so that we 
can rule out the soccer ball but accept the deflated basketball as matching our model.  This is the same 
method as we will encounter in the final chapter's discussion of The Chicken Sexer Paradigm.  Hence, 
this example is a paradigm or paradigmatic reasoning.
 In Stateman, the Eleatic visitor, too, suggests that important things are difficult to study without 
the use of a model or paradigm (παράδειγμα) but explains to Socrates that the idea of a paradigm itself 
is in need of a paradigm so that it can be understood adequately.27  The visitor uses the model of 
children learning to read and write as an example of paradigmatic instruction.  As children become 
literate, they can recognize and read letters in shorter, easier syllables and are able to “indicate what is 
true in relation to them.”28  When the same letters appear in more complex syllables, however, they 
often are unable to adequately read them and therefore “think and say what is false” about them.29  To 
27 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Stateman, 277d.χαλεπόν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι 
τῶν μειζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα πάντ᾽ αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνοεῖν. Plato, “The 
Statesman (Greek),” Perseus Project, accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?
doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg008.perseus-grc1:277d. 
28 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Stateman, 277e.
29 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Stateman, 278a2-278a3.
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instruct the children, one returns to those syllables to which they know and puts them beside those 
which they do not yet know; then they are compared.30  The visitor explains:
In comparing them, we demonstrate that there is the same kind of thing with similar 
features in both combinations, until the things that they are getting right have been 
shown set beside all the ones that they do not know; once the things in question have 
been shown like this, and so become models, they bring it about that each of all the 
individual letters is called both different, on the basis that it is different from the others, 
and the same, on the basis that it is always the same as and identical to itself, in all the 
syllables.31
This paradigm itself is the paradigm for paradigmatic investigation; as one understands individual 
components or individual truths in relation to some simple things, one may set it beside more complex 
things in order to understand those complex things better.32  So the  Statesman proceeds towards a 
better understanding of “expertise,” seeking to know what is the expertise of the king by beginning 
with examining the expertise of the weaver.
It is likewise in the earlier dialogue, The Sophist.  In The Sophist, the method of first 
investigating a paradigm is suggested because, much like investigating justice in the city is easier than 
in the soul, a recognizable paradigm is easier to “hunt down.”33  Through understanding how one 
recognizes a familiar paradigm, in this case, an angler, one can then apply the same method to discover 
more difficult paradigms.  Therefore, paradigms may offer a method of moving from the known to the 
unknown by recognizing the respect that one already knows in a new and possibly more complex or 
important context.  It is perhaps this movement from the known to unknown that led Plato's student 
30 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Stateman, 278a8-278b1.
31 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Statesman, 278b1-278c2.
32 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Statesman, 278e4-278e10.
33 Cooper and Hutchinson, bk. Sophist, 218d.νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔγωγε καὶ νῷν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ 
δυσθήρευτον ἡγησαμένοις εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν ἄλλῳ ῥᾴονι τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετᾶν, εἰ μὴ 
σύ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὁδόν. Plato, “Sophist (Greek),” Perseus Project, accessed April 17, 2015, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg007.perseus-grc1:218d. 
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Aristotle to declare that paradigmatic reasoning had the “nature of induction.”34, 35
ANALOGY, SIMILARITY AND REASONING IN ARISTOTLE 
Analogical arguments receive a formal treatment by Aristotle in several places.  In The 
Rhetoric, Book II, Section 20, Aristotle is concerned with enthymeme (an argument in which one 
premise is not explicitly stated) and reasoning from paradigms.36  Aristotle divides arguments from 
paradigms or analogies into two broad types: one which uses actual historical instances, and those 
which use invented instances.  Of the second type, he offers several examples.  His first example is an 
argument, which he puts into Socrates's mouth, that runs as follows: as athletes are not selected by lot 
but by fitness and ship captains are not selected by lot but by skills, so too should public officials not be 
selected by lot.37  The second and third examples are from fables but have the same basic form.  The 
value of these analogical arguments, Aristotle claims, is that they are illustrative, and with intellectual 
training, one can become skilled in framing them; fables are easy to invent, but actual historical 
parallels have more force in front of assemblies.38
In The Prior Analytics, Book II, Sections 23-24,  Aristotle addresses what he terms “rhetorical 
induction” and begins by sketching induction as determining a relation between “two extremes” 
through a middle term.  If given properties A and B, and a group of particulars, C, if all C are A, but all 
C are also B, then all A are also B.  What makes this induction, rather than deduction, depends critically 
on the particulars and the fact that knowledge that C are both A and B depends on experience: a survey 
34 Aristotle and Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation, Bollingen Series, 
71:2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), bk. Rhetoric, 1391a26.
35 Unless otherwise noted, all citations from Aristotle have been taken from Aristotle and Barnes, The Complete Works of 
Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation.
36 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Rhetoric, 1391a21-25.λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ εἴρηται περὶ 
τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα: ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματός ἐστιν. 
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν: ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή. Aristotle, 
“Rhetoric (Greek),” Perseus Project, accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?
doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-grc1:2.20. 
37 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Rhetoric, 1393b4-1393b8.
38 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Rhetoric, 1394a3-1394a9.
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of all C.39  In the section that follows, Aristotle moves on to explicitly consider the role that similarities 
play in making these sorts of determination and their differences.
Cases in which we have a paradigm are those in which an extreme is shown to belong to the 
middle term by means of a term which resembles the third.40  Here, Aristotle gives a helpful example: 
“Let term A be evil, B making war against neighbors, C Athenians against Thebans, and D Thebans 
against Phocians.”41 What stands to be established is to fight against the Thebans is evil.  This premise 
must be predicated on the supposition that making war against neighbors is evil.  Justification for this 
supposition must come from the observances of cases in which war was made against neighbors, as in 
the case of D, the Thebans against the Phocians.  Since it is clear that both C and D represent cases of 
B, and B has A (the property of being evil), the Athenians going to war against the Thebans is evil is 
proven.42  Clearly Aristotle is aware that the strength of the claim rests on demonstration that B is A as 
in D.  This point is precisely why, in his consideration of rhetorical induction, he takes the survey of all 
the particulars to be critical and why the argument is not actually deductive, but instead an unassailable 
inductive argument with no possibility of being wrong since all the particulars are accounted for, and 
there is no extrapolation from a survey set to a larger population.  Clearly in cases like “making war on 
one's neighbor” such a survey to see if in fact all B is A might not be possible.  Examples of arguments 
of this form which are unassailable without an exhaustive account of the particulars seem completely 
possible, however; where A is organism, B is composed of cells, C is plants and D is animals, it seems 
that given that C and D are B, we can demonstrate that they are A even though we have not surveyed 
the entire population of plants and animals.  We will consider these types of arguments momentarily 
when we turn to the role of similarity as discussed in The Topics.  What is notable in the forms of the 
argument that Aristotle presents here is that they are well-formed analogical arguments with the respect 
39 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Prior Analytics, 68b15-68b29.
40 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Prior Analytics, 68b37-68b40.
41 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Prior Analytics, 68b40-69a1.
42 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Prior Analytics, 69a1-69a10.
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by which two things are alike being specified.  The process of testing to see if in fact the two 
particulars or two sets of particulars are similar in that respect allows one to determine the truth of the 
claim being advanced.  
In The Topics, Aristotle identifies both the discovery of differences among things as well as 
similarities among things as one of four principle elements of which arguments are composed, the other 
two being the “securing of propositions” and “distinguishing how many ways an expression is used.”43  
Unlike his discussion in The Prior Analytics, where he discusses arguments employing similarities as 
moving from information about particulars to other particulars, in The Topics he considers the 
movement from particulars to geneses and universals.  He notes that likenesses are particularly 
important because it is through likenesses that geneses are distinguished (“as one is to one thing, so is 
another two another thing”, or, “as one is in one thing, so another is in another thing”).44  
This study of similarity has value in inductive arguments, hypothetical deduction, generating 
definitions, and rendering geneses and universals.45  In hypothetical deductions, through the proving of 
one case taken to be like the case at hand, the case at hand is proven by the strength of its resemblance 
of the other case; it appears that reasoning from precedents, a form of paradigms discussed in The 
Rhetoric, would likely fall into the category of hypothetical deduction.46  Likeness also provides for the 
generation of definitions when likenesses are observed in different contexts: windlessness inland and 
calm waters out to sea being examples which allow us to identify a similarity of both being “at rest.”47  
A genus is rendered when all of a species share some similarity, and earlier in The Topics Aristotle 
notes how similarities and differences allow us to nest one genus in another: so men, dogs and horses 
are all of the genus animals, but only dogs and horses are of the genus of four-legged animals, and only 
43 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 105a20-105a25.
44 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 108a7-108a12.
45 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 108b7-108b23.
46 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 108b12-108b19.
47 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 108b24-108b27.
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horses are of the genus hoofed animals.48 Though the use of inductive arguments, we can render 
universal claims as in “all organisms are composed of cells” above; this logical movement is referred to 
as “reaching deduction through induction” in the discussion of “rhetorical induction.”49  
Through likeness relations, we are able to develop typologies and taxonomies, which, like Plato, 
Aristotle sees as a skill developed with experience.  Skill is particularly needed in identifying 
similarities between things which are “far apart,” but careful examination of genres (or particulars) 
should detect if there is any property in common with all of them.50  Hence we could think about 
similarity identification as a competency; the ability to detect obvious similarities would be a 
prerequisite for applying basic categorical terms (“man,” “horse”) but the ability to detect non-obvious 
similarities is a more sophisticated epistemic ability through which both definitions and discovery are 
possible.
ANALOGY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE INDIAN TRADITION
The Indian tradition likewise has a rich tradition of philosophical debate surrounding analogy, 
and this debate in generally framed by the question of whether analogy (upamāṇa) is a valid means of 
knowing, a pramāṇa, and if such knowledge is indeed gained on the basis of similarity (sādṛśya) and 
not reducible to other pramāṇas.  The debate over what constituted valid knowledge and how such 
knowledge was grounded came in part to define the different Indian schools of thought.  For the 
purpose of this work, the sister schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the Prabhākara 
Mīmāṃsā, and the Buddhists as represented by primarily by Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti, will be 
considered.  The debates between these schools of thought will be detailed in Chapter Five, but by way 
of introduction a discussion of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika general theory of analogy will be useful.
Analogy has been considered a distinct pramāṇa since the very inception of the school Nyāya, 
48 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 108b27-108b31; 107a3-107b37.
49 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Prior Analytics, 68b15.
50 Aristotle and Barnes, bk. Topics, 108a12-108a15.
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which is generally understood as emerging from the foundational text, the Nyāyasūtra of Akṣapāda 
Gautama that perhaps dates as early as the sixth century before common era.51  This text provides a list 
of the pramāṇas that are accepted by the Nyāya school as valid, and the objects of such valid 
knowledge, the prameya. These are given as perception, inference, analogy or comparison, and word or 
testimony.52  For the Nyāya school, analogy was considered a distinct cause of knowledge, although 
discussions of how analogy functioned and what grounded analogy continued to develop within the 
commentary tradition.  Keeping in view only the Nyāyasūtra, however, we find an initial explication of 
analogy.  Analogy or analogical knowledge (upamānam) is knowledge which results from known 
similarity.53  There are some exegetical problems associated with the passage in which this definition is 
introduced, particularly the ambiguity of whether upamānam refers to analogy or the knowledge 
resulting from analogy, and later commentators have provided additional glosses.54  So, a gaur is like a 
cow.55  
The later Naiyāyika philosopher, Vātsyāyana, whose date is given by Ingalls as the third century 
of the common era, asks what then is analogy as an instrument of knowing.56  This is the very question 
that Chapter Four will take up, jumping off in part from Vātsyāyana's question and his response to 
himself.  Here, it is worth noticing what the later philosopher of the Navyanyāya philosophical school, 
Viśvanātha Pañcānana, who worked during the seventeenth century of the common era, has said about 
in an expanded discussion of analogy in his Bhāṣāpariccheda and self commentary, the 
51 Karl H. Potter, “Historical Resume,” The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2: Indian Metaphysics and 
Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to Gangesa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 4.
52 Gautama, “Nyayasutra,” GRETIL - Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages, 1.1.3, accessed January 
9, 2016, http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/nyaya/gaunys_u.htm.
53 Gautama, 1.1.6.
54 The later Naiyāyika philosopher, Vātsyāyana, whose date is given by Ingalls as the third century of the common era, 
provides an explanation: “prajñātena sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamānam iti " That is, that upamānam is 
the knowledge (upamiti) of some entity that results from the knowledge of some similarity (sāmānya).  Gautama, 
“Gautama: Nyayasutra, with Bhasya,” GRETIL - Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages, 168, 
accessed June 9, 2016, http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/nyaya/nysvbh1u.htm.  
55 Gautama, 168.
56 Karl H. Potter, “Vātsyāyana,” The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2: Indian Metaphysics and 
Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to Gangesa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 239.  
Gautama, “Gautama: Nyayasutra, with Bhasya,” 169.
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Siddhāntamuktāvalī.  When a villager who has been told that a gayal, which he has never seen, is like a 
cow, then he knows something about a previously unknown target domain, that is that a gayal is cow-
like.57  At this point this knowledge is primarily linguistic (śābda), knowledge that “a gayal is like a 
cow.”  When he sees a gayal, however, he comes to have perceptual knowledge of its similarity with a 
cow, from his previous experiences of cow, even if ignorant of the name of the creature “gayal” (but 
this point is not brought out by Viśvanātha58). Viśvanātha does observe, however, when the villager 
who has been told “A gayal is like a cow” later on sees a cow-like animal and concludes that it is a 
gayal, it is through his (1) recognition of the similarity between the cow and the gayal, and (2) through 
his recollection of this testimonial information, that he was able to be correct in his identification that 
this animal is denoted by the term “gayal.”59  His knowledge, then, that “This is a gayal” results from 
this operation of analogy through the instrument of similarity that is perceived.  His knowledge then is 
the denotation of the word “gayal.”  This is a distinctively linguistic understanding of analogy.
There were those among the Indian traditions that denied that knowledge of sādṛśya constituted 
a distinct pramāṇa, such as the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists.  As way of an introduction, the Buddhist 
objection will be considered as it clearly indicates that the question of analogy as a means of knowing 
is not merely an epistemic one but also one concerned with the metaphysics of similarity.  The standard 
Buddhist view is that there exist only two  pramāṇas, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), 
57 Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, Bhāṣā-Pariccheda with Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, trans. Swāmī Madhavānanda 
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1954), karika 79; John Vattanky, Nyaya Philosophy of Language: Translation and 
Interpretation of Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, and Dinakarī, vol. 5 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1995), 89–90.
58 This issue will be picked up again in Chapter Four as we will see that this knowledge of similarity may critically depend 
on the peculiar Nyāya view of “direct realism” of universals, sāmānya.  The Nyāya hold such universals are directly 
perceptible.  As Monima Chandha has pointed out, pulling from Jayanta, as person who sees a camel for the first time 
will be able to recognize another camel as the same type of thing the next time s/he sees one, but the explanation given 
here is because the same universals directly perceived in the first camel (camelness) are perceived in the second camel—
therefore, it is an issue not of similarity but sameness of perception.  The problem arises that perhaps knowledge of “a 
gayal is like a cow” is just knowledge that the gayal also has the universal “dewlapness” or others shared by the cow. 
Hence, how and if knowledge by similarity is different than knowledge of universals, sāmānya, is a question that the 
Naiyāyikas must address if they are to hold similarity is a different pramāṇa than perception or testimony.  See Monima 
Chadha, “On Knowing Universals: The Nyāya Way,” Philosophy East and West 64, no. 2 (2014): 292–94, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2014.0036.
59 Vattanky, Nyaya Philosophy of Language: Translation and Interpretation of Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, and Dinakarī, 5:89–
90.
20
and to some extend this latter is derivative of the former.  That there are only two means of knowing is 
based in part on the idea that the only thing that is knowable are what are variously termed the 
dharmas (Pali: dhamma), svabhāvas (self-beings) or svalakṣaṇas (self-qualities), the former being the 
psycho-physical events that make up the Abhidhamma analysis of reality and the later generally being 
considered the nature (or self-nature) that is the only item of reality to be known, characterized at times 
as objective entities “out there in the world.”  
To follow the Abhidhamma explanation of the dharmas,  these are entirely unique entities that 
constitute the whole of conditioned human experience. 60  These dhammas possessed only utterly 
unique, intrinsic properties (svalakṣaṇas) and self-being (svabhāva).  Because of their utter uniqueness, 
however, they cannot stand in any relation of similarity: a thoroughgoing nominalism insists that 
because no dhamma can have any property in common with any other dhamma, no relation of 
similarity can hold between them.61  Only cognition of the dhammas constitutes veridical awareness.  
Hence, analogy or analogical knowledge (upamānam) as knowledge resulting from known similarity 
was rejected as a veridical means of knowing since any “knowledge” of similarity was false since it 
could not be cognition of the dhammas or svalakṣaṇas, since similarity would imply impossible shared 
qualities.  Furthermore, knowledge of the relation must itself constitute a dhamma or svalakṣaṇa as the 
60 It is true that earlier texts, such as the  Paṭisambhidāmagga, seem to suggest all dharmas (it lists 201) have some shared 
nature (a single self-nature, svabhāva), but this shared nature is rejected in later Abhidhamma texts (A. K. Warder, ed., 
The Path of Discrimination (Paṭisambhidāmagga), trans. B. Ñāṇamoli (Pali Text Society, 1997), sec. 5.  It is quite 
possible that the Paṭisambhidāmagga introduced this term into Pali language philosophy (Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist 
Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (London: Routledge, 2011), 95.).  Likewise, there are other 
interpretations of what “dharma” means, as sometimes the teachings and sometimes the objects of that teaching or these 
metaphysical objects.  One text, accepted as canon among Burmese Buddhists but not necessarily other communities, 
the Peṭakopadesa, provides a heuristic tool for interpretation which itself exerted great influence over the tradition in 
which wording (Pali: vyañjana) is to be distinguished from meaning (Pali: attha) (Peṭakopadesapāḷi, Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana 
Pāḷi Tipiṭaka (Dhamma Giri: Vipassana Research Institute, 1995), secs. 2–3.) One principle of such is whether groups 
are grouped for wording or are meant to be distinguished by some commonality or as a set (Peṭakopadesapāḷi, sec. 48). 
This allowed later commentaries, namely the Saddhammapakāsinī attributed to Mahānāma, to accept the idea of 
svabhāva as introduced by the Paṭisambhidāmagga but deny that it was actually a shared property among dhammas and 
therefore better reconcile it with the notions of svabhāva and svalakṣaṇa that had been developed subsequently within 
the tradition.
61  Hence, of the 24 relations (Pali: paccaya) analyzed in the Abhidhamma texts, the Paṭṭhāna and Mahāpakararaṇa, 
similarity is conspicuously absent.  These relations are, however, of a particular sort, and perhaps better understood as 
psycho-physical conditions and the relations between conditions, causes and effects, rather than as relations in general.
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only legitimate object of knowledge, but this relation-dhamma would then fail to be about the two 
dhammas about which similarity was a means of knowing, and the similar feature would have to be 
abstracted away from the svalakṣaṇa which is, by the very nature of svalakṣaṇas, impossible.  Later 
Buddhist thinkers, particularly Dharmakīrti who will have our attention in chapter five, developed 
additional arguments against both relations, similarity, and analogical reasoning by attacking the idea of 
shared properties as “universals” (sāmānya or sāmānyalakṣaṇa) upon which he sees upamāna as 
depending.  Hence perceptions of similarity or talk that invokes relations or universals are in some 
sense ultimately misleading.
ANALOGY, CONCEPTS AND COMPUTATION 
Unsurprisingly, we find a close relationship between our ability to recognize similarity and use 
analogical reasoning and our use and understanding of language.  If language was to function as a 
source of information about the world, then it must be through testimony.  If testimony is to function as 
knowledge, and hence for language understanding to function as an epistemic faculty, it must not be a 
faulty means of knowing.  Therefore, the language of the speakers must be fixed in some way, perhaps 
by a mandate among speakers or through socialization, in order that they might refer to the same 
objects in order to communicate knowledge about them.  The differences in idiolect within a linguistic 
community make little difference so long as the language still serves to referentially coordinate 
statements to each other.  That is, the ability to coordinate between similarities in observation with 
similarity in linguistic ascription builds, in W. V. O. Quine's language, a conceptual schema.  As Quine 
notes, when we say “rabbit” we may be speaking of “a stage of a rabbit, an integral part of a rabbit, a 
rabbit fusion, or to where rabbithood is instantiated [sic],” but the practical differences in these 
concepts and usages are so subtle that knowledgeable speakers who take these different interpretations 
will not miscommunicate with each over the usage of the term “rabbit” since their idiolects exhibit 
22
isomorphic derivational structures and referential apparatuses, that is, they have a shared conceptual 
schema.62  Sameness of meaning might not be preserved among these different referents to the word 
“rabbit” but as long as similarity to a certain tolerance is preserved, we might never even notice the 
difference in the referent between rabbit fusions and rabbits.  It is in part because of the shared 
conceptual schema of socialized meaning that language is able to serve as a vehicle of knowledge.63  
This concept of “similarity to a certain tolerance” will be developed in subsequent chapters as key 
component of a theory of similarity.
As Quine points out, the ability to share in the accumulated knowledge of the linguistic 
community depends on the ability to pick out the same or similar objects and recognize the same or 
similar relationships among them through signifiers, whose conventional relationships we understand 
through language acquisition.  Therefore, the understanding of a language is the understanding of a 
number of similarity relations: it must exhibit similar properties that could provide evidence for beliefs 
about the world via testimony if the observationality of the phenomenon is such that someone else may 
have had such an experience of observing it and being able to recognize those similar properties or 
events.  It is not sameness; we hear words said differently, yet because these pronunciations are similar 
to a degree of tolerance, information is conveyed.  If the pronunciation is not similar enough, say 
because of a strong accent, then communication breaks down.  Language acquisition then, under 
Quine's theory of radical translation, then is just the coordination of similar utterances with similar 
stimuli. Therefore, language acquisition depends on our ability to recognize and coordinate similarities 
both in the world and linguistically.
This process has a digital analog.  In image-recognizing programs, such as the open-source 
software Pixy, which can be used to create object-tracking robots, or more sophisticated systems like 
62 Willard V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 52–53.
63 It is worth noting here that if we employ “similarity to a certain degree of tolerance” to coordinate word meanings rather 
than “sameness of meaning” we can avoid many of the classical problems of analyticity that Quine himself was so 
concerned about.
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SentiSight which have applications in “augmented” reality, similarity grounds the reasoning process.  
The process of computer learning and its application are illustrative.  Pixy is integrated with a camera 
and connects to a microprocessor; she operates by first “learning” an object by generating a virtual map 
of the object by assigning areas values according to hues.64  Hence, one teaches Pixy to identify a 
yellow ball by showing it the ball and telling it this is something you want it to remember.  Pixy runs an 
algorithm on what it “sees” 50 time per frame, and uses color statistics to determine if it is seeing an 
object-type that she has already learned; that is, she compares image-maps in her memory with present 
image-maps.65 Whenever something that looks like the ball (image-maps identification in shape and 
hue to a degree of tolerance ) are presented to Pixy, she then recognizes it; using the microprocessor 
and the information that Pixy has recognized something, the system of which Pixy is a component can 
be commanded to do something, such as approach the object or stay a certain distance from object.  
The ability to recognize the new object then is based on its memory of the object she learned.  
SentiSight is a much more powerful program, and can be taught thousands and thousands of 
objects and integrated into things like eyewear, yet it functions almost the same as Pixy.66  So one could 
present SentiSight with a tree leaf, and by comparing the similarity with the present leaf with those 
leaves it has previously been taught, SentiSight could determine the type of leaf and therefore the 
species of tree which it came from.  Perhaps the more modern example is its ability to detect the brand 
name and kind of soup you you just picked up in the market and inform you that it is cheaper at another 
shop.  
These examples from image recognition software, though, illustrate that the model of going 
from known to unknown is too impoverished.  When the villager sees another cow, which he has not 
seen before, he also recognizes it as a cow because he perceives its similarity. This knowledge does not 
64 “CMUcam: Open Source Programmable Embedded Color Vision Sensors,” accessed August 12, 2015, 
http://cmucam.org/.
65 “CMUcam: Open Source Programmable Embedded Color Vision Sensors.”
66 “Object Recognition for Robotics and Computer Vision,” accessed January 4, 2016, 
http://www.neurotechnology.com/sentisight.html.
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reduce to linguistic knowledge, as Mohima Chadha has pointed out in her discussion of the direct 
perception of universals in Nyāya thought.67  Citing Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ninth century), she notes that a 
man who sees a camel for the first time, but is not told what it is, will recognize the humped animal he 
encounters later as the same sort of thing despite not having any explicitly linguistic knowledge of it.68
Likewise, when one hears the word “cow” spoken by someone else, one can recognize it as the same 
word spoken by another person.  “Re-cognition” is not the movement from known to unknown, but the 
return to the known.  However, recognition depends on analogical structures as well—the ability to 
detect similarity between something being presented and something already presented.  Pixy already 
“knows” the yellow ball—it just takes an operation, in her case the running of an algorithm, for her to 
recognize this is an object she already knows.  Likewise, one suspects that there is some analogous 
structures and processes in human beings that produces recognition, whether recognizing this 
manuscript is the same you laid down, or that this man is your husband, or recognizing a stranger's 
perfume as that which your grandmother used to wear.  Such a suspicion is strengthened given case 
studies in which this ability in certain domains of knowledge is impaired by brain damage or that 
snakes and objects similar to snakes spawn particular recognition responses (perhaps explaining why 
mistaking a rope for a snake is the refrain example of mistaken perception in the India traditions—it 
seems like we are hardwired to recognize snake-like objects as snakes).69  Hence, it would seem that 
even discerning identity is a result of the ability to detect similarity and reason with it.
These examples of recognizing a cow as a cow in the case of the villager or a yellow ball as a 
67 Monima Chadha, “On Knowing Universals: The Nyāya Way,” Philosophy East and West 64, no. 2 (2014): 287–302.
68 Chadha, “On Knowing Universals,” 292.
69 There is a vast literature on this subject.  For a popular introduction, see Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Sandra Blakeslee, 
and Oliver W. Sacks, Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind (William Morrow New York, 
1998).  For more specific and more recent works that try to pinpoint some of these recognition processes, see Serge 
Brédart, Catherine Barsics, and Rick Hanley, “Recalling Semantic Information about Personally Known Faces and 
Voices,” European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 21, no. 7 (November 1, 2009): 1013–21, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09541440802591821. or Dirk T. Leube et al., “Successful Episodic Memory Retrieval of Newly 
Learned Faces Activates a Left Fronto-Parietal Network.,” Brain Research. Cognitive Brain Research 18, no. 1 
(December 2003): 97–101.  Quan Van Le et al., “Pulvinar Neurons Reveal Neurobiological Evidence of Past Selection 
for Rapid Detection of Snakes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 47 (November 19, 2013): 
19000–5, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1312648110.
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known object for Pixy also provide us with another way of speaking of analogical reasoning: as a 
process of mapping.  Pixy and similar software, like facial or fingerprint recognition software, work by 
comparing two image-maps, pixel by pixel, and determining if they are similar to a specified degree of 
tolerance and on what parameters.  The villager could be described as comparing the mental image of a 
cow from memory to the forest animal in front of him, and seeing if the images map onto each other.  
There is another sort of mapping, though, that can be be used (analogously) as a way of understanding 
additional dimensions of analogical reasoning.
We are all familiar with the idea that analogical arguments are inductive because while the 
premises could be true, the conclusion could still be false, and as we saw, this had been observed by the 
classical Greek philosophers.  This idea is one to which we will return, but most will uncritically accept 
this as a truism heard in each introductory logic class. 
In terms of computation, we can elaborate on this difference as a difference in a rule firing and a 
mapping.70  In rule-based systems (think deduction), a rule fires when its conditions are met: if yes, 
then do X, if no, then do nothing.  So there may be a rule, that “If X is a dog, then it barks.”  Given that 
Marmaduke is a dog, a rule fires that tells us, “ Marmaduke barks.”  In a mapping-based system 
(sometimes called a “representational system”), let us assume that this rule is not available.71  Instead, 
we have a representation of  Marmaduke, which includes information like “Marmaduke is a dog,” and 
“Marmaduke barks.”  
Now let us input into this system that “Snoopy is a dog.”  Now our system can infer, “Snoopy is 
like Marmaduke in that they are both dogs.”  Now we have some justification, albeit weak, to make 
inferences like “Snoopy barks.”  If we know many things that are dogs, and if we have many strong 
associations of the qualities of a dog, we will be safer in making many inferential associations with 
Snoopy, the name, with the general term of which Snoopy is a species.  Shared respects becomes a 
70 Keith J. Holyoak and Paul R. Thagard, “A Computational Model of Analogical Problem Solving,” in Similarity and 
Analogical Reasoning, ed. Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 246.
71 Holyoak and Thagard, 246.
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basis for inferring other probable shared respects.  As respects become more restrictive in their 
conjunctions, we narrow down the possibility of particulars matching such respects.  If all dogs we 
know bark, and we know plenty of dogs, we have good reason to think that Snoopy, if a dog, barks.  
That inductive process is a result of analogy, and one more akin to the classical description of moving 
from the “known to the unknown.”  It is inductive because our inferred shared respects could be wrong. 
If, for example, all the dogs we know are like Marmaduke in that they are enormous, and we infer the 
Snoopy, a beagle, is also enormous, then we would be in error although the inference might have been 
justified as being inductively strong.72  
This concept of mapping also leads us towards another way in which analogical reasoning and 
similarity it so tightly bound to language use.  As observed by Quine, the ability to recognize and 
coordinate similarities (similar utterances in response to similar stimuli) provides us with one model of 
language use, as in the case of radical translation and Quine's “meaning behaviorism.”73  Robert 
Brandom challenges us to reconsider this picture of language acquisition and mastery by asking us to 
consider how a language user under such a a theory is different from a measuring instrument, such as a 
thermometer.74 What are the differences between such an instrument, he asks, and an “observer who 
noninferentially acquires beliefs or makes claims about environing temperatures and colors?”75  
Brandom identifies the difference as one of understanding, and this difference marks the divide 
between responsive classification and conceptual classification. He writes
72 There is something to be said with this computational model of mapping and the movement in the formal Nyāya five 
step argument of the from the udāharaṇa step, or demonstration of concomitance (“The dog Marmaduke is large, to the  
upanaya step, the application of the mapping to the present object (“Like Marmaduke, Snoopy is a dog”).  Stephen H. 
Phillips points out although the five step argument operates deductively, the premises are arrived at inductively, and I 
would hold the relation between the udāharaṇa and upanaya rests of a similarity claim (Stephen H. Phillips, Classical 
Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of “New Logic” (Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1997), 55.).  
The fact that we cannot survey all instances of dogs however tempers our reasoning with fallibilism, just as observed by 
Aristotle as well as by Vācaspati Miśra (Prior Analytics 68b15-68b29; Karl H. Potter, “Relations,” in The Encyclopedia 
of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to 
Gangesa, vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, 1977), 67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x1d1b.7.).
73 W. V. Quine et al., The Boolos Panel (Philosophy International, 1994), 00:01:12-00:08:20.
74 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press, 
1998), 88.
75 Brandom, 88.
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 . . .  the difference between merely responsive classification and conceptual 
classification—is their mastery of the practices of giving and asking for reasons, in 
which their responses can play a role as justifying beliefs and claims. To grasp or 
understand a concept is, according to Sellars, to have practical mastery over the 
inferences it is involved in—to know, in the practical sense of being able to distinguish, 
what follows from the applicability of a concept, and what it follows from.76
While inferentialism has much more to say about meaning, conceptualization and conceptual 
classification, the ability to apply the known (Marmaduke) to the unknown (Snoopy) through known 
and inferred similarities girds an enormous amount of our practical everyday lives.  Conceptual 
classification plays just as vital a role in our everyday lives as it does in philosophy.  Recognizing, for 
example, when a known rule holds in a new situation requires the recognition of the relevant 
similarities needed to invoke the necessary inferences, such as stopping at a stop sign at a four way stop 
one has never been to before, or understanding how an elevator, which one has never been in, works 
based on previous experiences with other elevators.  Conceptualization involves understanding the 
inferential relations that exist between concepts, so that one is capable of inferring from “Snoopy is a 
dog” to “Snoopy barks.”  This process, which Brandom develops in his theory of inferentialism, can be 
understood as an application of analogical reasoning.
Hence, we can see that analogical reasoning covers a wide range of the human epistemological 
experience.  The thread, the similarity that runs through them all, is the dependence on recognizing 
similarities whether through the use of paradigms in education, purely mechanical computation like 
Pixy and her image-maps, to making inferences about the features of new particulars like previously 
unknown dogs or elevators.  Given that all of these ways of knowing and reasoning rest on knowing 
and reasoning with similarity, an explanation of what is the nature of similarity should illuminate them 
76 Brandom, 89.  Italics in original.
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and contribute something to our understanding of the metaphysical grounding that they have; what 
makes true similarity claims that are analogical arguments.  And given that it is desirable to have an 
understanding of the metaphysical grounding of ways of knowing and reasoning, undertaking the work 
to explore and explain the metaphysics of similarity is justifiable.  
WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR ANALOGICAL REASONING?
The problem is essentially this: if some analogical arguments (arguments depending on 
similarity claims) are true and contentful, what must be the case?   These analogical arguments range 
from simple similarity claims such as, “The rose is like the carnation,” to more complex forms such as, 
“A fish is to a school like a tree is to a forest,” “or, “The Theban war on their neighbors, the Phocians, 
was evil; so, too, would an Athenian War on the Thebans be evil,” or to non-verbal analogies such as 
that presented above..  The present work argues that in order for analogical arguments to be true, a 
number of presuppositions are required. These presuppositions are:
1. The existence of relations (similarity is a relation), or the reduction of relations to non-
relational terms
2. An ability to individuate relations (picking out “similar” from “smaller than”)
3. Some fact that entails the similarity relation obtains (the “truthmaker”)
4. Non-triviality (the statements are contentful and not vacuous)
5. That there are well-formed similarity claims
6. An ability to be aware of or attuned to the relation in order to recognize whether it obtains or
not
Any satisfactory account of similarity claims must also be able to give an account of these six
conditions, or show why one of these conditions is in fact not necessary (we will see in the next 
chapter, many will deny the first condition; subsequent chapters will show objections to other 
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conditions, such as the third and the sixth). The implication is that when one invokes analogical 
reasoning, one owes a metaphysical and epistemological account for these six conditions. 
The task at hand is therefore an ambitious one, but also tempered by restraint.  The goal is to 
elucidate and make explicit these assumptions we must make if we are committed to at least some 
similarity claims being both truth and informative.  The bulk of the work which follows will be devoted 
to exploring the metaphysics of similarity, beginning with the metaphysics of relations and then 
moving to the specific relation of similarity.  We will discover, however, that the very notions of 
relationality and similarity are bound up with one another.  Next, it takes up the task of connecting it to 
the epistemology of similarity.  This is done through exploring the twin metaphysical and 
epistemological debates regarding similarity and analogy in the Sanskritic traditions and the 
epistemological and hermeneutical debates within the Islamic jurisprudential tradition.  In the end, this 
work argues for a virtue-theoretic account for the intellectual virtue of analogical reasoning, which we 
might think of as similarity or relation sensitivity.  It will be argued that such a capacity can be 
developed and cultivated by training, that analogies can lead to truth and knowledge, and therefore the 
wisdom seeker should develop these capacities.  Unfortunately, though, many pressing questions 
encountered along the way must be set aside including fascinating areas of exploration such as the role 
of analogy in literature, aesthetics and rhetoric.  
Furthermore, there is emerging a flourishing study of similarity and recognition in cognitive and 
neuroscience as well as computer science, and often their understanding of just want constitutes basic 
notions such as “recognition” and “rationality” are at odds with one another.  Sadly, there is not the 
space here to explore these debates in any details.  The present text is very self consciously meant to 
serve as a foundational work that will have applications beyond itself, providing a basis for future 
questions rather than providing all of the answers on a topic that is literally implicated everywhere.  
Unpacking each of these above six assumptions means that considerable attention and effort 
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must be paid to ideas that are not strictly considerations of similarity qua similarity, but instead more 
general problems related to the ontology of relations.  In the following chapter, we shall see two 
approaches that attempt to subsume the categories of relations under other ontological categories, 
universals or tropes.   The former is the idea that properties exist independently of their instantiations, 
as universals which explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance through the appeal to non-
mental entities, and such universals are generally contrasted with individuals in which universals inhere 
or partake in some manner or another.  The theory of tropes proposed the idea there are property 
instances that are individual but in some way similar to other property instances in such a way as they 
are “are abstract yet they are not universal . . .  particular yet they are not concrete.”77  It should be 
clear from the discussion that follows that in general the dialogues about relations and the dialogues 
about similarity have been somewhat disconnected, particularly in the western tradition, with most 
philosophers assuming, it seems, a theory of properties will provide answers to the relation of similarity 
without recourse to an explanation of relations, or that a theory of properties will produce, as a by-
product of sorts, a workable theory of relations due, in part at least, to conflating a theory of properties 
with a theory of predication.  If this work accomplishes nothing else, it should demonstrate that this 
assumption is erroneous, and that a solution to the problem of properties will not precipitate a solution 
to the problem of relations.  
77 Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Tropes,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2014, 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entriesropes/.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF ANALOGY I: RELATIONS AS 
UNIVERSALS OR TROPES
“There is no term which is so absolute or so detached that it does not involve relations and is not such  
that a complex analysis of it would lead to other things.”  78
Analogical reasoning, in all its forms, posit a similarity relation that holds between two different 
entities.  Similarity is a relation that is predicated by the two-place predicate “x is similar to y”  or “x 
resembles y.”  Many people will accept this uncritically, although there is at least one proponent of the 
view that any relation can be reduced down to monadic properties, and hence we can do away with 
relations, while others will hold that even though similarity does not reduce to monadic properties, we 
can do away with relations as ontologically distinct from their relata.79 The prima facie notion of 
similarity is simply having a shared property, and that “x and y share property F” is a paraphrase of the 
similarity claim “x is similar to y in virtue of F.”  Both invoke a relation claim, one of sharing and one 
of similarity.  But note that they are not equivalent: we can imagine that two things can be similar, and 
without their similarity coming from a shared property.  For example, we can imagine two things being 
similar because of the very fact that they lack some property without thinking that there are negative 
properties (for example, the property of not being spherical).  A matchbox and an office-table can be 
similar because neither of them is spherical or made of cheese.
You have likely already recognized the prima facie view as that of the realist.  The realist is 
committed to the existence of universals.  MacLeod and Rubenstein have given a helpful generic 
definition of how universals are usually conceived:
Universals are a class of mind-independent entities, usually contrasted with individuals 
78 G. W. F. von Leibniz, P. Remnant, and J. Bennett, Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 228:10.
79 Milton Fisk, “Relatedness without Relations,” Noûs, 1972, 139–51.  
     E. Jonathan Lowe, “There Are (Probably) No Relations,” in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. Anna Marmodoro and 
David Yates, 1 edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 100–112.
Peter Simons, “External Relations, Causal Coincidence, and Contingency,” in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. Anna 
Marmodoro and David Yates, 1 edition (New york, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 113–26.
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(or so-called "particulars"), postulated to ground and explain relations of qualitative 
identity and resemblance among individuals. Individuals are said to be similar in virtue 
of sharing universals. An apple and a ruby are both red, for example, and their common 
redness results from sharing a universal. If they are both red at the same time, the 
universal, red, must be in two places at once. This makes universals quite different from 
individuals . . .80
It is the simplicity of the realist view that makes it so attractive at first blush.  There are entities, 
universals, which are instantiated by two particulars, and because of the existence of this same 
universal in two particulars, a relation holds between them: the relation of similarity.  So, when one 
says that a firetruck is like a tomato what one must be referring to is some state of affairs which has 
two particulars, a universal, and some relation standing in some appropriate arrangement to ground or 
make true the proposition, “A firetruck is like a tomato with respect to its color.”  Analogies, then, 
commit us to at least three types of entities under this view: particulars, universals, and relations.   In so 
far as there can be a disagreement about whether a color is a universal or a particular trope/quality, a 
similarity relation like the above might be more accurately be said to consist of particulars, properties, 
and a relation.
As early analytic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell were always eager to show us, what at 
first blush seems simple often hides dizzying complexity just beneath the surface.  And there are many 
familiar complexities which we could take up, such as the problems of exemplification or the other 
classic objections to the realist's view.  As we  take up some of these objections and a more critical 
examination of the realist's commitment to universals as they relate to similarity claims in this and the 
following chapters, we will see that many of the problems for the realist are accounting for the role of 
relations.  Likewise, in our present considerations of analogy, the most pressing seems to be the 
80 Mary C. MacLeod and Eric M. Rubenstein, “Universals,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed February 21, 
2016, http://www.iep.utm.edu/universa/.
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question, “What is a relation?”  In order to understand the metaphysics of similarity qua relation, one 
must first understand the metaphysics of relations; this is still a murky area.  As Peter Simons has 
remarked, “The metaphysics of relations (unlike their logic) is still in its infancy.”81  It is only once we 
have more clarity into what are relations can we return to the question of what is similarity, if it is 
indeed is a relation, and what metaphysical system or systems can best account for it.  This approach 
represents an inversion of the traditional approach, which has put forward a theory of properties, and 
has then tried to accommodate a theory of relations within in.  
This chapter constitutes a primarily negative project: it argues that taking relations as universals 
or tropes results in too many metaphysical difficulties and aporias.  Realists and trope theorists about 
relations consistently fall back on primitives or brute facts not because those facts seem to lie at the end 
of analysis, but because theorists fail to see how to resolve the problems resulting from treating 
relations as universals or tropes.  Part of this problem emerges from the need for relations to relate 
properties or property instances to concrete particulars, and the difficulties of doing so when relations 
are species of the same type as properties or property instances: that is, if relations are meant to relate 
properties to particulars, and relations are themselves treated as properties, it is unclear how relations 
can do this work which properties themselves could not (if relations are just properties).  In trying to 
achieve ontological parsimony, they sacrifice ideological parsimony: in concerning themselves with 
Occam's Razor they cut themselves on Leibniz's.  The subsequent two chapters take up the challenge of 
a theory of relations, attempting to avoid some of the pitfalls of taking relations as of the same type as 
properties and providing a general theory of relations capable of providing a foundation for the 
explication of one relation in particular, the similarity relation.
81 Simons, “Relations and Truthmaking,” 199.
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ARE RELATIONS UNIVERSALS?
There are many who would disagree with this characterization of the realist position and its 
commitment to three entities as shown above.  Michael Loux has remarked somewhat uncritically that 
relations are a type of universal.  This seems to reflect a widely accepted view that can be traced all the 
way back to Plato's Phaedo.82   Relations are understood under this view as dyadic or polyadic 
properties, captured by a two- or n-place predicate  Hence we should think “taller-than-ness” is a 
universal just as we think “tallness” is a universal.83  Bertrand Russell saw accepting similarity (or 
resemblance) as a universal as a necessary move to remove what he saw as a vicious regress, but also 
as something readily apparent (to him) given relations' repeatability.  In developing his critique of 
resemblance nominalism, he wrote [italics added]:
If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose some 
particular patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a 
triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the 
resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are many white things, 
the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things; and this is 
the characteristic of a universal. It will be useless to say that there is a different 
resemblance for each pair, for then we shall have to say that these resemblances 
resemble each other, and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a 
universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal.  And having 
being forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent 
difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of such universals as 
82 M. J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 2006), 20–21.   Plato, “Phaedo,” in Complete Works  
of Plato, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 74a-74b. 
83Here we should listen to the sage advice of David Lewis among others who reminds us that we should not think that a 
theory of properties will provide us with a theory of predication as well; predication and properties are not the same 
philosophical problem.  While it can be difficult to sort these two problems out, and while insights in one problem often 
carry over into the other, we have to be aware a solution to one may not entail a solution to the other.  See David Lewis, 
“New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 4 (1983): 352.
35
whiteness and triangularity.84
Having already accepted one relation as a universal, a spirit of ontological economy and the desire to 
avoid a suspected regress then motivates us to explain all relations as universals.  They are like any 
other universal except that they require more than one particular in order to be exemplified.  Hence in 
the explanation of the analogy, “A firetruck is like a tomato” we need to posit the existence of just two 
types of entities: particulars and universals.  This explanation, though, is nearly startling because that 
very difference—the difference between a property, which can be had by a single concrete particular, 
and a relation which can only exist “between” two more more particulars—is so enormous.  If you do 
not find this position attractive, then you are in good company.  
Śrī Vallabha of Mithilā, an early 12th century Vaiśeṣika philosopher, introduced a definition of 
similarity that would be adopted by many following philosophers, perhaps most notably the late 12th 
century Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, generally credited with having founded the Navya-Nyāya or “New 
Logic” school.  In Vallabha's Nyāyalīlāvatī, the only one of his works known to survive, he provides an 
analysis of similarity and is careful to distinguish it from universals.   A universal (like whiteness) 
inheres in an substrate (substance, or dravya), and we can predicate of it that “It is white.”  But this is 
not so in the case of similarity.85   In predicating similarity, we must predicate what it is similar to, it's 
counter-correlate.86 But similarity is the result of an universal inhering in two different 
objects/substrates.87  If it were not, similarity could inhere in a single object and we could then 
predicate of an object, “That is similar” without needing to say what it is similar to.  Similarity would 
then be a property itself, not the relation of two objects having some common property.  Alternatively, 
84 Bertrand Russell, “The World of Universals,” in Properties, ed. D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 48.  
85 One could, just to make the argument more transparent, use the example of a universal that in fact inheres in only one 
particular although it is in principle repeatable--such as the universal "passenger pigeon" that inhered/was exemplified 
only by Martha, the last of that species in the Cincinati Zoo until her death in 1914.  Errol Fuller, The Passenger Pigeon 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 109.
86 Vallabha, Nyāya Līlāvatī  of Sri Vallabhacharya With the Commentaries of Vardhamanopadhyaya, Sankara Misra and 
Bhagiratha Thakkura, ed. Dhundhiraja Sastri, vol. 1 (Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series Office, 1934), 75–78, 
https://archive.org/stream/Nyaya-Lilavati.of.Sri.Vallabhacharya#page/n25/mode/2up.
87 Vallabha, 1:76.
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in perceiving a quality (a universal), it is not required that I should have to perceive something else, 
some “counter-correlate,” in order to observe the universal.88  Rather, similarity just is the presence of a 
universal in more than one substrate.89 Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya gives a remarkably similar argument 
himself  in his debate with the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka who held similarity, while not a universal, was 
a distinct ontological category on par with universals.90   Hence it would be a confusion, these 
philosophers hold, to think that similarity is a universal.  To do so risks running into the worst of the 
problems of  realism, so innocently suggested in Parmenides 130b when it is asked, “And do you 
believe that Similarity itself is something separately from the Similarity which we possess?”91  The 
critique can be generalized to relations: universals do not require a counter-correlate, but at least some 
relations do.
Clearly, part of this debate stems from a difference in understanding what is the essential nature 
of a universal and of a relation.  For Russell, repeatability is the mark of a universal.  For Vallabha and 
Gaṅgeśa, it is the ability to inhere in more than one substance-particular at the same time.  For Russell, 
this means that whatever is repeatable is a universal, including the similarity relation and all other 
relations.  Indeed, it was this misunderstanding, claimed Russell, that led Berkeley and Hume into so 
much error in that “they only thought of qualities, and altogether ignored relations as universals.”92  For 
Gaṅgeśa, since the similarity relation cannot inhere in a single substance, it is something very different 
from a universal.  That we find the contemporary “analytic” realism about universals, such as Russell 
and many others, disagreeing about the nature of universals with the Vaiśeṣika or Navya-Nyāya should 
be unsurprising.  As Will Rasmussen has eloquently stated in his discussions of the differences between 
Plato's forms (eidos) and the Nyāya's universals (sāmānya), “We realize how [they] . . . are not so much 
88 Vallabha, 1:77.
89 Vallabha, 1:76.
90  See Stephen Phillips translation of the Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-viracitas tattva-cintā-manau upamāna-khaṇḍaḥ (pages 105-
133) in Stephen H. Phillips, Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyaya School (New York: 
Routledge, 2013). These debates within the Indian tradition will be explored more fully in Chapter 5.
91    Cooper and Hutchinson, Complete Works of Plato, bk. Parmenides, 130b.
92 Russell, “The World of Universals,” 58. 
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talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different 
things.”93  Still, we should not let this difference stop us from the insight that Russell's “relations as 
universals” need not be the de facto position of the realist.  This disagreement about the nature of 
universals illustrates, too, a second important point of disagreement, and it is critical to see that the 
concern here with Russell and with Vallabha is not a concern merely with similarity sui generis but 
with relations in general.  
Whether or not we accept the realism of  Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa, we should agree with them that 
in fact relations are not universals.  First, we should not find it problematic that relations, or the 
resemblance relation in particular, may resemble each other.  Second, we would find a problem in 
determining the truth of relational predicates if relations were universals.  A third objection which can 
also be overcome is that known as Russell's Regress of Resemblance, but it will be addressed in a 
following chapter after we are in a better position is see the larger stakes given the regress of 
resemblance is aimed not just at demonstrating that relations are universals, but instead aimed at 
countering nominalist explanations, particularly resemblance nominalism.  
If resemblance relations, or any other relation for that matter, are particular entities (not 
particulars in the language of the realist but simply individual, non-repeatable ontological entities), 
then it should be unsurprising that they are able to resemble each other.  If we say that the state of 
affairs of this manuscript being in front of you includes a particular relation of “being in front of,” and 
that this relation has the same particularity of the manuscript or other entities which we can individuate 
into particulars, then we should expect that, like those other particular individuals, relations may 
resemble each other.  
If we say that the fish is to a school as a tree is to a forest, it would be appropriate to say the 
relation holding between the fish and school and between the tree and forest are indeed similar in that 
93 Will Rasmussen, “The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 37, no. 3 (2009): 232.
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they are both relations of composition: they both express a relation between the two relata by which 
one relatum is composed by the other.  Without the ability to discern this similarity in the relations, one 
could not make sense of the analogy.  Likewise, to say that the relationship of similarity in respect to 
color between the tomato and firetruck and the similarity in respect to color of the ocean and the sky 
are similar in that they are both relations of similarity in respect to color does not seem illogical or 
extravagant.
If that is the case, and relations may enter into resemblance relations with each other, then it 
seems perfectly sensible to think that individual similarity relations can be particular relations, and that 
the relation of the manuscript being before you is similar to the relation of the tea cup being before you. 
As such, relations can be grouped and conceptualized based on the similarities that hold between the 
relations themselves, however we decide to describe those similarities.  It would seem that this ability 
to sort relations (as well as properties) into kinds or classes depends on relations (as well as properties) 
having properties themselves.  This debate is of course the debate about the intrinsic properties of 
properties.94   We will have more to say about this debate when we turn our attention in the following 
chapters to the similarity relation and the idea of set formation particularly in Chapter Four.
Furthermore, the relation itself cannot instantiate itself, for we should remember Vallabha, and 
recall that relations require at least two entities—they do not exist independently, and so a single 
relation cannot be an instantiation of itself except in rare cases where a relation is self-reflexive (relates 
itself back to itself in the same way that it relates other things, such as the identity relation which is, of 
94 For some of the dimensions of this debate, see   David Lewis, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 68, no. 7 (1971): 203–11, https://doi.org/10.2307/2024902.;  Andy Egan, “Second-Order Predication and 
the Metaphysics of Properties,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 48–66, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/713659803.; and  Derek Nelson Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” Philosophers’ 
Imprint, November 2011, http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/4044.  
Intrinsic properties of properties seem vital to perform just this categorization, and might be critical to determining, for 
example, when any two tropes are in fact members of the same class (hence, the same property).  As we will see in the 
following chapter, some have appealed to such intrinsic properties of properties to ground a primitive resemblance 
relation.  See both Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” and its follow-up, David Lewis, “Against Structural 
Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 1 (March 1, 1986): 25–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408612342211.
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course, identical to itself).  Most relations are precluded from instantiating themselves or serving as one 
of their own relata by their very nature, demonstrated in their expression as a two- or n-place 
predicates.  This is certainly the case with similarity, as will be painstakingly demonstrated in the 
following chapter.  By comparing two relations  that we found similar, there would have to be some 
property of the relations that justified claiming they were similar.  If this was possible (and prima facie, 
it is), then similarity is a relation that may hold between relations.  
Yet, just as everything stands in the identity relation to itself, so too does everything stand in a 
similarity relation to itself given everything is similar to itself; similarity is a reflexive relation.  Yet it is 
only in its similarity to some other similar relation it can be individuated, but yet that could be in the 
relation the relation has to itself.95  It is not self-exemplifying, but rather contains within itself the tools 
for individuation (not so with any other relation except perhaps identity and equality, to be discussed in 
Chapter Four).  Yet, given most relations cannot self-exemplify (for example, “heavier than,” 
“equidistant from,” “beloved by,”), they hence avoid the familiar “third-man problems.”  There is no 
danger of a vicious regress merely on the postulate that relations may hold between relations.
Concluding that relations may be similar to each other does not demonstrate Russell is incorrect 
in concluding relations are universals.  Although it may undercut his objection, one could still maintain 
the following line of argumentation: the teacup and the manuscript are both in front of you because the 
same relationship holds between you and the manuscript and you and the teacup, not merely the same 
type of relation (the type being conceptualized on the basis on the similarity holding between the two 
particular relations).  Hence, it would be better to consider them as universals rather that some second 
kind of ontological entity, relations.  The real difficulty enters for an account that considers relations as 
universals when we consider an objection from the standpoint of truthmaking.  The difficulties 
associated with relations and “making true” are not confined to realism about relations, however, but 
95 Chapters Three and Four develop a detailed argument to support this theory of individuating relations.  The reader is 
kindly asked to accept this as a promissory note until that time.
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are also associated with the view that relations are tropes.
THE TRUTHMAKER THESIS
The truthmaker thesis, or TT in what follows, is the claim that whatever exists makes true 
whatever propositions are in fact true.  It supposedly matches a common hunch that, in the words of 
David Lewis, 
 . . . the most promising . . . among the grand theories of truth are the theories that 
somehow require what's true to depend on the way the world of existing things is, or on 
the way some part of that world is.96
TT exists in various formulations across the philosophical canon, and has been endorsed in one form or 
another by a number of philosophers ranging from Aristotle (“To say of what is that it is not, or of what 
is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”97), 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (“ . . . the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not 
the case” and, “If an elementary proposition is true, the atomic fact exists; if it is false the atomic fact 
does not exist”98), Bertrand  Russell (“When I speak of a fact . . . I mean the kind of thing that makes a 
proposition true or false”99), J. L. Austin ("When a statement is true, there is, of course, a state of affairs 
which makes it true"100) to Kit Fine (“one requires not merely that each true proposition be made true 
by a fact in the sense that necessarily if the fact exists the proposition is true, but also that the truth of 
the particular proposition thereby be explained”101) and perhaps most devotedly by the late David 
96 David Lewis, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making.,” Nous 35, no. 4 (December 2001): 603.
97 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1011b25 
98 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. K. Ogden (New York, NY: Cosimo Classics, 2007), secs. 
1.12; 4.25.
99 Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume 8: The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914-19, ed. John G. Slater, 1st edition (London ; Boston: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1986), 163.
100 J. L. Austin, “Truth,” in Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, 3rd ed., Clarendon Paperbacks 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), n.p., 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001/acprof-9780192830210.
101 Kit Fine, “First-Order Modal Theories III: Facts,” Synthese 53, no. 1 (1982): 69.
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Armstrong.102  
One simple formulation of TT is: that for any proposition P,  T is the truthmaker of proposition 
P iff "T exists" entails "P is true." This formulation may seem little more than a correspondence theory 
of truth, but in fact TT is not just the correspondence theory in new clothes, as TT is not a theory of 
being true, but instead the thesis that every truth claim has an ontological commitment.  In that the 
correspondence theory of truth is, at minimum, supposed to be an account of being true (rather than 
perhaps making true) there is a difference, although some of the familiar problems of correspondence 
theory will also have versions that impinge upon TT.103  
TT is, however, unworkable in what might be considered the “naive version” given above.  For 
example, we can easily demonstrate that without reforms, TT fails to be true if it insists all true 
statements have truthmakers.  First of all, it does not seem at all clear just what exists that makes TT 
itself true!  As if this was not damaging enough, we can easily demonstrate that this naive version of 
TT fails to offer a universal account of truth making.  For example, 
Premise a1: For any proposition P,  T is the truthmaker of proposition P iff "T exists" 
entails "P is true."
Premise a2: All true propositions have truthmakers.
Premise a3: Jarrod's older brother does not exist.
Premise a4: Nothing exists to make it true, “Jarrod's older brother does not exist” but 
rather the lack of something's existence makes it true that “Jarrod's older brother does 
not exist.”
Conclusion 1a: Therefore, Premise a1 or Premise a2 is false.
Simply put, as a thesis TT fails without reforms, and the truthmaker for TT and negative existential 
claims are not the only problematic areas.  That being said, it is correct that many true propositions 
102 David M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
103 Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology (New York: Clarendon Press, 2007), 15.
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depend on “what is” to make them true.  For example, if I say “There is a black cat in that room” the 
proposition “There is a black cat in that room” is true iff there is a black cat in that room.  If there fails 
to be a black cat in the room, then the proposition is false.  
RELATIONS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
Given this understanding of truthmaking, 
understanding relations as universals is problematic. 
Consider the following illustration: “The cup is on top of the 
desk.”  Wittgenstein observed that “Every statement about 
complexes can be analyzed into a statement about their 
constituent parts, and into those propositions which 
completely describe the complexes.”104    If relations are 
universals, then they exist independently of their 
instantiations.  This means that the cup, the desk, and the 
universal of the relation “on top of” all exist and constitute the proposition.  Given this, the truth of 
“The cup is on top of the desk” is made true by the existence of the cup, the desk, and the relation as a 
universal.  But note that given the existence of these elements, that “the desk is on top of the cup” 
seems to be made true as well.  We have a complex--the cup, the desk, and the universal of the relation 
“on top of”--that seem to make true both propositions, “The cup is on top of the desk,” and, “The desk 
is on top of the cup.” 
Clearly, however, it is not the case that the desk is on top of the cup.  The mere existence of “on 
top of” does not indicate what is on top of what.  Yet, the universal “on top of” obtains regardless of 
whether the table is on top of the cup or the cup is on top of the table.  The directionality of certain 
104 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, sec. 2.0201.
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relations, that is asymmetric relations, runs against the grain of relations existing independently of their 
instantiations.  Given the existence of the relation as a universal, apart from its instantiations, the 
application of the TT thesis leads to weird results.  Consider the following argument: 
Premise b1: Relations are universals.
Premise b2: Universals exist independently of their instances.
Premise b3: “In front of” is a relation.
Conclusion b1: Therefore, “in front of” exists independently of its instances.
Premise b4: You exist.
Premise b5: The manuscript exists.
Premise b6: TT
Conclusion b2: Therefore, the proposition “You are in front of the manuscript” is true.
This argument seems strange enough: that just given the existence of these three entities, two 
particulars and a universal, we can get the truth of the proposition in Conclusion b2.  If we add another 
premise, we can make the weirdness of TT along with the claim that relations are universals more 
apparent.
Premise 7b: Salmon Rushdie exists.
Conclusion 3b: Therefore, the proposition “You are in front of Salmon Rushdie” is true.
We can try to resolve this by rejecting a premise, and the two prime candidates seem to the first 
conclusion, Conclusion 1b, which gives us the independent existence of “in front of” apart from any 
instance of “in front of” and the sixth premise, that is TT.  If we reject the latter, however, we are 
burdened with offering some alternative account of truthmaking for the proposition.  One can approach 
the argument without rejecting TT but instead argue that TT has just been incorrectly applied here.  The 
individual who wishes to rescue Conclusion 1b will do something just like this by arguing that although 
TT is true (or at least workable in this instance), it is not the independent existence of the elements of a 
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proposition that make the proposition true.  If that were the case, then “I am blue and Salmon Rushdie 
is a fish” would be equally as plausible since, assuming realism, blueness and fishness also exist, as do 
myself and Salmon Rushdie.  
The point here is pretty simple: the two particulars and the universal-property-version of the 
relation together are not sufficient condition for the truth of the relational proposition. The set that 
contains these four elements, myself, the British Indian novelist, and the two universals, does not 
ensure that the universals inhere in either myself or the novelist, something else needs to determine 
which universal is in which, and this “being in” seems to be irreducibly a relation, not a relational 
property or universal. Atomic elements (particular and abstract), which can only be named, are not 
truthmakers but rather it is facts or states of affairs—on configurations of atomic elements—that are 
truthmakers.  That is to say, echoing Wittgenstein, the world is the totality of facts, not of things.105  As 
Armstrong explains, 
Why do we need to recognize states of affairs? Why not recognize simply particulars, 
universals (divided into properties and relations), and, perhaps, instantiation? The 
answer appears by considering the following point. If a is F, then it is entailed that a 
exists and that the universal F exists. However, a could exist, and F could exist, and yet 
it fail to be the case that a is F (F is instantiated, but instantiated elsewhere only). a’s 
being F involves something more than a and F. It is no good simply adding the 
fundamental tie or nexus of instantiation to the sum of a and F. The existence of a, of 
instantiation, and of F does not amount to a’s being F. The something more must be a’s 
being F – and this is a state of affairs.106
Lists of elements, of particulars and universals, just do not have the type of unity that is required to be a 
legitimate state of affairs or play the truthmaker role.  And, with the revision that truthmakers are states 
105 Wittgenstein, sec. 1.1.
106 David M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Focus Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 89.
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of affairs, such weird results as above are seemingly ruled out.  In fact, some have presented TT as a 
theory that should have a sort of intuitive appeal to realists.  Armstrong states elsewhere, for example, 
My hope is that philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the 
idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth [on] something ‘outside’ it, in 
virtue of which it is true.107
Part of the reason for that appeal is because of the radically different natures of particulars and 
universals.  The participation of one in the other requires some sort of “metaphysical cement” to bring 
the two together to borrow a phrase from Dobb.108 
While more true to the spirit of TT and other truthmaker theories, invoking facts or states of 
affairs does not resolve the question of the role of relations as universals in truthmaking, but rather puts 
us back in the position we started.  This problem stems from invoking relations within facts' or states of 
affairs' definitions or explanations: states of affairs are various described as being composed of 
elements (such as particulars and properties) or being arrangements of elements.  States of affairs are 
variously described by Wittgenstein as “combinations” and “configurations,”109 by David Armstrong as 
“structures” that are “composed” of non-relational parts and relations110 and elsewhere as constituted by 
“properties and relations” which "are, of course, universals”,111 and by Sally Haslanger as a “relation 
between an object and a property.”112  
Combinations, configurations, compositions, and relations are all relational.  Hence an 
explanation of what a state of affairs as truthmakers for propositions is, and what role relations can play 
within them, demands that we understand how states of affairs are being “formed” by relations.  If we 
treat the relation that “composes,” “structures,” “configures” or “relates” to form states of affairs as 
107 Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers, 7.
108 Dodd, “Farewell to States of Affairs,” 50.
109 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, secs. 2.0272; 2.01.
110 David M. Armstrong, “In Defence of Structural Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 1 (March 1, 
1986): 85, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408612342261.
111 David M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20.
112 Sally Haslanger, “Persistence Through Time,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. Michael Loux and Dean W 
Zimmerman, 1 edition (Oxford University Press, 2005), 343.
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universals, then the relation is always the same.  Hence, all states of affairs are composed of the same 
relation.  This theory then leaves only the constituents of the states of affairs, the elements, as 
differentiating one state of affairs from one another. Surely this theory is a winner.
But this leaves us with the aporia that (A) given the same set of elements in any given state of 
affairs, (B) given relations are universals, and (C) given TT, then the truth of the proposition about that 
state of affairs will remain the same so long as the elements remain the same.  But as in the case of the 
cup on top of the table, this conclusion is simply false: given the cup, the universal “on top of” and the 
table, it is not just the three elements that compose the states of affairs that gives us the truth of the 
proposition, “The cup is on the table” as the same elements give us the false proposition, “The table is 
on the cup.”  We can lay this argument bare as follows: 
Premise c1: A state of affairs is a configuration of atomic elements.
Premise c2: A configuration is either a relation, or it is not a relation.
Premise c3: If a configuration is a relation, either it is a universal or it is not.
Premise c4: If relations are a universals, then they are the same in all of their instances.
Premise c5: Relations are universals. 
Premise c6: If  a configuration is a relation, then it is the same (identical) in all of its 
instances.
Premise c7: States of affairs are the truthmakers of propositions.
Premise c8: Propositions have different truth values.
Conclusion c1: If all states of affairs have the same configuration, then differences in 
truth values are not due to differences in configuration of states of affairs.
Conclusion c2: Therefore, differences in the truth values of propositions must come from 
differences in the atomic elements of states of affairs, since atomic elements in a 
configuration are all that states of affairs are.
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Conclusion c3: Therefore, states of affairs with identical atomic elements are 
truthmakers for propositions with identical truth values.
We are back to where we started from, only now we have compounded the problem.  Invoking 
states of affairs as truthmakers rather than the elements seemed a worthwhile move.  But if relations are 
considered as universals, not only does the weirdness persist in that, given relations as universals and 
the relata, we cannot account for truth differences given asymmetric relations, but we now have an 
additional problem given that we have a relation as a universal, which we are invoking to explain the 
unity of states of affairs, and it turns out as a universal, it is the same relation everywhere by which 
states of affairs are constituted.  Now any simple complex presented by a property predication, such as 
“Anjing is brown,” will have three elements—the particular and two universals.113
This relation as a universal was invoked just to avoid the problem of atomic elements  as 
truthmakers since we have clear illustrations that, if allowed ,atomic elements as truthmakers can result 
in false propositions such as the case of the desk being on top of the cup even though all of the 
elements of the proposition exist.  We can illustrate this principle easily.  Imagine two possible worlds, 
in both of which the dog named Anjing exists and  the property brown exists.  In only one of these 
possible worlds is Anjing actually brown, being white in the other world.  Unless we have some way of 
discussing the unity of the property universal with the particular, we are unable to explain why in one 
world the proposition “Anjing is brown” is true and is false in the other world.  So, consider two 
possible worlds, X and Y, in which both a and the property universal B (B-ness) exist.  
X: a & B-ness exist & “a and B exist” is true & “a is B” is false 
Y: a & B-ness exist & “a and B exist” is true & “a is B” is true 
 In the simple case of Anjing being brown,  the existence of Anjing the particular and brownness 
the universal by themselves seem incapable of making true the proposition, “Anjing is brown.” We are 
113 Anjing is a dog, taken from the Malayu word “anjing” meaning dog.
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at a loss to explain the truth differences across these worlds just given what exists within them.  The 
difficulties for TT and states of affairs sadly do not end there.  For if we introduce a unity relation as a 
universal to relate the particular and universal in the appropriate way, we have added an additional 
ontological element.  For now the list of elements in our cup example include not only the cup, the 
desk, and the relation-universal “on top of” but a fourth element, what we might call the “unifier 
relation universal.”  
Three immediate difficulties with this account are apparent: first, how do we determine when 
this relation actually obtains and states of affairs are formed?  A second and closely related problem: 
given the account of relations as universals, this relation must everywhere be the same.  Therefore, how 
do we individuate this relation in its obtainments into individual states of affairs?  Third, given that as a 
universal, the unifier relation must also exist in both possible worlds containing Anjing, its existence 
alone does not allow for us to discriminate between the true proposition that Anjing in brown in the 
world in which it is actually brown.  The specific problem still remains: if relations are treated as 
universals, both possible worlds,  X and  Z, will contain the particular Anjing, the property universal 
brown, as well as the relation on inherence, another universal.  In one of those possible worlds, the 
relation of inherence actually links the universal property to Anjing, and in another it does not.  If we 
want to preserve TT, something else besides this inherence relation must be appealed to in order to 
determine correctly in which worlds Anjing is brown and in which worlds Anjing is not brown.  
Finally, the unifier relation seems to requires a second unifier relation to unite it to the elements 
in the states of affairs.  How do we prevent a state of affairs constituting a second states of affairs if it 
requires the recognition of a relational universal obtaining?  At least under some descriptions of a state 
of affairs they are just the configuration of a particular and a property, or a structural unity of non-
relational and relational elements, and the possibility for states of affairs themselves to be constituents 
in such configurations seems real here.  That is, if a relation universal is needed to form states of 
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affairs, have not states of affairs become elements in higher order states of affairs that are equally 
necessary to form lower order states of affairs.  So it seems the the following regress is generated:
Premise 1d: The cup, the desk, and “on top of” are unified by the unifier relation.  
Premise 2d: The proposition “The cup is on top of the desk” is made true by the cup, the  
desk, the “on top of relation,” and the unifier relation.  
Premise 3d: Propositions are made true by their particulars, universals (including 
property and relation universals), and the unifier relation.
Conclusion 1d: Therefore, ““The cup is on top of the desk” is made true by the cup, the 
desk, the “on top of relation,” and the unifier relation”” is made true by the cup, the 
desk, the “on top of relation,” a unifier relation, and the unifer relation.  
That is, that something is a state of affairs requires a second state of affairs to be made true—the state 
of affairs that relates the relation of unity back to the first state of affairs.  And there seems no reason 
for this not to continue ad infinitum.  This is not the virtuous regress of truth—that if it is true that the 
grass is green, then it is true that it is true that the grass is green and so one—because  for each step in 
this regress a new ontological entity is introduced, not merely a new metalanguage: a universal is 
introduced, a unifier relation that is being posited as having being.  Hence, we have an instance of the 
type regress that is always lurking at the shadows of any work on relations—the Bradley Regress.114  
So what is the way forward?  Several options are open to us.  One option is to deny Premise 1c, 
that “A state of affairs is a configuration of atomic elements.”  Another option is to deny Premise 5c, 
“Relations are universals.”  A final option is to deny states of affairs all together.  There are those who 
have suggested this first option, and that in fact states of affairs are brute facts.115  This seems to be 
hardly an explanation at all; as Ludwig Fauhback has said, “Brute facts are facts that have no 
explanation. If we come to know that a fact is brute, we obviously don’t get an explanation of that 
114 Bradley-type regresses will be explored more fully in the next two chapters.
115 For example, see David M. Armstrong, “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt,” in Properties, ed. 
D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 101–11.
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fact.”116  However, if we are able to determine that something is a brute fact, then something will be 
gained, and so the suggestion and its consequences are worth exploring given that they also have 
something to say about the nature of relations.  Denying the second premise, that relations are 
universals, can solve the “internal problem” of asymmetric relations, and also has something to say in 
the way states of affairs are conceived.  Armstrong remarked that, 
It seems to me that once one accepts the objective reality of properties and relations … 
then it is inevitable that one accepts states of affairs of some sort.  If you accept that 
these properties [and relations117] … are universals as I do, … then [you will accept 
that] the instantiations of universals … are states of affairs.118
If one does not accept properties and relations as universals, then perhaps one is not in the position of 
having to accept states of affairs.  The final option, denying states of affairs, is also all together 
plausible.  It comes with its own demands: first, TT must be entirely discarded, as TT depends upon 
there existing, above and beyond particulars and universals, states of affairs.  Another theory offering 
many of the advantages (as well as some of the disadvantages) of TT lies in wait: Truth Supervenes on 
Being.  The first two of these options, however, suggest that relations are not universals, while the third 
is agnostic.
STATES OF AFFAIRS AS BRUTE FACTS
Fauhrback has helpfully defined a brute fact as “A fact is brute when an explanation for it does 
not exist.”119    These facts for which explanations  do not exist can be of various kinds, but the general 
idea is that a fact is brute if it is incapable of analysis where analysis is the decomposition of concepts 
116 Ludwig Fahrbach, “Understanding Brute Facts,” Synthese 145, no. 3 (2005): 1.
117 Armstrong is unequivocally devoted to the thesis that relations are universals.  See Armstrong, A World of States of 
Affairs, 20.
118 David M. Armstrong, “Questions about States of Affairs,” in States of Affairs, ed. Reicher Maria Elisabeth (Berlin, 
Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 39.
119 Fahrbach, “Understanding Brute Facts,” 1.
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or entities into more fundamental, ontologically prior concepts or entities, and/or the search for 
necessary and sufficient reasons for any given fact.  For states of affairs to be brute facts, this would 
mean that they cannot be analyzed or explained in terms of constituent parts: particulars, relations, and 
properties, and that no necessary or sufficient reasons can be given for them.  Anna-Sofia Maurin has 
taken up the suggestion made by Armstrong that in fact particulars, relations and properties are 
somehow parasitic on states of affairs and that states of affairs are ontologically prior to particulars or 
universals.120 Under the “radical interpretation” of Armstrong which Maurin makes, this entails that the 
constituents of states of affairs “do not exist.”  She writes,
After all, all there is are states of affairs. ‘a ’ and ‘F-ness’ may still be said to have 
referential force, but  their referent will be the states of affairs, for that is all there  is. 
States of affairs are brute; they are our rock-bottom.121
So on one account, taking states of affairs as brute facts results in the denial of the fundamental nature 
of both particulars and universals (among which we may include relations).  To be a particular or 
universal is to be within a state of affairs.  That Anjing and brownness can be members of states of 
affairs means we can speak of them, and that Anjing and brownness are within the same state of affairs 
means we can speak of Anjing being brown.  It would seem that particulars and universals are 
analyzable in terms of states of affairs, and not vice versa.  Yet that is not the whole story.
The perhaps unexpected result of such a mode of analysis is nominalism.  There are two 
arguments we can put forward to defend the claim that taking states of affairs as brute facts lands us in 
the nominalist camp.
Premise e1: If you deny universals and tropes, you are a nominalist.122
120 Armstrong, “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt,” 110.  
Anna-Sofia Maurin, “States of Affairs and the Relation Regress,” in The Problem of Universals in Contemporary 
Philosophy, ed. Gabriele Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 195–214.
121 Maurin, “States of Affairs and the Relation Regress,” 200.
122 Since all the constituents of states of affairs are fundamentally unreal, if they are tropes rather than universals they are 
also denied.  Whether tropes offer a better option for truthmakers than universals has been considered and will be 
addressed in what follows.  See also  Julian Dodd, “Farewell to States of Affairs,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
77, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 146–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409912348901.;”   Friederike Moltmann, “Events, 
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Premise e2: Properties are universals or tropes.
Premise e3. By denying the existence of properties, you deny the existence of both 
universals and tropes.
Premise e4: If you claim states of affairs are brute facts, you deny the existence of 
properties.
Premise e5: You claim states of affairs are brute facts
Conclusion e1: Therefore, you are a nominalist.
Premise e6: Nominalist are committed to the existence of particulars and only to 
particulars.123
Premise e7: If you claim states of affairs are brute facts, then states of affairs are 
particulars.
Premise e8: The world is states of affairs and only states of affairs.
Conclusion e2: Therefore, you are a nominalist.
As Maurin puts it, 
For if what exists are ontologically structureless “blobby”states of affairs, and if states 
of  affairs are (as Armstrong would take them to be) concrete particulars, then, on this  
suggestion, the world is a world of structureless concrete particulars.124
We reach the first conclusion simply because, in claiming states of affairs are brute facts, you deny the 
existence of property universals, relation universals, or tropes—anything thought to constitute a state of 
affairs since the state of affairs is itself ontologically simple.  States of affairs cannot themselves be 
assigned properties (which may be problematic if we want to speak of modal properties, but we can lay 
Tropes, and Truthmaking.,” Philosophical Studies 134, no. 3 (June 2007): 363–403.;” and Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Trope 
Theory and the Bradley Regress,” Synthese 175, no. 3 (2010): 311–26. 
123 This is an exceptionally strong presentation of nominalism, and obscures the differences between different nominalist 
positions. But if one is committed to the premise that particulars exhaust existence, then one is certainly a nominalist. 
Peter van Inwagen has, for example, defined nominalism as just the position that “everything that exists is an 
individual.” Peter Van Inwagen, “Against Ontological Structure,” in The Problem of Universals in Contemporary 
Philosophy, ed. G. Galluzzo and M. J. Loux (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 47.
124 Maurin, “States of Affairs and the Relation Regress,” 200.
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that problem aside since we can instead treat modal properties as quantifiers, yet even that might still 
have hidden difficulties), for if they did, they would face the same problem of unity as described in the 
previous section.  We reach the second conclusion because, given the world just is the totality of states 
of affairs, the world then is a world of particulars.  Therefore, not only does the position that states of 
affairs are brute facts commit us to nominalism, and therefore to the position that relations are not 
universals, it also denies relations all together.
The position fails to illuminate the problem of just what are states of affairs.  The retreat to 
considering states of affairs as brute facts seems not to be because we actually have good reason to 
think that they are ontological primitives, reached at the end of analysis, but rather because we cannot 
explain the “metaphysical cement” that holds them together.  The treatment of states of affairs as brute 
facts obfuscates rather than illuminates.  It cannot be maintained simultaneously with the claim, 
however, that relations are universals.
RELATIONS AS NOT UNIVERSALS 
So what avenues are open to us if we deny Premises 1b and 5d, “Relations are universals,”  
instead? Here, a promissory note must be offered for the present.  First,  the “weird problems” 
associated with TT and the successor theory that will be discussed, Truth Supervenes on Being, fall 
away if the relation does not exist except when the relation actually holds, that is, except where it 
obtains between two relata.  This move comes at the price of demanding an ontological account of 
relations that explains when and how relations obtain and clarifies just what relations are if they are not 
universals.  This is a demand for a general theory of relations.  
A general theory of relations should meet the demands of any general theory.   First, it should be 
coherent (does not involve holding a contradiction). This is the logical constraint. Second, it should 
offer maximal coverage—meaning, the best theory is that which explains the most cases with the 
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fewest outliers. This is the explanatory constraint.  For a theory of relations, this means an account of 
several types of relations: at least symmetric and asymmetric relations, transitive and non-transitive 
relations, the so-called “internal” and “external” relations, as well as taking into account various ways 
that things can be related, such as temporally, spatially, logically, causally, as well as an entire suite of 
messier relations like emotionally, epistemologically and ethically as well as the relation of our primary 
consideration, similarly.  While the purpose is to provide an explication of just what is the similarity 
relation, without a general theory of relations an explanation of similarity can be little more than an ad 
hoc explanation, full of unexamined assumptions about the nature and ontology of relations.  If the 
similarity relation is then invoked to explain other metaphysical and epistemological  features of the 
world, such an explanation will be sadly lacking.  Third, a general theory of relations should be as 
ontologically sparse as possible. This is the metaphysical constraint and what has come to be known as 
Occam's Razor—do not have unnecessary entities. Fourth, it should posit as few unexplanables or brute 
facts as possible, a constraint that Peter Forrest has called “Leibniz's Razor” —the constraint of 
sufficient reasons.125  Finally, we should not be able to generate any exceptions to the workings of the 
theory—the constraint of testing.  If we find we cannot provide a satisfactory general theory of 
relations, then we have a reason, albeit an insufficient one, for accepting states of affairs as brute facts 
and embracing the nominalism it entails, doubting the existence of relations or that in fact a general 
theory of relations is possible.  A general theory of relations is developed in the following two chapters.
What denying Premises 1b and 5d does not do is solve the problem of what constitutes states of 
affairs: the unity problem is not solved.  Why think, however, that something is needed to unify the 
states of affairs at all if a particular is already related to its properties, or two particulars are already 
related?  One reason is, as we have seen, TT demands states of affairs for truthmakers, as the 
constituents of those states of affairs are insufficient to serve as truthmakers for propositions that 
125 Peter Forrest, “Razor Arguments,” in The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, ed. R. L. Poidevin et al. (Taylor & 
Francis, 2009), 252.
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impute properties to particulars.  And with the demand for truthmakers comes a treacherous path in its 
demand for unity.  Dobb cautions that the introduction of a relation to relate the particular and property 
(and thereby constitute a “state of affairs”) is a dangerous ontological road to tread.  He writes, 
One thing is for sure: the metaphysical cement cannot be provided by introducing 
another universal, the relation of instantiation, to hold between a and F, for a vicious 
regress is threatened instantly . . . . How are a, F, and the instantiation universal 
unified? If we introduce another universal, a relation holding between pairs of 
particulars and universals and the relation of instantiation, the same question is 
begged.126 
This problem of unity is, however, one we can dissolve.  We do not have to solve the problem of unity: 
we can simply avoid it entirely by denying Premises 1b and 5d and making further assertions or 
denials.  We might, for example, claim that not only are relations not universals, but properties are not 
universals and therefore do not require “metaphysical cement” to relate them to particulars: they do not 
exist independently of their particulars.  In doing so, however, we dissolve states of affairs as 
ontological facts either as brute or as entities over and above their constituents.  As Armstrong was 
noted to observe above, states of affairs allegedly have intuitive appeal to realist.  If we deny realism, 
states of affairs lose that appeal for we no longer find ourselves in need of the sort of unity that realism 
seems to burden us with.  For this, though, we must also abandon TT in favor of another theory of 
truthmaking that does not depend on states of affairs: Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB in what 
follows).  This abandonment of TT is one of the denials which we can and should make.
TRUTH SUPERVENES ON BEING
There is another theory of truthmaking that might also be a friend to the realist without 
126 Dodd, “Farewell to States of Affairs,” 150.
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demanding something like a state of affairs.  Many of TT's ideas and insights are preserved in this 
reformulation, usually known as the thesis that Truth Supervenes on Being.  TSB has been summed up 
by Trenton Merricks as claiming: “ . . .  any two possible worlds alike with respect to both what entities 
exist and which properties (and relations) each of those entities exemplifies are thereby alike with 
respect to what is true.”127  David Lewis has formulated it as follows:
For any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P is true in W but not in V, then either 
something exists in one of the worlds but not in the other, or else some n-tuple of things stands 
in some fundamental relation in one of the worlds but not in the other.128
TSB offers an immediate advantage over TT: as Dodd points out, citing David Lewis, truth seems like 
it depends not only on “whether things are, but also on how things are.”129  This is particularly true 
when we consider inessential predication rather than existential or essential predication.130  Hence, it is 
not the mere existence of entities, but their existence and their relations with other entities that “make 
truths,” and therefore the immediate drawbacks of naive TT are shut out from the beginning.  
A second advantage with the formulation of TSB is that it does not invoke states of affairs as 
truthmakers but entities and relations.  Although it does depend on modal statements such as possible 
worlds, all the work we need to do with TSB looks like it could be achieved by ersatz possible worlds 
and we need not embrace full-blown Lewisian modal realism.  By considering different truths between 
possible worlds, such as one in which it is true that Anjing is brown and one in which it is false that 
Anjing is brown, we can identify the difference maker: what differs between the worlds that provides 
us with an account of the different truth values, and therefore what is the case that makes it true Anjing, 
in this given world, is actually brown.  For example, in any possible world that Anjing exists and is 
brown, the proposition that Anjing is brown will be true by virtue of a brown Anjing, and if our world 
127 Merricks, Truth and Ontology, 68.
128 Lewis, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making.,” 606.
129 Julian Dodd, “Is Truth Supervenient on Being?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 102, no. 1 (2002): 
69–85, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00043.x.
130 Dodd, 73–74.
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is among those possible worlds in which there is a brown Anjing, then the proposition will be true in 
our (actual) world.  In any possible worlds in which Anjing does not stand in the “fundamental 
relation” to brownness, that world will be a world in which it is false that Anjing is brown even through 
Anjing and brownness may both exist in that world.  And if our (actual) world is like that world, then it 
will be false that Anjing is brown even though brownness and Anjing do both actually exist in our 
world—only not in the same fundamental relation as in worlds in which it is true Anjing is brown.  
TSB does not overcome all of the problems of TT, or at least without amendments.  The 
problem of negative existentials, for example, remain.  Lewis maintained that TSB accounted for 
negative existential statements, because in a given world a negative existential is true just in case no 
“falsemakers” exist to make the negative existential true, and this can be understood in light of the 
difference between possible worlds in which the entity (and hence a falsemaker) does exist.131  
However, this fails to accord with the hunch that what is true depends on what exists.  The explanation 
for the truth of the negative existential is still given in terms of the lack of something's existence—
namely, the falsemaker.  But the falsemaker is generally just to be understood as the entity whose 
existence is being denied!  Lewis attempts to invoke the difference in the world in which unicorns do 
not exist and that in which they do as “difference-makers.”  Thus the world in which unicorns do exist, 
and its difference, is the truthmaker for the proposition “Unicorns do not exist” in our world.  Our 
world, unlike the world with unicorns, does not contain the falsemaker.  Yet still, the truth of the 
negative existential does not depend on being.  The falsemaker for the proposition, “There are no 
unicorns” would be a unicorn.  So while differences between possible worlds can be illustrative, the 
existence of an entity in one possible world and non-existence in another possible world does not seem 
to ground negative existentials in existence anymore than TT was able to do so since it is still the non-
existence in the world in which the negative existential is true that grounds the existential proposition's 
131 Lewis, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making.,” 110.
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truth.  There may be ways to escape this objection, such as to suggest that negative existentials actually 
supervene over worlds as totalities, and that such totalities have negative properties (e.g,. “the property 
of containing no unicorns”).  Given that the purpose here is not to defend TSB as a complete, universal 
theory of truthmaking, such a defense will not be given, and the challenge of negative properties to the 
realist or TSB theorist cannot be taken up here.  It seems unlikely, however, that TSB can successfully 
be defended as a complete theory of truth making without any outliers.132
TSB can, however, offer an explanation of how many propositions depend on what there is for 
their truth values, as the case of whether it is true there is a black cat in the room or whether the cup is 
on top of the desk.  It can, therefore, be a helpful tool in the metaphysician's kit even though it cannot 
serve as a ontological Swiss army knife to solve all the riddles associated with what makes any given 
proposition true.  And as it turns out, TSB can be very helpful in understanding relations, as well as the 
similarity relation in particular, and hence this hashing out of  TSB above is warranted.  TSB will not 
only help understand some of the problems of treating relations as universals, but will also come in 
quite handy in understanding why analogies are not in fact trivially true later on in this work as we see 
that how TSB deals with necessary truths also illuminates the problem of triviality in similarity claims.
So, assuming TSB with certain restraints given its limitations, cannot we still hold that relations 
are universals?  It seems that since it is not merely what exists, but also how existents stand in relation 
to one another, the weirdness of TT is eliminated without the demand of abandoning relations as 
universals.  So, when relata stand in different relations to one another between one possible world and 
another, we have a difference in truth values.  Hence, in one possible world there is a desk on top of a 
cup, and in another we have a cup on top of a desk.  In one world the proposition, “The cup is on top of 
the desk” is true and in another it is false.  What more do we need?133
132 Here I find myself in agreement with Trenton Merricks, who despite a spirited effort to develop the most stalwart of TSB 
theories finds that ultimately it fails to offer an explanation of how all true propositions are made true by being.  See 
Merricks, Truth and Ontology.
133 TSB may also offer advantages over TT in that it seems better positioned to explain relations that hold between relata in 
which one may not presently exist.  For example, “Ho Chi Minh was shorter than Barak Obama” or “Thomas Edward 
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First, there is something more to be asked for in this account.  If “on top of” is a relation 
universal, then the same “on top of relation” obtains in either of the two cases above.  And given the 
two particulars are the same, and the relation universal is the same, how do we explain the difference in 
truth values?  The answer is of course obvious: in one case, it is the cup that is on top of the table, and 
in the other it is the desk that is on top of the cup.  But how does an identical universal, holding 
between the exact same particulars, obtain differently?  
Whether we embrace the position that relations are universals, particulars, or another 
ontological category onto themselves, a general theory of relations that also provides an explanation of 
such asymmetric relations is still required.  The question of how the same relation can obtain 
differently is one of the most interesting and perhaps most difficult questions confronting 
metaphysicians today.
TRUTHMAKING AND ASYMMETRIC RELATIONS
It is Russell who is generally credited with observing that certain relations seemed to have a 
“direction” built into them and therefore would behave logically different from symmetrical relations, 
although that some relations had directionality “built into” them had been long observed by the Greek 
and Indian philosophers.  Hence, the one I love occupies the position of the beloved, but if that love is 
unrequited then I am not also in the position of beloved but rather in the position of jilted!  Russell 
devotes the sixteenth chapter of his Principles of Mathematics to asymmetric relations.  Russell divides 
relations into four “types” based upon two properties: symmetry and transitivity. 134  A symmetric 
relation is one is which the truth of aRb, which symbolizes “a is related to b,” guarantees the truth of 
bRa.  An asymmetric relation is one in which the truth of aRb never guarantees the truth of bRa. A 
Lawrence caused the present day rule of the House of Saud.”  TT seems as though it must endorse an eternalist theory of 
time, whereas it appears at least the TSB may have additional room to maneuver.
134 Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (University Press, 1903), §208, https://books.google.com/books?
id=yN9LAAAAMAAJ.
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relation is transitive if aRb and bRc guarantees the truth of aRc. A relation is intransitive if aRb and 
bRc never guarantees the truth of aRc.135  These formal characterizations seem the easiest way to 
distinguish between the four “types” of relations.  The challenge that has been persistently introduced 
in this chapter up until now is how the realist can defensibly suggest that a universal, identical in all of 
its manifestations, can explain this difference in direction of asymmetrical relations given (1) the 
particulars are the same, and (2) the universal (the relation) is the same.  How can the numerically 
identical relata and the numerically identical relation relating the relata result in different truth values?  
Granted similarity is not an asymmetric relation (or, it will be argued in a later chapter, “naively 
transitive”), but any explanation of similarity must provide a prerequisite explanation of relations, and 
such an explanation must satisfy the demands of these four types of relations.  A workable explanation 
of the symmetric relation of similarity that conflicts with an explanation of asymmetric relations fails to 
be an explanation of similarity.  
TSB tells us that the relata here must be related differently, as difference-making (in how things 
relate) explains truth value differences when there is no difference in what exists.  Therefore, the 
relation of the table being on the cup and the cup being on the table must somehow be difference as we 
so obviously can observe.  A universal is the same (numerically identical) in all of its instantiations.  
Therefore, at least in the case of asymmetric relations, they must either be universals that are more 
finely particularized,  resulting in a more ontologically extravagant world, or they are not universals.  
The argument runs as follows:
Premise f1: Universals are numerically identical in all their instantiations.
Premise f2: Relations are universals.
Premise f3: “On top of” is a relation, and therefore a universal.
Premise f4: The cup and the desk are related by an identical universal when the cup is 
135 Russell, §208.
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on top of the desk, and when the desk is on top of the cup.
Conclusion f1: Therefore, there is nothing different in the way the cup and desk are 
related to each other when the cup is on top of the desk, and when the desk is on top of 
the cup.
Premise f5: TSB
Conclusion e2: Therefore, when “The cup is on top of the desk” is true then “The desk 
is on top of the cup” is true.
Premise f6: It is not true that when “The cup is on top of the desk” is true then “The 
desk is on top of the cup” is true.
Conclusion f3: Conclusion f1 must be false given we know Premise f7 is in fact true.
Conclusion f4: At least one premise from Premise f1-f5 must be false.
It seems then that asymmetric relations have some peculiarity that we do not find in other universals, 
for example, the universal “rabbithood.”  Realist tend to think that rabbithood is the same in all its 
instantiations, which is what makes rabbits the genus that they are—rabbits.  If we know that 
something instantiates rabbithood, then we know it is a rabbit.  It is very curious, though, that given just 
the raw information about asymmetric relation universals and its relata we cannot tell what is true about 
the world.  We cannot make sense of how the relation can hold differently if it is identical, and holding 
differently is just what TSB demands from us to make sense of the different truth values in the 
argument above.   One solution is to reject that relations are universals.  That suggestion will be taken 
up in what follows.  There may be a way to rescue realism from this dilemma, though, but at a cost.
One route is to particularize the type of relation more finely: there is a relation of “being on top 
of a desk” and a relation of “being on top of a cup,” and these are two different relations and therefore 
two different universals.  This explanation seemingly forces us into the most crowded of “Wyman's 
slums” with a host of relation universals for every for possible particular and every possible relation.  
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The result is ontological extravagance in the extreme; while the realist may claim that these are still 
only one type of ontological entity, universals, their universals are now completing with the nominalists 
for the sheer number of particular entities.  It is also an open question as to how many of these resulting 
“finely particularized” universals would actually be repeatable.  There is also a second problem that the 
relation “hides” a particular within the relation.  The relation of “being on top of a desk” demands, for 
example, and specific type of particular: a desk.  If the universal exists independently of its 
instantiations, how can it include a concrete particular, or a second universal, for example, “on top of a 
particular exemplifying deskhood?”  
“Does this relation,” the questioner asks, “hold when it sits on a table being used as a desk?  Or 
what about a board sitting on top a few cement blocks above which the poor graduate student types out 
her papers?”  Here, though, the realist may have an advantage.  The relation universal “being on top of 
a desk” only holds between two particulars, one of which additionally instantiates the universal of 
“desk-ness.”  One may have trouble distinguishing the fine desk of the professor from the heap of 
boards and concrete of the graduate student, but that is just a problem in sorting out universals.  Once 
we determine the universal in fact obtains, then we have the possibility of a second universal, the 
“being on top of a desk” universal, obtaining as well.  
Part of the problem with this approach is simply the multiplication of entities involved in any 
given situation.  When the cup is on top of the desk, “being on top of a desk” is also present as the 
instantiation of a universal.  But must not also “being below a cup?”  And we might think that “being 
five inches from the edge of a desk,” or “being three inches from the center of a desk,” or “being two 
inches below the handle of a cup,” or “ceramic being in contact with wood” are all ontological entities 
that are present.  While there may be some who would swallow such a world with such abundant 
universals, most realists do not endorse universals for relations such as “being three feet from a barn” 
or “being three feet from this [particular] barn.”  Perhaps they should, since it seems the justification 
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for setting aside this answer at this point comes more from Occam's Razor than any objection as to the 
unworkability of this answer.  Finely grained relation universals seem capable of providing a solution 
to the problem: one denies an “on top of relation” and instead insists that relations, even spatial 
relations, have other universals built into them.  Relations hold between particulars, but only as those 
particulars exhibit other universals.  Such a solution might, however, seem an anathema to many 
realists.
“But,” comes the question, “given this multiplication of entities, why not just embrace 
nominalism: it has the same ontological parsimony that made you resist considering relations as an 
independent category apart from universals (fewer kinds of things) since it allows you to get rid of 
universals, and at the cost of the multiplication of entities which you have already embraced?”  This 
suggestion is plausible, at least, given the reply to Russell we saw at the beginning of the chapter.  
Nominalism does not multiply the types of entities, but the number of entities. Instead of suggesting 
there is a type of relation universals, the “on top of the desk” relation universal, one could claim that in 
fact all relations are particulars, and hence deny they are universals at all.  This approach dissipates the 
problem of distinguishing between the desk being on top of the cup or the cup being on top of the desk 
since those are both unique relations.  However, it does not address the repeatability of the “on top of” 
relation we seem to see enshrined in our use of relational language and our claims about relations.  
These claims are of course not limited to a universe of discourse containing desks and cups, but include 
relational claims across the gamut of human experience and epistemology.  
If we treat each relation as a particular, we do not encounter the problem of the contradiction in 
Conclusion f3.  Yet, we may give up repeatability.  Trope theory offers a middle ground.  Although we 
take property instances to be unrepeatable property instances, they are seen as forming classes of things 
which, taken together, constitute properties.  It seems, then, that they may offer a roundabout solution 
that can give us particular instantiations of relation tropes, but ones which form a class or set and 
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therefore have at least some explanation as to why we think the “on top of” relation is similar when the 
cup is on top of the table or when the table is on top of the cup.
RELATIONS AS TROPES
Tropes are not universals in that they are particulars, are spatio-temporally located, and 
therefore are not shared, but unlike tables and cups they are often considered to be “abstract” rather 
than concrete entities.136  This characterization of them as “abstract” may be a little misleading.  By 
abstract, theorists have meant that they can be “abstracted” away from the concrete particular, like 
color or shape.137  So, consider a glass of water, a glass of milk, and a glass of orange juice.  The water, 
milk, and orange juice all seem to have a common property, fluidity.  The trope theory objects that we 
have not observed a single thing, fluidity, but instead have observed three different instances of fluidity. 
It would be incorrect to infer, from these three observations, that one and the same thing—the property 
of fluidity—exists or is exemplified in all three. Rather, we have three instances of exactly or extremely 
similar things—the fluidity of the water, the fluidity of the milk, and the fluidity of the orange juice. 
The theorist tells us that these “property instances” are tropes.  Talk of the property of fluidity is then, 
according to the trope theorist, talk of the class or set of all instances of fluidity.  Tropes are usually 
considered to be an alternative answer to the problem of properties in general, and so it has been usual 
for the trope theorist to suggest that all property-talk is to be explained in terms of tropes or sets of 
tropes without recourse to universals.138
Tropes seem promising because they avoid a number of problems associated with TT and TSB.  
First, relational tropes do not exist independently of obtaining; unlike universals, tropes do not have 
existence apart from their instantiations.  Hence, “on top of” does not exist independently of something 
136 Maurin, “Tropes,” n.p.
Douglas Edwards, Properties (Malden, MA: Wiley, 2014), 48–49.
137 Edwards, Properties, 50.
138 Of course, we can imagine a theorist who holds that there are universals, which explain properties, but that relations are 
best explained by tropes.  Such a possibility, however, will not be explored here.
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being on top of something else.  This sort of particularization is attractive because it also seems to solve 
the “directionality” problem that seems so difficult to explain when considering relations as universals. 
Given that the “on top of relation” is a different relation in all of its instantiations, we have no 
aporia as to how the same relation can obtain between the same two objects yet yield different truth 
values: the same relation simply does not obtain. We recognize some similarity, however, between the 
cup and the manuscript being on top of the desk, and therefore we have a class of relations which we 
predicate of entities by saying, “One is on top of the other.”
Tropes have therefore been invoked as an explanation of relations.  Hence, in observing the cup 
on top of the table and the manuscript on top of the table, we observe two particular relations that 
exactly or extremely closely resemble one another.  But if the manuscript is picked up from the table, 
the relational trope “on top of” that existed ceases to exist as it has no independent existence.  That the 
relations resemble each other exactly or extremely closely, as do instances such as fluidity, allows us to 
form sets of resembling tropes, and these sets of resembling tropes (sets of “on top of” relational tropes 
or sets of instances of fluidity) allow a more general property talk: talk of properties is talk of sets of 
tropes.  
As promising as it would first appear, trope theorists fare little better than the realist when it 
comes to analyzing relations.  Although offering some advantages over relations as universals, taking 
relations as tropes comes along with its own set of associated problems.  Three such problems loom 
large.  First is the problem of locating relational tropes, and one theorist's attempt to explain this 
problem by attempting to eliminate relational tropes will demonstrate just how extensive the problem is 
for the trope theorist.  Second is the problem of participation that arises depending on our answer to the 
first: how relation tropes inhere in substances or form bundles, given participation seems to be a 
relation.  Third is the problem of how tropes form classes or sets, but without a theory of similarity 
among tropes, how one forms sets will remain mysterious.
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THE LOCATION OF RELATIONAL TROPES
First, let us take a simple example with the relation of “adjacent to.”  Let us say that the cup is 
adjacent to the book.  Given a general commitment of the trope theorist that all tropes are 
spatiotemporally located, where is this trope located?  Is it located in the space between the book and 
the cup?  When I have removed the book from its place on the table and put in on the shelf, but have 
not disturbed the space between that existed between the book and cup and now continues to exist sans 
book, why do I think the trope no longer exists?  And what about relations that, prima facie, look much 
less like candidates for something that is spatiotemporally located at all, such as “Ivan IV Vasilyevich 
was older than Napoléon Bonaparte.”139  Given the lives of Ivan and Napoléon never overlapped—that 
is, that the two relata never existed at the same time—suggesting that the “older than” relation between 
them is a spatio-temporally located trope seems to insist on an eternalist or growing block metaphysics 
that many trope theorists will be disinclined to accept.140  
The difficulty here is that trope talk, when it is property talk, normally comes along with a 
commitment to a either substratum theory, as in the case of the Nyāya philosophers, or to a bundle 
theory, or to some hybrid view like that suggested by Peter Simons.141   Under the first view, there is a 
substratum, a bare particular,142 in which the trope inheres.  This “inherence relation” was long 
recognized as posing the sort of problems we saw above with realism and unifying particulars and 
universals into states of affairs.  It has been accorded a sort of primacy by the Nyāya philosophers (it is 
a self-linking relation, and is not a trope but has only one instance, yet it is also not a universal—it is 
139 Ivan IV Vasilyevich (1530-1584) lived over 53 years while Napoléon Bonaparte (1769-1821) lived less than 53 years.
140 This problem again serves to illustrate the impact that a theory of relations will have on larger metaphysical enterprises.
141 Peter Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 54, no. 3 (1994): 553–75, https://doi.org/10.2307/2108581.  In this essay, Simons suggests 
that tropes that are essential to a particular being what it is form the bundles that make up particulars, and the substrate 
in which non-essential tropes inhere.  It appears that Simons may have now abandoned this position, however.
142 Many trope theorists have rejected bare particulars, but whether such accounts are successful, or what the arguments are 
for claims substrate trope theorists need not be committed to bare particulars, cannot be explored here for considerations 
of space.
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the same inherence relation that relates all substances to their properties) as well as some contemporary 
trope theorist who takes the relation as a brute fact.  Under the second view, that of the bundle theorists, 
particulars just are bundles of tropes without some substratum in which they inhere.  Indeed, under this 
view bundles have even been described as the “mereological sums of properties” where those 
properties are understood as tropes, although this is not a view endorsed by all bundle theorists.143  Both 
views are not without their problems, as we will see in what follows, but this immediately poses the 
problems of relations which do not exist in or inhere in either of their relata, nor constitute them.   
It seems for property tropes that the trope is always in or part of a concrete particular.  But with 
relations like “adjacent to” it does not seem that there is some concrete particular in which the relation 
inheres (no substrate) nor some bundle it is apart of.  Speaking of the latter theory, Ted Sider recently 
remarked that relations “just don't fit into the bundle theory's picture.”144  Therefore, given this lack of 
location of relation tropes, it seems that relations are a very different sort of beast than property tropes.  
This objection is of course not a sufficient reason to reject that relations are tropes, but if one is also 
going to endorse tropes as an explanation of properties and tropes as relations—that properties and 
relations are fundamentally the same kinds of ontological entities—then one owes an explanation as to 
why properties and relations seem to be so very different, one located in a concrete particular (a 
substrate or bundle) and one somewhere in a yet-to-be-explained aether.  Hence, the same demand we 
can make on those that treat relations and properties as universals must be made upon those that treat 
relations and properties as tropes.
TROPES BUT NO RELATIONS 
One line of argument is to simply abandon the idea that all tropes are spatiotemporally located.   
There may be tropes that are strictly abstract, or that are not spatially located, such as “subtle” or 
143 Douglas Ehring, Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation (New York: OUP Oxford, 2011), 98.
144 Theodore Sider, “Object-Free Ontology” (American Philosophical Association, Chicago, IL, March 3, 2016).
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Hamlet's melancholy.  Some entities are, under this view, abstract but are particulars and non-
repeatable none the less, and hence qualify as tropes.  Some relations, at least, might be similarly 
abstract and therefore asking where they are located is a misguided question all together.
Another position is to deny that all or any relations actually have corresponding tropes.  What 
follows, although specific to a trope theorist, provides us with a sort of preview of what the denial of 
relations might look like.  Among those relations that theorists have suggested do not have 
corresponding tropes are just these very sort of problematic cases discussed above, such as “adjacent 
to” or “older than.”  This position, argued for by Peter Simons, is that, “contingent spatiotemporal 
truths do not require external relations as a basic kind of entity, that the more fundamental relational 
truths behind such contingencies are internal . . . .”145  Simons would claim that in the example of Ivan 
and Napoléon, no relation actually exists between Ivan and Napoléon, but rather Ivan and Napoléon 
themselves (or some analog, such as the process or bundle that will be identified as Ivan and Napoléon) 
are the sole truthmakers for the the proposition  “Ivan IV Vasilyevich was older than Napoléon 
Bonaparte.”146  There is no third thing, the relation between Ivan and Napoléon, that make the 
proposition true.  In fact, Simons will widen his account and conclude that in fact there are no relations, 
only features of particulars from which we can make relational predications which are simply two or n-
place predicates but ones without any existential commitment to the predicates having an ontological 
entity as a “real” themselves behind them, so to speak.  So when I say “The cup is on top of the table” I 
do not therefore have an ontological commitment to something like the on-top-of relation.  So under 
this account, there are no relations.  Simons's account depends on exploiting the difference between 
“internal” and “external” relations, and denying the latter while claiming all relations' work can be 
done with the former which does not, in fact, commit us to an ontology containing relations.  
The distinction between internal and external relations roughly follows that given by Russell as 
145 Simons, “External Relations, Causal Coincidence, and Contingency,” 114.
146 Simons, 114.
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he considers the opinion of the “philosophical dislike of relations.”147  The first of these views is that all 
relations are grounded in the nature of the the relata.  Russell writes of two views that might be 
considered “internalist” about relations:
When this opinion [of philosophical dislike of relations] is confronted by a relational 
proposition, it has two ways of dealing with it, of which the one may be called 
monadistic, the other monistic. Given, say, the proposition aRb, where R is some 
relation, the monadistic view will analyse this into two propositions, which we may call 
ar1 and br2, which give to a and b respectively adjectives—supposed to be together 
equivalent to R. The monistic view, on the contrary, regards the relation as a property of 
the whole composed of a and b, and as thus equivalent to a proposition, which we may 
denote by (ab)r. 148
Klemet restates Russell's position by saying  “this amounts to the claim that a's bearing relation R to b 
is always reducible to properties held by a and b individually [the monadistic view], or to a property 
held by the complex formed of a and b [the monistic view].”149  These are total theories of relations, 
however today many metaphysicians think that there are some relations which are internal and some 
which are external.
Internal relations, then, are those relations which are necessary to the existence of their relata in 
that they emerge from the very natures' of their relata.  These are sometimes termed as intrinsic 
relations or essential intrinsic relations.150  A common example of such an internal relation is the 
relation that makes true the proposition, “Six is less than seven.”  This relation that makes true the 
proposition could not be changed without changing the intrinsic properties of the relata themselves.  If 
147 Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Section 212.
148 Russell, 212.
149 Kevin Klement, “Russell’s Logical Atomism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 
2016, 2016, n.p., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/logical-atomism/.
150 Erica Shumener, “Response to ‘Object-Free Ontology’ by Ted Sider” (American Philosophical Association, Chicago, IL, 
March 4, 2016).
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it were not true that six is less than seven, then six and seven must actually be something different than 
they are.  Hence the relation is taken to be an “internal relation.”151  
External relations, sometimes called extrinsic relations, are simply relations in which the relata 
do not depend on the existence of the relation.  External relations are not necessary to the natures of 
their relata.  An example of such a relation is the relation that makes true the proposition, “Cesar Cielo 
is faster in the 100 meters freestyle swim than David Walters.”152  One does not think that David 
Walters shaving off 0.43 seconds off of his swim would have changed what either he or Cesar Cielo 
essentially are.  We do not think that their very natures would be changed had Walter defeated him at 
that swim meet in Rome in 2009 in the same way that we think that the very natures of six and seven 
would be changed if it were not true that six is less than seven.  Another simple example is the cup and 
the desk upon which the cup sits.  We do not think that either would have their natures changed were 
the cup set upon the shelf.  The relation between them does not seem constitutive of the cup's or table's 
natures, and therefore is an “external relation.”  
Simons modifies this account of external relations to some extent, and qualifies such relations 
as weakly external or strongly external.  A relational predicate is
weakly external if its truth is necessitated by the existence of the terms and the ways 
they as a matter of fact intrinsically (non-relationally) are, their factual natures153
and a relational predicate is 
strongly external if the existence and factual natures of the terms do not necessitate its 
truth. For example that John and Mary are at a certain time spatially next to one another 
. . .  is not necessitated by how John and Mary are then, but by where they are 
151 We could generate pluralistic, monadistic accounts and monistic accounts of such a relation. Hence this division between 
internal and external relations is not a commitment shared by all thinkers about relations.
152 This is based on the November 2015 U.S. Open and NCAA records, based on a 2009 record.  “USA World US Open and 
NCAA Records,” accessed December 17, 2015, http://www.usaswimming.org/_Rainbow/Documents/cbdbc270-a6a4-
4f5e-b9e9-a95866df19f2/USA%20World%20US%20Open%20and%20NCAA%20Records%2020160308.pdf.
153 Simons, “External Relations, Causal Coincidence, and Contingency,” 114.
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then . . . .154
First, Simons strategy is to reduce weak external relational predicates to internal relational predicates, 
and hence demonstrate that they are extraneous.  And given there are no external relational predicates 
needed for weak external relations, we have no need for an ontological entity to serve as a truthmaker 
for them nor a need to find some positively existing entity or configuration for truth to supervene upon.
Consider the situation, “Lakshya is taller than Devon.”  This seems to be an example of an 
external relation given that it does not seem necessary to either Lakshya's nature or Devon's nature that 
they are the height that they are, and hence the relation could be changed without any change in 
identity.  For Simons, this is a weak external relation.  But if we are willing to make these features of 
Lakshya and Devon necessary, or if we are willing to simply disregard the necessary versus contingent 
distinction expressed in the earlier definitions of internal and external relations, we can collapse these 
sorts of relations easily.  If we think that if fact Lakshya would not the same Lakshya that he is without 
being the height that he is, we can dispense with the distinction between internal and weakly external 
relations.  
And what of so called strongly external relations?   Simons focus is on spatiotemporal relations, 
and as we saw he denies that “contingent spatiotemporal truths require external relations [sic].”155  
Simons makes this claim because an ingenious use of events as ontological entities, with the underlying 
assumption for any event E, E  has both its causes and its constituents (whatever those may be) 
necessarily.  That is, event E would not be event E had something else caused it.  For example, had the 
Titanic sunk because of a structural problem rather than having struck an iceberg, the event that was the 
sinking of the Titanic would have been a different event that it actually was.  Furthermore, if an event E 
does not have its same constituents it would not be the same event.  So for example, had the swim 
match in Rome in 2009 featured different swimmers than it actually did, or the 2016 Superbowl 
154 Simons, 115.
155 Simons, 114.
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featured different teams than it actually did, both would have been the different events.
Are any relations admitted by Simons?  A collision provides what seems a good example of a 
relational trope, but if we invoke events in our ontology, claims Simons, we can analyze away the 
relational trope.  He writes,
If John collides with Mary in the corridor at 10 a.m., the collision is an event which 
cannot exist without both John and Mary, neither of whom is part of the other, and since 
it is categorically impossible for an event to be part of a thing like John or Mary, the 
collision is a relational trope.156
However, in the end Simons will reject even this is requires a relation trope as he will interpret it not as 
an external relation, but an internal relation of the event itself, of the collision.157  Given it would be 
impossible for event C to have existed without its constituents, its constitution is an internal relation.  It 
would have been impossible for event C to have occurred without John and Mary.  Therefore, rather 
than interpreting the collision as an external relation between John and Many, it is interpreted as an 
internal relation of the collision itself, involving two relata but ones necessary to the very nature of the 
entity.  It is likewise with the proposition, “Cesar Cielo is faster in the 100 meters freestyle swim than 
David Walters.”  Rather than analyze this as a strong external relation holding between Cielo and 
Walters, instead it is analyzed as a weak external relation between the events, that of Cielo's 100 
freestyle swim and Walter's 100 meter freestyle swim.  Then the analysis from weak external to internal 
can proceed, so that there is no longer a relation between Cielo or Walters, or between Cielo's swim or 
Walters's swim, but rather just facts about Cielo's swim and Walters's swim that are sufficient to serve 
as the truthmakers for the proposition, “Cesar Cielo is faster in the 100 meters freestyle swim than 
David Walters” without introducing any further ontological entity in the form of a relational trope.
Simons pursues this strategy to analyze all relations as internal relations, with the claim that 
156  Simons, 118.
157   Simons, 119–20.
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internal relations require no further ontological commitment beyond the relata themselves as would 
external relations.  Given there are no genuine external relations, there are no ontological commitments 
to relations.  Since there would be relational tropes iff were there external relations, given there are no 
external relations there are no relational tropes.  For spatiotemporal relations, he writes, 
The (very many) processual inhabitants or occupants of spacetime are severally and jointly 
sufficient for the many truths about their spatiotemporal relationships, and no additional real 
relations are required in the truth-making role.158
Simons claim is that the bundle trope theorists can not only make sense of relations, but true to Ted 
Sider's insight quoted above, can actually dispense with relations as ontological entities all together.  
Tropes are all one needs, and among tropes relational tropes are not needed.  
Yet there is still a problem looming for theorists such as Simons: it appears that Simons 
advocates a position in which every trope an entity has, it has necessarily.  One might, at first blush, be 
comfortable with me having all the properties I do necessarily, but it seems that my properties 
constantly change; in the evening, I look a bit scruffy, and I do not after a morning shave.  In the 
winter, I pale and therefore am pale, but in the summer, I tan and therefore am tanned.   Some account, 
then, of how my necessary properties change but my identity remains the same, is needed; either the 
denial of the identity of indiscernables needs to be made, and some alternative account given, or an 
account of the seeming haecceities that must be introduced to maintain identity through change is 
required.  Even if I am analyzed not as a concrete particular but instead as an event, it is hard to believe 
that my teaching of class this morning would have been a different event had my bundle differed in 
terms of its scruffy tropes or its pale tropes.  Some properties of events simply do not seem to be 
necessary to the event's identity, like my relative scruffy tropes when teaching this morning.  One might 
question if the event that was the 1988 World Series would have been a different event if we replaced 
158 Simons, 124.
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one dust particle on the playing field, or if John's coat had an extra speck of lint on it when he collided 
with Mary.  If we agree these would have been the same events despite microscopic changes in the 
composition of the events, then the analysis of all relations as internal given that all events have all 
their properties necessarily just seems false. In the past, Simons maintained that some tropes may be 
essential, and that these were involved in making up the bundle that made up a particular, and that this 
bundle could then serve as a substrate for non-essential tropes, the so called “nuclear option.”159  This 
combination of bundles and substrate theories allowed the distinction between necessary, internal 
tropes (and hence internal relations) and accidental tropes (and hence strongly external relations).  Such 
a distinction cannot be maintained, however, with the claim all relations are internal.
We might also simply think that there do exist relations that cannot be explained in terms of 
internal relations at all. For example, that Devi is the step-daughter of Prakash seems not to depend on 
any internal properties of Devi or Prakash.  The “events” that are Devi and Prakash seem to lack any 
necessary connection as well.  It is possible, for example, that Prakash is unaware he has a step-
daughter, or that Devi does not know her mother has remarried.  What would the internal relation be, 
then, that would make true the relational predication then?  Given TSB, the world in which Prakash is 
Devi's stepfather is different than the one in which he is not, and given TSB this is because Prakash and 
Devi must stand in different relations to each other.  Here, the denier of relations must retreat to the 
claim that there will simply be some relations that are, in some sense, “unreal.”  For relations that 
cannot be explained by strictly internal relations, we simply deny that they have any ontological reality 
and become “merely verbal” or “strictly conventional.”160  
We can press the denier of external relations further here.  Another example, which one might 
be less inclined to dismiss as “merely conventional,” is the relation of lines being parallel or the 
relation of being perpendicular. That any two lines are perpendicular in Euclidean or affine geometry 
159 Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” 567.
160 This will be explored further in Chapter Five in light of Buddhist objections to the reality of relations.
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seems a perfect candidate for a contingent spatiotemporal truths.161  If it requires external relations to 
determine any two lines are perpendicular, then Simons is wrong on both fronts: that contingent 
spatiotemporal truths require no external relations, and furthermore, that there are no external relations. 
Perpendicularity is perhaps the clearest case in which we could know everything there is to know about 
each of the two lines themselves and still not know whether they are in fact parallel.  
Perpendicularity is a symmetric relation that holds between lines iff the two lines intersect, and 
at the point of intersection the straight angle of one line forms two congruent angles, and that the sum 
of these congruent angles is 180º (hence, each angle must necessarily be 90º).  However, we could be 
supplied with all the information about any two lines, such as their slope, but without external 
relational information we can get only by comparing the slopes or the lines themselves, we could not 
determine whether they were perpendicular.  The slope of the lines, for example, which can be used to 
determine whether lines are perpendicular only make sense relative to a Cartesian plane, itself a system 
of relations; without reference to such a plane, the slope of a line is meaningless.  The slope itself 
represents a relation between the x-axis, y-axis and the line itself. We could be supplied with 
information about every point constituting each line, including the points of intersection for any two 
lines.  But this information would still be insufficient to determine if they were perpendicular because 
we would require additional information, in the form of the relations the points hold to each other, to 
determine if the lines were perpendicular.  We might note, for example, that given information about all 
the points, that the lines intersect.  If there were more than one intersection, we could rule out the lines 
are perpendicular.  However, if there were only one intersection, this would by itself not provide us 
with the information to determine whether the angles are congruent.  It is only if we understand either 
the relations between the points—information not supplied by information about the points themselves
—or the relations between the lines, such as angles formed by the lines but not constituting nor 
161 The argument, although different in details, should generalize to hyperbolic geometry and elliptic geometry as well.
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properties of the lines themselves—can we determine if any two lines are perpendicular.  Therefore, 
contingent spatiotemporal truths require (strong) external relations as truthmakers, and therefore there 
are, contra Simons, (strong) external relations.  Now the question is, granted there are external 
relations, is there any reason not to invoke them in scenarios such as collisions and comparisons of 
height and swimmers?  None seem obvious.
While it seems the trope theorist who denies relations as distinct ontological entities can 
accomplish much, problems remain with the account.  The first set of problems concern making all 
properties essential properties of a bundle whether the bundle is taken to be a concrete particular or an 
event.  The account suggests that concrete particulars have all of their properties necessarily, while it 
seems that a bundle has some its tropes accidentally.  The claim that all events have all their properties 
necessarily seems false.  It further seems that this account either must suggest that the identity of 
bundles is constantly changing, or it introduces unexplained haecceities .  The second set of problems 
concerns those relations that just seem immune to this analysis.  Even if we deny that relations can only 
be explained by appeal to strong external relations and therefore not “real” or lack existence, an 
account of them must still be offered given they account for differences in truth values of propositions 
across possible worlds.  And it seems such a denial does violence to relations that we think are as real 
as any others, like being an in-law or being perpendicular.
The denial of relations will be explored in the following chapters, highlighted by the debates 
between several schools of thought in the Indian tradition that do not treat relations as either universals 
or tropes, the Nyāya, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, and the Buddhist denier of relations, Dharmakīrti.  Yet 
another problem of relations looms large for the trope theorist who grants that there are relations, and 
such relations are of the same type as properties, tropes: the problem of participation.
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BUNDLES, RELATIONS AND COMPRESENCE 
There is another classical problem casting its long shadow over trope theory, and this problem is 
the cousin to that of universals and the formation of states of affairs.  How do tropes come together 
with concrete particulars under the substratum theorist's and bundle theorist's and accounts, since if the 
relation between tropes and particulars is indeed a relation, then will not that relation itself be a trope?  
For a trope to be related to substance or bundle of which it is a part of, either as inhering in a substrate 
or constituting a bundle, a third trope will be needed to relate the trope accordingly, and if this third 
trope is related to the bundle, then a fourth trope will be needed to relate the third, and so on, ad 
infinitum.  The parallel between the substrate trope theorist and the realist ought to be apparent enough, 
but a very similar regress problem also confronts the bundle trope theorist.  As such both substrate 
theorists and bundle theorists have typically resorted to a primitive or special relation in attempt to 
block such a regress: a special inherence relation and compresence.  In what follows, the bundle 
theorist's compresence relation will be looked at as it demonstrates a unique set of problems for the 
trope theorists, including those who seek to analyze relations as ontological entities through internal 
relations.
While inherence is usually associated with substrate theories, compresence is usually associated 
with bundle theories.  One explanation of bundle theory is that objects are bundles of tropes.  These 
groups of object-forming tropes are considered to be compresent, meaning that they occupy the same 
spatiotemporal region.162  Compresence seems to be a spatiotemporal relation that exists between the 
compresence tropes: that they are located in the same spatiotemporal location is what makes them 
compresence.  Just what is this compresence relation?  Maurin suggests that there are two ways to think 
about this relation: as an internal relation or as an external relation.163  It seems, though, that neither by 
taking compresence as an internal relation or an external relation do we get a satisfying answer.   The 
162 C. Daly, “Tropes,” in Properties, ed. D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 157.
163 Maurin, “Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress,” 321–22.
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problems of making compresence essential to the natures of the compresence tropes seems apparent 
enough from the discussions above, but Douglas Ehring has also identified two regresses the emerge if 
it is taken as an external relation.164  Hopefully, the parallels with realist problems of the unity relation 
and inherence will be obvious enough to the reader without additional explanation.  
If we think that the relation of compresence between two tropes in a bundle is an internal 
relation, then there must be something about the nature of the tropes themselves that make them 
compresent.  This would mean, then, that for any property instances a particular has, it must have these 
properties necessarily.  If we think that Anjing exemplifies the property instances of being a mammal 
and of being brown, something about the nature of the mammal trope and brown trope are related into 
such a way as it is impossible for them not to be so related.  If, for example, Anjing were white, and did 
not exemplify the brown trope, the mammal trope would be so radically altered as to no longer be the 
the same in its intrinsic nature.  The problem with this account is that we do not think that all the 
property instances any particular has are essential to it.  We do not think that there are necessary 
relations that exist between Anjing's “mammalness” and Anjing's “brownness,” and we can imagine 
Anjing no longer being brown (for example, having been dyed blue or having gone gray from age) with 
Anjing's mammalhood being unchanged.  To make compresence an internal relation seems to make the 
relation between an object and its properties too strong.  To think that my tannedness or paleness at the 
moment is essential to me fails to accord with at least some theorist's intuitions about necessary and 
accidental properties or understandings of modality.  This is the problem that a theorist like Simons will 
have to explain or explain away, and that comes part and parcel with Simon's rejection of relational 
tropes.  For those who accept compresence as an internal relation, the problem is identical.  This 
conclusion, that all properties are necessary or essential, seems hard to swallow as a consequence either 
denying relations as ontological entities, or insisting compresence is an internal relation.
164 Ehring, Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.
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We might then instead think that we would be better off in treating compresence as an external 
relation since we can now feel some confidence that there are such entities.  This approach seems to 
offer the advantage that the relations between compresence tropes are not necessary while leaving room 
to think that some tropes might be necessary to the object's nature or identity.  Hence, while we can 
imagine Anjing being a dog and being either brown or white, we cannot imagine Anjing being a dog 
but no longer being a mammal.  The essential property instances are not relations that hold between 
tropes, but hold between the particular and the tropes it may or may not have.  
Since relations are also tropes, the compresence relation, as an external relation, is also a trope.  
Therefore, since all tropes are to be spatiotemporally located, we can legitimately ask the question of 
the last section: “Where is the compresence relation trope located?”  Ehring had identified two different 
regresses that kick in depending on how we answer that question, one that results from considering the 
compresent relation within the bundle, and one that results from placing the compresent relation 
outside of the bundle.  
Under the first view, tropes are part of a bundle because they are related by a compresence 
relation.  If the compresent relation is placed inside the bundle, then the compresent trope is part of the 
bundle and therefore compresent with the other tropes which are part of the bundle.165  The account of 
how tropes become part of a bundle is that they are related by a compresence relation.  Therefore, the 
compresent relation relating the tropes in the bundle must be part of the bundle by entering into a 
compresence relation.  This compresent relation will either be inside the bundle or outside the bundle.  
If it is inside the bundle, then it will be so in virtue of being related to the tropes to which it is related 
through another compresence relation, and so one.166  It is a familiar story from the problem of unity of 
states of affairs, a wolf in new clothing to mix metaphors.  
The second problem is likewise a familiar one, an analog to the problem observed concerning 
165 Ehring, 120.
166 Ehring, 120.
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the independent existence of relations as universals and TT.  Ehring asks us to consider the following: 
For tropes t1 and t2 to be compresent, they must be linked by a compresence trope, say 
c1. But the existence of tropes t1, t2, and c1 is insufficient to make it the case that t1 and t2 
are compresent since these tropes could each be parts of different, non-overlapping 
bundles. 
The problem is practically identical to that observed in the “weird” results of the truthmaker theory that 
led to the difficulty of explaining how, if existence makes true, the existence of the universal relation 
“in front of” and the the particulars you and Salmon Rushdie, “You are in front of Salmon Rushdie” is 
false.167  If compresence is outside of the bundle, then there is no guarantee, given the existence of that 
compresence relation, that any two give tropes are actually compresent.  That is, trope t1 and trope t2 as 
well as the compresent trope, c1, could all exist yet trope t1 and trope t2 not be part of the same bundle, 
that is, not be compresent.
Ehring considers six different possible responses to the problem of compresence, including that 
compresent tropes are not within the bundles; one that simply posits, post hoc, that there can be no 
higher-order compresent relations; one that denies the compresent trope can itself be compresent; and 
two, that simply deny compresence is in fact a relation and hence introduce compresence as a 
primitive: it continues to operate as a relation in that it relates tropes to form bundles, but unlike all 
other relations, it is not a trope relation but a primitive.168  He finds reasons to reject all of these 
options, and I will not rehearse them here except to point out the common strategy shared in all these 
approaches: because the treatment of properties and relations as essentially the same kinds of things, 
tropes, these accounts of relations failed.  In each case resort was made to a special relation, an outlier 
to which all the theory has to say regarding relations is discarded because were the theory of relations 
applied to this relation, the theory becomes unworkable as a whole.  Ehring's last suggestion, and his 
167 If you do happen to be in front of Salmon Rushdie right now, please give him my regards and consider something else 
that exists and is currently far away from you.  
168 Ehring, Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation, 122–28.
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own as a bundle theorist, is interesting as we can identify at least some parallels between his suggestion 
and that of much earlier philosophers of the Indian Nyāya school, such as Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.  
Calling his position that of “compresence is self-relating,” Erhing writes 
There is no regress because the compresence relation itself is a special kind of relation, 
a “self-relating” relation, one that can take itself as one or more of its own arguments. 
As we move up the supposed regress, we do not find ourselves with new compresence 
tropes, and, hence, there is no infinite regress at all.169
That is, the compresence trope is “self-relating,” meaning that it relates the tropes to form bundles, but 
it is related to itself, which is how it is itself part of the bundle.  Hence, we may ask for a compresence 
relation to relate the compresence relation to the bundle, since under this view it is part of the bundle.  
However, that second-order compresence relation, because compresence is self-relating, just is that first 
compresence relation.  Erhing explains:
Tropes t1 and t2 in bundle b are linked by a compresence trope c1 which is in b. c1 is 
linked by a compresence trope to t1, but that linking compresence trope, c2, is just c1  
itself, which is both a relation and one of its own relata.170  
So we must conclude that we are mistaken even in identifying c2 as a second trope. There is in fact only 
one, c1, capable of relating tropes to each other was well as itself to other tropes.
Oddly enough, Erhing does not use the term “reflexive relations” as this concept seems like it 
would be beneficial since the logic (if not the metaphysics) of reflexive relations are well understood.    
As it will be recalled, Peter Simons remarked, “the metaphysics of relations (unlike their logic) is still 
in its infancy” and the metaphysician, although blazing new trails, must be cognizant of the better 
understood logic of such relations.171  Generally, relations are classified as reflexive, irreflexive, or non-
169 Ehring, 128.
170 Ehring, 128.
171 Peter Simons, “Relations and Truthmaking,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 84 (2010): 
199.
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reflexive depending on the relation's relation to itself.  Hence, a relation is reflexive iff for any object x, 
if x is in relation R, then x bears R to itself.  A classical example is “being the same weight as” since 
anything any object in the relation of “being the same weight as” will bear that relation to itself.  
Relations are irreflexive iff it is impossible for any relata in the relation to bear the relation to itself (for 
example, “is a different weight as”).  Non-reflexive relations are those in which any relata may or may 
not stand in the relation to itself.  An example would be, “is liked by” as it is possible that I may like 
myself, and therefore stand in a reflexive relation to myself, but it may be true I do not like myself and 
therefore do not stand in such a reflexive relation to myself.  Compresence, if “self-relating,” must be a 
reflexive term; clearly, it cannot be a irreflexive term since it is related to itself, but it must always be 
related to itself, and therefore cannot be a non-reflexive term.  If it were a non-reflexive term, then 
there would always be the possibility that the compresence trope is not compresence with the tropes 
that it unifies, and hence a set of problems similar with it being outside of the bundle, examined above, 
would emerge.  
There is an apparent difficulty, though, that makes this account of self-linking very different 
from that of the inherence relation of the Nyāya.  The Nyāya were acutely aware, in part because of 
their opponents' attacks upon their metaphysical system, that a regress of “unity” or participation would 
emerge from their substrate theory in much the same way the problem emerges with states of affairs.172  
To overcome this potential regress of relatedness, they posited a self-linking relation  [svarūpa-
sambandha] of their own.  This is inherence [samavāya], and it bears some similarity to the idea of 
“instantiation” posited by Armstrong with some important differences.173  Namely, under the Nyāya 
view, there is just one inherence.  Every observation of inherence is an observation of a single 
numerically identical “relation;” inherence is an irreducible primitive, but is not multiply instantiated.  
172 Stephen H. Phillips, “Gaṅgeśa on Inherence,” in Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the 
Emergence of" New Logic (Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1997), 230.
173 For a parallel discussion from the realist perspective, on “instantiation,” see David M. Armstrong, Universals and 
Scientific Realism Volume 1: Nominalism and Realism (Cambridge University Press, 1980), 109.
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It is a single thing, and has only one instance—the same instance everywhere it is observed. Hence, the 
inherence of an inherence instance is the observation of just one thing, the self-linking inherence.  That 
is, given property a inheres in substrate F, one may ask by what does the inherence Θ1 inhere?  If 
pressed, one can say that the inherence Θ1 inheres by virtue of inherence Θ1 and not in virtue of some 
inherence Θ2 that is, a second relation of inherence is not required as inherence is self-linking, and thus 
relates to itself.  But given that there is only one numerically identical inherence, we also explain that 
property b inheres in substrate H in virtue of inherence Θ1.
Tropes are unique particulars, however, and therefore every bundle supposedly has a different 
compresent trope (and this difference becomes vital in individuating bundles).  Ehring considers four 
objections, which again are not rehearsed here.  What he fails to consider, though, perhaps because he 
does not pay sufficient attention to the logic of relations, is what makes a relation reflexive.  Given that 
all compresence tropes are identical in all their intrinsic properties, even as unique particulars, he fails 
to realize that if their reflexivity arises from these intrinsic properties, it seems impossible to keep those 
identical intrinsic properties from relating the compresence tropes to one another (in the same way that 
“is the same weight as x” relates all objects that are the same weight of x to x).  Hence, we can generate 
the following argument:
Premise g1:  Any trope of the same kind (set) are identical.
Premise g2:   Anything that is identical must be identical in terms of its intrinsic 
properties.
Premise g3:  The compresence relation is a trope.
Premise g4:  Any compresence trope, c1, will be related it itself (it is reflexive).
Premise g5: Reflexive relations are reflexive because they relate their relata' “back” to 
the relata itself.
Premise g6:  Reflexive relations relate their relata back to themselves through some 
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intrinsic property of the relation itself.
Premise g7:  For any compresent trope, c1, it will have identical intrinsic properties with  
any other compresent trope, c2.
Conclusion g1:   Therefore, compresent trope c1 will be in a non-reflexive compresence 
relation with c2 in that it will relate its intrinsic property to the shared intrinsic property 
of c2.
We cannot appeal to the extrinsic relations of the compresence trope (which would be the tropes that it 
relates aside from itself) to somehow avoid this problem, because first of all, relations are not reflexive 
because of their extrinsic properties,174 and second, the very appeal to compresence is to explain how 
tropes are related to one another to form bundles.  One cannot then suggest that the bundles are what 
explain compresence—it is a bad move in the game of metaphysics as it begs the question since the 
compresence relations are being appealed to in order to explain the bundles.
Consider the other example of a reflexive relation above, the “being the same weight as” 
relation.  This relation is self-relating, reflexive, which means that for an x, x will bear this relation to 
itself.  But x will also bear this relation non-reflexively to any other object that is the same weight as x.  
Now what is the nature of the compresence trope that allows it to enter into the compresence relation 
with other tropes (brown tropes, for example) as well as with itself?  It seems for any relation to be 
reflexive, it is because it is relating some aspect of object x back to the same aspect of object x.  
Because tropes are identical to each other, all aspects of the tropes are identical to one another with the 
exclusion of extrinsic relations like spatiotemporal location.175  Whatever intrinsic nature that 
compresent tropes have that relates them back to themselves also relates them back to anything with 
that identical nature: all other compresent tropes.  This problem is shared with the reflexive relation of 
174 I could be mistaken about this, but have yet to come up with a reflexive relation that is reflexive because of the extrinsic 
properties of the relation itself.
175 There are attempts to explain spatiotemporal locations as tropes.  See Daniel Giberman, “Tropes in Space,” 
Philosophical Studies 167, no. 2 (2013): 453–72, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0108-8.
85
equality given the identify of indiscernibles; if x and y are identical, then x=y because such relations 
depend on the aspects or properties of their relata.  
Hence, all compresence tropes are compresent with one another—in the same bundle.  And 
given that all bundles are just those tropes that are compresent, then it appears that this line of thought 
collapses us into a “blobby” universe where there is only one compresence trope.  Unlike inherence, 
which seemingly allows different different properties to inhere in different substrates, a single 
compresence trope gives us a single bundle and therefore a single object, which for Ehling will 
represent the mereological sum of all the properties in the universe.  Must trope theorists who believe 
that relations are tropes and that a self-linking relation can rescue the idea of compresence accept what 
amounts to monism?  If not, these theorists should pursue a strategy of ensuring a compresent trope can 
only be compresent with one compresence trope—itself.  What such a strategy would amount to is not 
clear.  
Perhaps colocation is a restriction that could be introduced and something along the lines of, 
“Compresent tropes are reflexive, but may only enter into the relation of compresence only with 
colocated tropes.”  Colocation has its own problems, although it seems to offer some promise.  If we 
take bundle theory seriously, and I am a bundle of spatiotemporally located tropes, it seems that those 
tropes are distributed in certain ways across the area that I occupy, an area which is larger than a single 
point.  Compresence was in part an explanation to explain why “I” end at my hand and do not extend to 
the table that my hand is resting on.  The table is a different bundle, and therefore a different object, 
because my tropes are not compresent with it even though we are conjoined by touch.  It seems I must 
already have a sense of what my bundle is composed of, and why the table is not part of it, to determine 
the space which I occupy and therefore determine what tropes are colocated.  Compresence “aligns” 
tropes spatiotemporally so that I don't leave behind my tanned trope when I walk out of a room while 
taking my pudgy trope with me.  Given a single compresence relation is distributed throughout my 
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area, and another throughout the table's area, and one is responsible for making tan and pudgy part of 
me, everywhere that is me is “within” this particular compresence relation and not within the 
compresence relation that forms the tables bundle.  Therefore, that relation will be colocated in any part 
of the bundle with itself, but  it will be not colocated with any other compresence trope such as that 
which unified the table into a bundle.  If I cannot tell where I end and where the table begins, responds   
the compresence as self-linking theorist, that is an epistemological and not a metaphysical problem.  
We might also suggest that compresence tropes can only enter into the compresence relation 
with another compresence relation iff the compresence relation has identical extrinsic properties as well 
as intrinsic properties.  The problem is it can be true that compresence tropes can only enter into 
relations with colocated tropes, or those with exactly the same extrinsic properties, and monism could 
still be true: there still may be only one such trope.  We have to have some account of the nature of the 
compresence relation that allows it both form discreet bundles by entering into compresence relations 
with other tropes, that allows it to be reflexive and take itself as one of its own relata yet restricts it into 
only entering reflexive relations only with itself and not with other tropes that are exactly identical to it 
in all of their intrinsic properties (and perhaps extrinsic properties as well). The burden is then on the 
“compresence as self-linking” theorist to explain in virtue of what it has these properties.  To not is to 
treat compresence as a primitive, with spooky properties attributed to it simply to fulfill the theoretic 
needs of the trope theorist.
This difficulty seems to be a “chicken and egg” problem.  Unless we can already make sense of 
what a bundle is, we cannot make sense of how to individuate compresence relations to ensure there is 
more than one such relation.  And it seems we cannot make sense of what a bundle is without some 
appeal to understanding the compresence relation.  
While sympathetic to the theorist's claim that this is just an epistemological and not a 
metaphysical issue, I am suspicious of that claim as it seems to beg the question.  The suspicion does 
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not come from the relation as a trope per se, but instead the difficulties in ensuring that the relation 
behaves as the trope theorist needs it to behave.  Of course, one might object that if a correct 
understanding of relations leads us monism, that is no fault of the theory.  It does not appear, though, 
that a correct understanding of relations outside compresence would lead us to endorse monism.  The 
inability of both monism and idealism to account for asymmetric relations led to Russell's rejection of 
both of them.176  Perhaps because repeatablity formed the core criteria for universals for Russell, this 
understanding of asymmetric relations led to  Russell's embrace of realism instead.  This illustration 
demonstrates that understanding relations lies at the core of metaphysics.  
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
Realists' and trope theorists' approaches have typically taken for granted an understanding of 
properties as truthmakers for a wide range of predications, and from that understanding attempted to 
accommodate relations within their ontological system.  The result as been ontological gerrymandering, 
the retreat to special primitive relations, or the denial of relations or certain types of relations.  These 
problems have emerged when looking at realist and trope-theoretic systems that attempt to treat 
relations as essentially of the same kind as properties, either as universals or tropes.  The motivation 
appears to be ontological economy, or the similarities observed between repeatable properties and 
repeatable relations, or between property instantiations and relation instantiations.  In seeking 
ontological parsimony, however, many theorists have sacrificed ideological parsimony, and features 
such as a brute unifier relation or compresence relation have been posited because they are required for 
the rest of the theory to work rather than for any clear and sufficient reasons.  
If we assume that similarity is a relation, as we have in chapter one, this problem is 
compounded.  Since to be similar is to be similar in respect to something (most often a property), an 
176 Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” 371.
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adequate explanation of similarity will have something considerable to say about both relations, since 
similarity is assumed to be a relation, and similarity claims often invoke properties as part of the 
truthmakers for those claims.  Another approach to this problem is to first ask, “What is the nature of 
relations,” and then once having reached a better understanding of relations, then ask the question, 
“What is the relationship between relations and properties.”  This approach has the advantage that it 
does not privilege one set of relations, those related to properties, above other sets of relations we can 
imagine: the relations between particular objects, for example, or between relations themselves.  A 
general theory of relations might in fact help illuminate these very issues that are so problematic when 
we begin with properties and property instantiation.  Indeed, there are approaches to properties that 
considers them first and foremost relational.  One such approach, resemblance nominalism, suggests 
that in fact all we need are relations, and particularly the similarity relation, to provide a complete and 
satisfactory accord of making true property predications.  Structural realism, with its slogan, expressed 
by Karen Barad as “relata do not precede relations” is another such approach.177  This core 
philosophical problem, the nature of relations, will be taken up in the following two chapters, and we 
shall see that indeed if we can get closer to solving the problem of relations, then we are in a better 
position to offer a solution that other central metaphysical problem of the metaphysics, the problem of 
similarity, or the “One Over Many Problem.” 
177 K. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Duke 
University Press, 2007), 334.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF ANALOGY II: THEORIES OF 
RELATIONS 
“Philosophy has been a long time coming to grips with the category of relations . . . .  It is not until the  
late nineteenth and twentieth century . . . that relations begin (not more than begin) to come into  
focus.”178
THEORIES AND RAZOR BLADES
We need a workable theory of relations.  As David Yates has written, “It is uncontroversial that 
there are a great many relational truths, but grounding such truths raises a host of philosophical 
problems.”179  Although no theory of relations emerged from the predominantly negative project of the 
last chapter, we were able to identify some of the reasons why relations are invoked as explanations of 
“the way things are,” something about the nature of relations given those reasons, and some of the 
philosophical problems a theory of relations needs to avoid.  We also saw some theories that failed to 
work.  The failure primarily was seen in the sacrifice of ideological economy over ontological 
economy; in order to preserve fewer types of entities (in order to count relations as fundamentally of 
the same type as a monadic property), brute facts were invoked.  In evoking primitives or brute facts, a 
philosopher says that some fact about the world lacks necessary and sufficient reasons or exists at the 
end of analysis.   For an analysis which is supposed to provide, in the case of metaphysics, necessary 
and sufficient reasons for as many of the facts about the world as possible, the fewer number of 
primitives or brute facts a theory invokes is a strong reason for favoring it over theories with more 
primitives evoked.  
That more ideologically severe theories are better might not ways be the case; we can imagine a 
theory that invokes one primitive.  For example, we can imagine a profoundly superstitious individual 
178 Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, 29.
179 Anna Marmodoro and David Yates, “Introduction: The Metaphysics of Relations,” in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. 
Anna Marmodoro and David Yates, 1 edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1.
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who attributes to a god all explanatory force and all abilities, even the ability to violate the principle of 
non-contradiction.  When questioned about how such a god might have such powers, or why the 
individual thinks that a god does, s/he answers, “That is just the mystery of god.”  Surely the theory 
might have ideological ( and even ontological) economy, but it fails to have any explanatory force at 
all.  So certainly ideological economy alone is not enough to judge a theory or judge its explanatory 
force.  Instead, maybe we might think that as metaphysicians we should instead focus just on the 
explanatory force of a theory, and let the best explanation lead us to the ontology rather than having 
ontological principles lead us to the best explanation.
The dichotomy here, though, is false.  We can no more give up the demand that we are frugal 
ontologists than the demand that our explanations actually explain things.  Our ontological principles 
are not rules for theories, but rules for theorizing.  They are tools that, as abstract as metaphysics can 
sometimes seem, keep us from “building castles in the sky.”  The demand for ontological economy is 
actually just a demand that we do not “spackle” our theories by inventing entities to cover the gaps.  
The demand for ideological economy is the same demand in principle: your explanation should not be 
needlessly patched up with inexplicables.  A frugal metaphysician such as myself dreams, of course, of 
a theory that meets both demands, perhaps a workable monism or a system with no brute facts at all.   
The first was the dream of Spinoza, and the second the dream of Leibniz, and hence the latter has lent 
his name to the theoretical principle dubbed “Leibniz’s Razor.”
Just because a theory free of any brute facts seems unobtainable does not mean such features 
should receive a carte blanche with just a caution to “keep it under control.”  Rather, as the previous 
chapter attempted to begin illustrating, even if we believe we have reached something that in fact has 
no necessary and sufficient reasons, then we should have a very good explanation of why the fact has 
no necessary and sufficient reasons.  In the last chapter, the principle that “Without this brute fact or 
primitive, the rest of the theory does not work” was rejected.  Instead, and the criteria this chapter holds 
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itself to most of all in developing the outlines of a general theory of relations, is that the theory should 
tell us why such and such is a brute fact.  We should be able to explain, echoing Wittgenstein, just how 
our spade hit this bedrock it has come to.180  If we have those good reasons, we may have found a stud 
rather than spackling and have something upon which to hang the walls of our metaphysical project.
It sounds so simple, this framing houses metaphor, but it will not hold up if we push it too far 
(“So what, then, is the foundation?” and so on).  The problem is that we find ourselves in the house 
already, fully built.  Moreover, although “reduction” or “conceptual decomposition” sounds as if that is 
what we should be doing when we engage in analysis, they are sometimes little more practical than 
disassembling a house so you can build that very house.  To discuss relations, we must take them for 
granted.  Nowhere is this fact more clearly seen than when we reflect on the similarity relation, and 
how it must be presupposed for you to understand the words on the page, or categories, or repeatable 
concepts.  This presupposition is both significant and inescapable.  Part of what makes the project 
before us so difficult is this necessary “taking for granted.”  Hence in trying to take up relationality as 
something that must be explained before any relation in particular, we must continuously fall back on 
taking a particular relation, the similarity relation, for granted to understand relationality in general.  
Moreover, this recourse is sure to be counted as a philosophical foul, a begging of the question, but 
unfortunately, it is unavoidable.  The very idea of a type, of something that counts as a relation but does 
not count as a stone, for example, requires the idea of similarity and hence relationality.  Later on, a 
justification will be offered: relations, and the similarity relation, are both necessary—they would be 
part of the furniture in any possible world—and they are fundamental, meaning they are not reducible 
to other  (non-relational) features of the world and hence are ontologically primitive.  They are 
bedrock.  
We do not quite have the sort of spades we will need to reach this bedrock yet, however; to start 
180 L. Wittgenstein, P. M. S. Hacker, and J. Schulte, Philosophical Investigations, 4th edition (Singapore: Wiley, 2009), 
Paragraph 217.
92
digging, we must first attempt to provide a theory of relations.  To do so, we must begin grappling with 
some of the most challenging elements of relations to explain.  After reviewing an extremely truncated 
history of theorizing relations in the West and India to set the stage, and to which we will usefully 
apply in Chapter Five, we will leapfrog over centuries to move on to examine by far the most 
influential contemporary effort to provide a theory of relations, that put forth by Kit Fine in his paper, 
“Neutral Relations.”181  It will be argued that in fact no reduction of relations to non-relational entities 
is possible, and that in fact Fine's solution to the problem of “directionality” or asymmetric relations, 
the “antipositionalist view” and the accompanying “Substitution Model of Relations” in fact 
presupposes relations, specifically, the relation of similarity.  Given that similarity is a relation, and 
antipositionalism is meant to explain relations, ultimately Fine is guilty of begging the question.  In 
parallel to this examination of Fine's position, a second account, the “Similarity Model of Relations,” 
will be developed.  The chapter concludes with a forceful argument that in fact there is a good reason 
for this Fine's fault: the similarity relation is a fundamental, irreducible element of the world, and as a 
relation, this means that relationality is likewise a fundamental element.  Relationality and similarity 
are bedrock.  In the chapter that follows, this conclusion will be challenged through difficulties arising 
from the epistemology of relations within Indian and Buddhist debates as well as Islamic jurisprudence.
RELATIONS IN ARISTOTLE
As we read in the previous chapter,  it is Russell who is generally credited with observing that 
certain relations seemed to have a “direction” built into them and therefore would behave logically 
different from symmetric relations.  Similarity lacks such directionality; it is a symmetric relation, 
meaning that in all cases if a is similar to b, then b is similar to a.  Other relations, like “bigger than,” 
are not symmetric.   Although Russell perhaps first saw the full implications of this difference, that 
181 Kit Fine, “Neutral Relations,” Philosophical Review, 2000, 1–33.
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some relations had directionality “built into” them had been long observed by Greek and Indian 
philosophers.  For example, Aristotle, despite his possible belief that all relations were reducible to 
monadic properties, built in a sort of directionality into these “properties.”182  In §7 of Categories, 
Aristotle considers relatives, which are “all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than 
other things, or in some other way in relation to something else [italics in original].”183  Aristotle takes 
it to be a question of merit whether a substance can be spoken of as one of these relatives, and 
dismisses that individual substances, whether “wholes or parts” can be spoken of as relatives.184  
Aristotle observes that one may come to know a substance, but that this does not mean one 
immediately knows the relations it enters into.185  Hence, relations do not seem to be substances.186  
What follows below is the “mainstream interpretation” of Aristotle's theory of relations, an 
interpretation which we will see has recently been challenged.
According to the mainstream interpretation, Aristotle seems to suggest that substances have 
relative properties, such as “being larger than” in which the predication only makes sense if we 
understand some other substance which serves as the correlate, for as Aristotle puts it, “all relatives are 
spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate;” if we are ignorant of the correlate, we are 
ignorant of the relative.187  Here Aristotle has identified a linguist use, our use of what the medievals 
termed “relative terms.”188  Hence, we cannot know something is twice something else, or the slave of 
someone, without also knowing that something is half of something else, or that there is a master of 
182 Marmodoro and Yates, “Introduction: The Metaphysics of Relations,” 4.
183 Aristotle, “Categories,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 6th edition, vol. 1, Bollingen Series 
LXXI 2 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 6a37-38.
184 Aristotle, 8a14-17.
185 Aristotle, 8a37-8b21.
186 This understanding of relations is actually remarkably close to the same reasoning, which we will examine more closely 
in the subsequent chapters, that leads the author of the Nyayalilavati to reject that similarity (and, we might infer, other 
relative terms) are universals.  He writes, “ttaccaikavyaktigrahaṇasamayē agrr hītamapi pratiyōgigrahē avagamyata iti 
siddhim,” that is, “In understanding one individual the correlates [of that individual] are not also understood.”  
Vallabha, Nyāyalīlāvatī. V.1:76.
187 Aristotle, “Categories,” 6b27; 6b27-36.
188 Jeffrey E. Brower, “Aristotelian vs Contemporary Perspectives on Relations,” in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. Anna 
Marmodoro and David Yates, 1 edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 39.
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someone else. However, he also observes that these relatives likewise have a counter-correlated 
relative.  So “double than” has a counter-correlate relative, “half than,” and the relative “slave of” 
means another relative exists, “master of.” 189  Each of these relatives has its own “direction.”  Hence, 
the statement that “This mountain is larger than that mountain which is smaller” seems to be made true 
not by one relation holding between the two mountains, but to relative properties had by the individual 
mountains—one being “larger than” and the other being “smaller than.”190  Hence, the direction of the 
relative, as well as the correlate, seems to be built into the property itself by Aristotle.   He finds, 
though, that linguistic use is not a reliable guide because we can say things like “the hand of” and this 
would result in us considering a substance (the hand) as a relative.  Because of the earlier stricture of 
how we understand substances—we do not need to know another substance in order to a present 
substance—this means the linguistic definition will fail as a metaphysical guide.  
There is, however, another definition that is not so clearly given, and this may be part of the 
reason why many have taken the above interpretation to be accurate.  Observing that language fails to 
serve as a guide about just what are relations, Aristotle notes we may be left with simply having to say 
that “those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something” and 
while the linguistic analysis is helpful and indeed applies to all relatives (and problematically, to things 
which are not relatives), it fails to tell us what relatives actually are.
As Anna Mormodoro and others have rightly observed, the first “linguistic attempt” and 
suggestion that all relations are indeed just “relative properties” is an example of what Russell critiques 
as the “monadistic theory” of relations noted in the previous chapter.191  In what can be understood as a 
reply to this perceived Aristotelian approach, Russell writes
189 Aristotle, “Categories,” 17b15-17.
190 Aristotle further observes also that not all relatives have this structure by which they imply some counter-correlate 
relative.  He notes while these relatives with counter-correlate relatives are dependent on one another, in that one could 
not exist without necessarily implying the other, this does not seem to be the case of all relatives.  For example, the 
relation of perception to perceptible does not, Aristotle argues, stand in this relation since perception need not exist for 
perceptibles to exist  (Ibid., 7b35-8a12).
191 Marmodoro and Yates, “Introduction: The Metaphysics of Relations,” 4.
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In the first way of considering the matter, we have 'L is (greater than M)', the words in 
brackets being considered as an adjective of L.  But when we examine this adjective it 
is at once evidence that it is complex: in consists, at least, of the parts greater and M, 
and both these parts are essential.  To say that L is greater does not at all convey our 
meaning, and it is highly probably that M is also greater.  The supposed adjective of L 
involved some reference to M; but what can be meant by a reference the theory leaves 
unintelligible.  An adjective involving a reference to M is plainly an adjective which is 
relative to M, and this is a merely a cumbrous way of describing a relation.192
There seems to be no advantage, from Russell's perspective, for Aristotle's “relatives,” and in 
subsequent chapters we will see how the use of relative properties renders all similarity claims trivially 
true, mere tautologies, and hence vacuous.  We already saw in the last chapter a few of those reasons 
when we considered the problems of treating asymmetric relations as universals.  
That this was actually Aristotle's or Aristotelians' views on relations, or the claim that the 
concern with relations is a recent one in the west, has recently come under criticism from Jeffrey 
Brower.193  Brower suggests that even before Aristotle relations had been the subject of philosophical 
scrutiny, and certainly we find evidence of this in Plato at least.194  Brower suggests that it is this second 
definition, with its certain vagueness, that was the definition actually taken up by later Aristotelians, 
and furthermore, relations continued to be treated as one of the irreducible categories of being, a point 
further emphasized by Sydney Penner.195  Quoting from the late medieval philosopher Peter Auriol, 
Brower emphasizes that there continued to be a tradition, which saw itself as the intellectual 
192 Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, §214.
193 Brower, “Aristotelian vs Contemporary Perspectives on Relations.”  
------, “Abelard’s Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition,” The Review of Metaphysics 51, no. 
3 (1998): 605–31.
194 Brower, “Abelard’s Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition,” 605.  
It cannot be justifiably claimed that The Phaedo, as well as parts of The Republic, are not concerned with the nature of 
relations.
195 Brower, “Aristotelian vs Contemporary Perspectives on Relations,” 42.
Sydney Penner, “Why Do Medieval Philosophers Reject Polyadic Accidents?,” in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. 
Anna Marmodoro and David Yates, 1 edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 55–79.
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descendants of Aristotle, that believed that Aristotle's “relatives” were not “relative properties” but 
were relations proper.
In the third book of his commentary on the Physics . . . [Averroes] says that a relation is 
a disposition existing between two things.  But even apart from him it is clear that 
fatherhood is conceived of as if it were a kind of thing standing between a father and his 
son.  And the same is true with other relations.196
So it seems that not all of those who saw themselves as the intellectual heirs of Aristotle believed that 
relations in fact reduced to relative properties, but rather, whatever relations were, they were 
ontologically distinct from their relata and the properties of their relata.  While it would be beyond the 
present author to say much about the medieval work on relations that Brower, Penner, Mark 
Henninger197 and others have explored, it seems sufficient to say that in fact there was a history of 
thinking about relations in the West, and also that the mainstream twentieth-century interpretation of 
Aristotle a la Russell might in fact not be accurate.  What is more, it was a particular type of relation 
that philosophers struggled with from early on: asymmetric relations, or relations with “directionality,” 
the very sorts of relations we saw gave realists and trope theorists (including Russell) so much trouble 
in the past chapter.  Perhaps this is because relations were not treated as an “irreducible category of 
being?”
RELATIONS IN NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THOUGHT
Because the specifics of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theorizing about the relation of similarity are largely 
the focus of a following chapter, and as such their defense of relations will have to be elaborated on, 
only the contours of their theory of relations will be presented here.  What we see, however, is that like 
Aristotle, the  Nyāya hold that relations are irreducible, but in part this position emerged from their 
196 Brower, “Aristotelian vs Contemporary Perspectives on Relations,” 42.  Quoting from Mark G. Henninger, Relations: 
Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
197 Henninger, Relations.
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specific sorts of relations. 
One the most general level, there are three types of things in the  Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology: 
substrates (dharmin), properties (dharma), and then relations (sambandha), and these are placed into 
appropriate ontological categories.  The last is necessary for the first two to participate, for like 
Armstrong and other realists, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are devoted to something that at least parallels states 
of affairs.  For substrates to bear properties, there must be some relation between them, and this 
necessitates relations in this worldview.  
Unlike Aristotle, who set relations aside as a category, we find relations in various categories 
proposed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.   In the six categories inherited from the Kannada's 
Vaiśeṣikasūtra, we find relations distributed among at least three of them.198  Some of the problems we 
saw plaguing realist theories that consider relations as of fundamentally the same type as properties are 
avoided by the  Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by considering relations as different types of things than properties 
(dharmadharmibheda).  So we have one category, that of inherence (samavāya) that is entirely made 
up of a relation.  That is singular, as there is only one samavāya relation, as we saw in the last chapter, 
a way of stemming off the sort of regress arguments possible against other theories requiring a relation 
to relate a substance and property.199  The category of qualities contains some relations like contact.  
A relation is characterized as simply the entity that comes to be between or rests on two 
different substrates (divsṭhaḥ sambandhaḥ), such as contact.  Spacial relations are useful as examples 
because they are perhaps more obvious than more theoretically complex relations such as inherence.  
When one's right and left hands touch, there is contact (samyoga).  Where the two hands not both in 
contact, there would be no relation of contact.  In fact, by just separating hands that were in contact a 
198 “dharmavize.sa prasuutaat dravyagu.nakarmasaamaanya vize.sasamavaayaanaa.m padaarthaanaa.m 
saadharmyavaidharmyaabhyaa.m tattvaj~naanaanni.hzreyasam.”   Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.4.  The categories are dravya 
(substance), guṇa (quality), karma (activity or action), sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya 
(inherence).  Later, abhava (absence) would also be added as a category.
199 We also saw that this relation is self-linking (svarūpa sambandha), which, combined with its singular nature, avoids a 
regress, unlike self-linking relations that are many in nature.
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second relation, disjunction, occurs.200  Yes, it would be improper to say that the relation is in either the 
right or the left hand.  Hence, the relationship, samyoga, although understood as “resting between 
them” is distinct from either hand.  Not all relationships, though, are so clearly between two distinct 
entities like contact, but these relations will have to be considered in the following chapters.  
What emerges from these early considerations of the nature of relations by Aristotle and the  
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an appreciation that relations should be treated on their own terms, and are not 
reducible to properties or substrates, the only other contenders for the  Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, nor are 
explained by Aristotle's remaining nine categories, although we might object relations are to be found 
in some of those, notably location, temporality, and affection.201  The concerns with the seeming 
directionality of relations and the reduction of relations to relational properties (also considered by later 
Nyāya thinkers) are all issues that the contemporary ontologists continue to address.  In what follows, 
we will turn our attention from the past to some of the most recent scholarship on the nature of 
relations and will find these concerns remain at the forefront.  We will see a vindication of these 
thinkers' insights that relations are non-reducible.  We will do this through a critical examination and 
evaluation of perhaps the most notable recent effort to reduce relations to non-relational entities, that of 
Kit Fine.
SUBSTITUTION MODEL OF RELATIONS: ANTIPOSITIONALISM
Kit Fine, in his article “Neutral Relations,” attempts to give an account of ordered relations that 
does not depend on positing an additional ontological category of relations.202  Fine concerns himself 
with developing a metaphysical account to explain relations in general but takes asymmetric relations, 
what he calls “biased relations,” to be a special challenge.  He develops his “antipositionalist” position 
in opposition to the “standard” view and to the “positionalist” view, both of which he sees as failing to 
200 “anyatarakarmaja ubhakarmaja.h sa.myogajazca sa.myoga.h | etena vibhaago vyaakhyaata.h |” Vaiśeṣikasūtra 7.2.9 
201 Aristotle, “Categories,” (1b25-2a4).
202 Fine, “Neutral Relations.”
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provide the account demanded by asymmetric or “ordered” or “biased” relations.
The antipositionist view of Fine is not dependent on the standard view that, under Fine's 
presentation, sees relations as holding between items in a particular order as more or less a brute fact of 
relationality.  Fine describes the standard view as follows:
According to the standard view, there is a certain notion "holding" or exemplification 
that holds between a given relation and its various relata. Thus we may say that the 
relation loves of the objects a and b in this sense just in case a loves b. It should be 
noted that the order of the relata is relevant to whether the relation holds. Thus whereas 
loves holds of Don Jose and Carmen, it does not hold of Carmen and Don.203
It is this ordering of relations that is of primary concern.  So while it may be true that Anne loves Ollie 
(aLo) it may not be true that Ollie loves Anne (that is, ~oLa).  In considering how to explain the 
“ordering” of relations, one must also explain why certain relations—symmetric relations like 
similarity in particular—do not depend on such ordering.  As an account that explains all relations in a 
single theoretical framework rather than separate account for symmetric and asymmetric relations is 
preferable given theoretical elegance, if an account can explain both biased (ordered) and unbiased 
(unordered) relations, it will be preferable.
Fine's proposal, the antipositionalist view, holds we understand relations by their similarity with 
one another, and that certain objects may fill certain relations, and their order is understood not by 
ontological entities that are slots, space holders or argument places, but instead simply by substitution: 
what other objects can stand in this relation.204  An analogous way to think of these relations are 
unsaturated two- or n-place predicates, which, when filled, must be true (and hence not all entities will 
be eligible to fill them, or fill particular places in them).  There are two related mysteries with this final 
account: first, how relations are to be identified through another relation—that of similarity; and 
203 Fine, 2.
204 Fine, 16.
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second, why substitution provides the best account of explaining the order of relations without resort to 
biased relations.  I suggest that the motivation for both of these solutions is the ontological economy of 
the frugal metaphysician.  The hope is armed with only substitution we can provide an account of all 
relations, biased and unbiased, including similarity.
THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED
Fine holds that there are two principles that must be explained in any account of relations: 
identity, which holds that “any completion of a relation is identical to the completion of its converse,” 
and second, uniqueness, that holds that “no complex is the completion of two distinct relations.”205  A 
completion is a completed relation. Together, however, these form a contradiction.  Consider a 
completion of the asymmetric relation R, for example, “2 is less than 3.”  Now by Identity, “2 is less 
than 3”  is also a completion of a converse of R, S.   By uniqueness, these two relations are the same. 
Given that R is asymmetric, however, they are distinct and the relationships R and S are not identical.206 
Uniqueness is a challenge of identifying different relations: if a single completion exemplifies them, 
and there are no separable ontological entities that are relations, only the complex, then how are 
multiple relations to be identified on the basis of a single complex?  Taken together identity and 
uniqueness form a contradiction when considering symmetrical relations as a single complex is always 
the completion of both the relation and its converse relation and therefore violates uniqueness given 
identity (consider how the cup on a table is a completion of both the “above” and the “under” 
relations).  Therefore, an adequate theory of relations must entail a solution to this contradiction, and as 
the standard account fails to resolve this contradiction, it is inadequate.207
THE STANDARD VIEW
205 Fine, 5.
206 Fine, 5.
207 Fine, 7.
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The standard view simply holds that since relations must relate, they must relate in some order.  
This order of relating reveals both the relation as well as what objects can stand in that relation.  Fine 
denies that standard view is adequate to explain this conundrum above.  This is because, given a single 
state of affairs, the same objects may complete both a relation (aLo) and its converse (oLa), although 
only one relation may actually be realized.  Given the same state of affairs (the set of two objects), one 
must invoke some notion other than the set of two objects to explain why the first relation is 
exemplified but not its converse.  For example, we may have two objects, Allie and Oliver, but the 
relation of love may only hold in such a way that Allie is the beloved of Oliver, but not in such a way 
that Oliver is the beloved of Allie.  Fine denies that the standard view can give an account of why both 
the relation and its complex are not realized.  This is the problem of converse relations which any 
adequate theory of relations must address.  While there are avenues the standard view may take, 
depending on whether the standard view wishes to deny either identity or uniqueness, both approaches 
seem inadequate to explain two problems: why aLo is true but not its converse, and second, how to 
distinguish aLo from any other relation exemplified by Anne and Ollie, such as “Anne is beside Ollie” 
(aBo, and, since it is a symmetric relation, oBa).  A revised position, the positionalist account, seeks to 
solve the problem by suggesting relations have ontological prior space holders or “argument-places” 
which only certain objects “fit into.”  
THE POSITIONALIST VIEW
The positionalist view comes to the defense of this naïve standard view.  The positionalist 
account, as developed by Fine, holds that there exists some space holder in relations (a space holder for 
“is beloved” and “loves”), an “argument-place” that is ontologically prior to the objects that can fill 
such space holders but impute no other qualities (aside from “can fit into this placeholder”) to the 
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objects that can fill them.208  There are “argument-places.”   Argument-places can only be filled by 
certain objects in certain relations—only certain objects will “fit” into the relation's argument-places 
much in the same way that only square blocks will fit the square slots in baby toys, while spheres will 
only fit into the circular slots.  The relation itself is then understood simply by what space holders it 
has.209  The relation of maternity, for example, is just understood in terms of having the slots “mother 
of” and “child of,” or the relation of slavery as “master of” and “slave of.”  In some ways, the 
positionalist account comes close to what we are observed in Aristotle's Categories.  
While the position seems attractive at first glance, further complications made it less tenable.  
First, one must stipulate the mysterious notion of “fit” that relates objects to their space holders in the 
relations that they enter into, and second, why some resulting relations are in ordered relations, and 
other relations are not.  Finally, an objection not considered by Fine but critical to the problem of 
individuation of relations is how are distinct relations in which the objects “fit” into the same “slots” to 
be distinguished from one another.  For example, if Ollie has now developed his own amatory 
attraction to Anne, then aLo and oLa are both the case.  How is this to be distinguished now from Ollie 
being beside Anne (oBa and aBo) if relations are only known via how objects “drop into” them?  With 
only the primitive notion of fit, it seems we are not able to individuate relations.  Particularly troubling 
are relations that are always concurrent with each other or relations which are nested inside of each 
other (for example, object x is not touching object y, and, object x is spatially distinct from object y; b is 
a relative of c, and, c is the daughter of b).  Given the ideological extravagance of this primitive notion 
of fit fails to allow us to differentiate relations with identical relata, which we assume a theory of 
relations should be able to do, the sacrifice of ideological economy is too great given it does not serve 
the ontological duties we hoped that it would.
208 Fine, 10.
209 Fine, 10–11.
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THE ANTIPOSITIONALIST VIEW
Fine's solution to the problem of individuation is elaborated on in his antipositionalist account.  
What makes one relation the same as another (such as the loving relation in such cases as Ollie loving 
Anne, and, Meas loving Seyha) is the fact that they resemble one another.  Rather that assign relations 
argument-places as in the positionalist account, the antipositionalist account takes relations to be 
multivalued operations, and hence the outcome is multiple states by which the relation could be 
completed by different objects.210  What constitutes resemblance is that “one state is the completion of a 
relation in the same manner as another.”211  Two relations are the same relation if they resemble each 
other, resemblance being that they are “completed in the same manner.”212  Fine provided a formal 
definition of a relation completed in the same manner as another:
. . . this is a relation that holds between a state s and its m constituents a1, a2 ..., an, on 
the one side, and a state t and its m constituents b1, b2, ..., bn on the other, just in case s is 
formed from a given relation R and the relata a1, a2 ..*, an in the same way in which t is 
formed from R and the relata b1, b2, ..., bn.  Thus, each of a1, a2 ..., an will, from an 
intuitive point of view, occupy the same positions in s as b1, b2, ..., bn  occupy in t, the 
constituents on each side will similarly "configured" in their respective states.213
Hence, if Deepa is the left of Wong (dLf), and Hafthor is to the left of Beth (hLb), we can identify the 
relation as the same since Deepa and Hafthor will both occupy the relational position of “left” and 
Wong and Beth will occupy the relational position of “right.”  This “antipositionalism” will also apply 
to relations which have a converse relation but in which the converse relation may not hold, as well as 
relations that do not have a converse relation.  That is, we understand “2 is less than 3” and “3 is greater 
than 2” as different relations because in the first, 3 cannot occupy the position of “less than” when 2 
210 Fine, 19.
211 Fine, 20.
212 Fine, 20.
213 Fine, 20.
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occupies the “greater than” position.
However, this idea of “completed in the same manner,” which I will refer to simply as 
“similarity” or “resemblance” in what follows, is itself a relation that holds between relations.  Hence, 
in order to individuate relations, we must first have a working theory of relations!  Then, through the 
similarity relations between relations, we can sort them out into different relations, from “beside,” 
“loves,” to “less than.”  The idea of relations holding between relations has, however, a sketchy 
position in the history of philosophy because of the lurking specter of a regress.  This concern will be 
addressed in the following section.  This potential problem will be set aside for the moment.
To know such relations (for individuating relations is as surely an epistemic as well as an 
ontological issue), Fine performs a thoroughly Platonic slight of hand.  Just as we saw in Chapter One 
with Plato suggesting we need a paradigm to understand paradigms (and therefore assuming 
paradigmatic reasoning), Fine suggests that we can understand and individuate relations through 
paradigmatic (hence analogical and relational) reasoning.  Fine writes:
Suppose, for example, that we wish to say that the amatory relation holds of Anthony 
and Cleopatra in the manner characteristic of loving rather than being loved. Then using 
t0 above as an exemplar, we may say instead that there is an (actual) state s that is a 
completion by Anthony and Cleopatra in the same manner in which t0 is a completion of 
Abelard and Eloise.214
There is much that we could bring out here—that our ability to individuate relations under this 
view depends on our ability to recognize when a relation holds and therefore to recognize other 
places or times at which it holds through recognizing co-mannered relations.  Most critically, 
perhaps, is the use of analogical reasoning—the use of an exemplar of a relation to recognize 
the same relation holding at other times and places.  This recognition further depends on our 
214 Fine, 21.
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ability to recognize a second relation (besides “loving” or “being loved”) which is similarity.  
Some of these issues will be addressed at length in what follows, and again, must be set aside 
from the moment.
Fine considers three objections to his antipositionalist account, but only the third need 
to concern us here.  That is the objection that the notion of co-mannered completion is taken for 
granted when it should be explained on other terms, in part because co-mannered completion 
seems just as mysterious as argument-places or the brute nature of relations under the standard 
view.215  It also might fall prey to the objection that it is relational itself, and therefore fails to 
provide an account of relations since it assumed relations.  Fine attempts to address this 
objection through the notion of substitution (henceforth, Substitution will be used to refer to 
Fine's theoretical concept, and substitution to refer to substitution in general).216
SUBSTITUTION 
Fine assumes that we have a general, non-domain-specific understanding of substitution and as 
such the antipositionalist account can call upon substitution as a more primitive notion to explain 
relationality and the individuation of relations through similarity.  Therefore, we can understand co-
mannered relations simply in terms of substitution instances.
For to say that s is a completion of a relation R by a1, a2 ..., an, in the same manner that t 
is a completion of R by b1, b2, ..., bn is simply to say that s is a completion of R a1, a2 ..., 
an that results from simultaneously substituting a1, a2 ..., an for b1, b2, ..., bn in t (and vice 
versa).217  
Even though substitution is a general concept, there comes the objection that even though it is general, 
there are always domain-specific structures that explain the result of any substitution instance. For 
215 Fine, 25.
216 Fine, 25–28.
217 Fine, 25–26.
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example, if I were changing the lights at a stop light, I would substitute one red light for another, and 
there is a structure that explains why substituting a green light for the red and yellow lights would be an 
improper substitution.  The convention of traffic rules and signs forms a domain-specific structure that 
determines what can be substitutions for what.  In what follows and in the next chapter, it will be 
argued that such substitution instances are determined by similarity in the relevant respects.  The 
objection, here, however, is that even though substitution is a general notion, there are still structural 
considerations for any specific application of substitution.  
There are at least two possible responses that Fine considers. The first is simply to take 
substitution as a primitive notion.218  The second is to consider substitution not as primitive but in terms 
of a structural operation.  The problem with the latter account is, however, that it seems structural 
operations can also be given in terms of substitution, just as substitution can be given in terms of 
structural operations.219  As Fine writes, “the mere fact that there cannot be substitution without
structure does not mean that it is by reference to the structure that the possibility of substitution should 
be explained.”220  Fine simply denies that this is an actual problem.221  Therefore, substitution provides 
us with a  model of representing and understanding relations that can make sense of both biased or 
asymmetric relations as well as symmetrical relations without a commitment to an ontology of 
argument-places or placeholders nor assigns relations any mysterious directionality.  It can provide an 
account of positions by referring to co-positions: for example, b2 can be substituted for a2 and therefore 
can be considered co-positional, and abstracting this idea of co-positional we can do all the work of 
argument places that the positionalist account can do.222
218 Fine, 27.
219 Fine, 27.
220 Fine, 28.
221 I am unsure of just how to interpret Fine's terse statement here.  If he is talking about the mere possibility of substitution, 
as a concept or operation, without reference to structure, then likely there is no reason to object.  However, in any actual 
substitution, it does seem arguable, at least, that in fact ontological or meaning structures provide the very possibility of 
any specific substitution as counting as successful (e.g., replacing a red traffic light with a  green traffic light fails to 
count as a successful substitution).
222 Fine, “Neutral Relations,” 32.
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What we get, then, is a picture that depends on recognizing a relation as holding (Ollie loves 
Anne), and recognizing that because we could substitute Anthony and Cleopatra for Ollie and Anne and 
still have the same relation, that we, in fact, have a relation, loves.  Moreover, this is all we need.  We 
do not need, claims Fine, any understanding beyond recognizing what substitution instances preserve 
the state of the relation holding, recognizing that the relation can be completed in multiple ways by 
multiple objects.  Unfortunately, Fine is too optimistic about the ease of explanation antipositionalism 
and Substitution seems to offer. 
There are several problems lurking in the shadows here as has been noted in the preceding 
paragraphs.  In what follows, these problems that are not addressed by Fine are taken up.  While 
ultimately Fine's explanation of relations is unsatisfactory, because it depends critically on already 
having an understanding of a particular relation and therefore attempts to allow the theory to lift itself 
up by its own bootstrings, this is because a theory of relations necessarily must do so.  Therefore, first 
Fine's theory will be defended from accusations that relations among relations, particularly the 
similarity relation needed to identify co-mannered relations, results in a regress of relations (Bradley-
type regresses) or a regress of resemblance (Russell's Regress).  Along the way, the objection that 
unique relations with a single instantiation are impossible to recognize since they would have no other 
substitution instances will be addressed and overcome.  Then we come to the heart of the issue, and that 
is the notion of substitution. Fine's antipositionalism fails only because it does not go deep enough, not 
because it failed to reduce relations to non-relational concepts.  It is argued that Substitution (big S) 
fails to adequate explain relationality because substitution (little s) depends on relationality, specifically 
on the relation of similarity.  Therefore, Fine is guilty of begging the question.
An alternative account of individuating and understanding relations will be given then in terms 
of similarity.  This will not be a reduction of relations, however, as similarity is a relation.  However, 
similarity is a more fundamental concept that substitution, and an algebraic proof will be given that 
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substitution can be accounted for in terms of similarity but similarity cannot be accounted for in terms 
of substitution.  This will be accomplished by demonstrating that identity and similarity can be given in 
terms of one another, but substitution can be given in terms of identity but identity cannot be given in 
terms of substitution.  At that point, we will have the spade we need to hit bedrock.  We will have the 
foundation upon which to build our house.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF ANALOGY III: THEORIES OF 
RELATIONS CONTINUED
In the previous chapter, we considered three approaches to relations; from our brief 
consideration, we saw that both Aristotle and early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers thought of relations as 
fundamentally irreducible types of ontological entities although we did not dive into the details of their 
respective theories.  We also considered the fairly contemporary and very influential theory of Kit Fine, 
who proposed that relations are best understood as substitution instances individuated by their 
similarity with other substitution instances.223  Fine does not propose his work necessarily as a 
reduction of relations, and in fact the word “reduction” never appears, but he believes it offers a general 
theory of relations224  However, it is difficult to understand why he then proposed that substitution is a 
more primitive notion than relating or how like-mannered relations are available to us as a tool for 
understanding relationality and individuating relations.  The answer dawns upon us when we realize 
Fine takes for granted that we have a clear understanding of just what relations and relating are; the 
puzzle is only why some relations have what Russell called “directionality” seemingly build into them 
and why some do not.  
This chapter, through the vehicle of both a defense and critique of Fine's work on relations, 
develops a working theory of relations that can serve to gird a theory of analogical reasoning, the 
principle reason for this long foray into relations.  As will be recalled from the last chapter, in his 
antipositionalist account, Fine takes substitution to be a more basic and ready-at-hand concept that 
relations, and therefore analyzes relations as substitution instances. What makes a relation the same 
despite different particulars entering into the relation is that such complexes are similar—they are “co-
mannered relations.”  
223 Fine, “Neutral Relations.”
224 Fine.
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Theoreticians working on relations have long been suspect of relations holding between 
relations, or similarity as a tool of individuation.  These are most powerfully expressed in two regress 
arguments, one associated with Francis Herbert Bradley and the second with Bertrand Russell.  In 
defending the antipositionalist account from these two regress arguments, by showing either they fail to 
apply or are in fact virtuous rather than vicious, we gain a deeper understanding of antipositionalism 
than is available from Fine's account alone.  In doing so, the insights gained from the previous two 
chapters must be marshaled, and the problems associated with taking relations as universals or tropes 
must be avoided as well as blundering into nominalist mousetraps.  With a more robust and charitable 
reading of Fine, we are also in a better position to observe how much work the primitive notion of 
substitution and “co-mannered relations” are doing.  This position allows us, in turn, to develop a more 
sophisticated critique of the antipositionalist account by demonstrating that it is, in fact, a resemblance 
nominalist theory of relations and as such is subject to many of the same critiques that can be leveled at 
resemblance nominalist theories of properties.
By examining the analogous relation of set-building (analogous to relation completing), we can 
see that in fact bare substitution fails to individuate relations and therefore preserve identity.  By 
examining the algebraic operations of substitution, we can further demonstrate that substitution is a 
reducible concept, and a more primitive notion is available to us and in fact should be employed:225 
identity.  Although more primitive than substitution, in that all accounts of substitution may be given in 
terms of identity but not vice versa, identity itself is a complex notion and demonstrably inseparable 
from two other notions: equality and similarity.  Here is truly bedrock.  What this finding entails is that 
we must take similarity for granted (if we are to grant such seeming truisms like 1=1 or 2=1+1); once 
having similarity as a given concept we can construct substitution instances and understand “co-
mannered relations” in such a way that preserves both uniqueness and identity.  The metaphysics of 
225 Although no attempt is taken to demonstrate it here, these claims from algebraic operations should also apply to first-
order logic.
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relations will be completed as a workable theory, but the epistemological problems—of knowing 
relations—and the normative consequences of such knowledge—will still await us in the subsequent 
chapters where attacks on both relations as irreducible and analogy as means of knowing will be 
explored in detail.  
INDIVIDUATION BY SIMILARITY AND BRADLEY'S AND RUSSELL'S REGRESSES
The use of similarity (co-mannered relations) immediately introduces a number of possible 
problems that must be overcome.  First, does the introduction of a relation of resemblance to 
individuate relations risk a regress a la Bradley's Regress as “co-mannered” is a relation of 
resemblance holding between relational complexes? This is particularly important given the ordered 
relations that antipositionalism proposed to individuate relations.  Second, does Russell's Regress of 
Resemblance, elaborated as a critique of resemblance nominalist theories, apply to a similar theory not 
of properties but of relations and the use of resemblance between entities as a way to individuate them 
without reifying types?  And finally, does a theory of individuation of relations in terms of similarity (to 
other relations) fail to account for the individuation of relations with a single completion instance, that 
is, relations with a single instantiation?  For if to individuate a relation is to recognize that relation's 
similarity with another relation, does that not mean in principle relations with single exemplifications 
cannot be recognized?
The first problem should already be familiar to us from the previous chapters.  Bradley asked 
the question of what makes a related to b in aRb?  For it is not enough that there is an object a, an 
object b, and a relation R for all of these could exist independently of one another.  Bradley suggested 
that there must be some third relation, an instantiation relation, I, that relates R to a and b.  But, so the 
regress goes, must there not be some other instantiation relation O to relate I to the relation R to relate 
it?  Bradley writes,
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 There is a relation C, in which A and B stand; it appears with both of them.  But 
here again we have made no progress.  The relation C has been admitted different 
from A and B and is no longer predicated of them.  Something, however, seems to 
be said of this relation C, and said, again, of A and B. And this something is not to 
be the ascription of one to the other.  If so, it would appear to be another relation, 
D, in which C, on one side, and on the other side, A and B, stand.  But such a 
makeshift leads at one to the infinite process.  A new relation, D, must be 
predicated . . . and hence we must have recourse to a fresh relation, E, which 
comes between D and whatever had come before.226
And Phillip Keller has helpfully described the regress as follows: 
If exemplification were a relation between, say, a particular a and a property F, 
and hence a universal, a further relation would be needed to connect a, F and the 
exemplification relation . . ..  An ontologically and [explanatory] vicious regress 
would follow. 227
A similar sort of regress can be posed to the account of individuation of relations through similarity 
where individuation stands in the same problematic relation as instantiation in Bradley's work and 
which we spent some much time ruminating over in Chapter Two.  The regress introduces an order of 
relations problem given that there are second-order relations that are used to identify first-order 
relations.  The question is, then, is not a third-order relation needed to identify the second-order 
relation, and then a fourth-ordered relation to identify the third-order relation, and so on ad infinitum. 
226 Francis Herbert Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (Macmillan, 1899), 17–18.
227 Philipp Keller, “Why Bradley’s Regress Is Harmless,” 2008, 1.  Stewart Candlish and Pierfrancesco Basile have 
suggested that there are some exegetical problems with this sort of formulation of the regress, and that it is better 
understood as a regress that begins with the relational nature of the terms themselves and suggest that the regress runs in 
the opposite direction--an infinite regress in which each term is broken up into two related terms, which are then 
subsequently broken up in two related terms, and so on.  While they are absolutely correct in identifying this regress of 
term-relationality, in giving his analysis Bradley does seem to propose the regress most associated with him and the one 
that concerns the text quoted above.  See: “Francis Herbert Bradley (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy),” accessed 
September 10, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley/.
113
Here is an illustration of the problem.  For us to individuate relation L (say, as the loving 
relation) we need to recognize the relation holding in other instances, say instances t0 and t1.  That is, 
we recognize relations as being co-mannered and hence of the same relation.  I recognize another 
relation, P, by the same means (let us say, “of equal weight to”) through complexes c0 and c1  .  I can 
differentiate and therefore individuate relation L from relation P by recognizing P is not co-mannered 
with L—what I can substitute into relational complexes t0 and t1 that allow me to individuate L cannot 
be substituted into P, so P is not co-mannered and hence is a different relation since not everyone who 
loves one another happens to weigh the same as one another.
It is the recognition of a relation above and beyond the complexes t0 and t1 that allow me to 
recognize it as co-mannered—that t0 and t1 are similar to one another in the proper respect (of being co-
mannered) just as c0 and c1  are co-mannered.  What makes the individual complexes co-mannered is 
the similarity of the relations that hold between them “internally,”228 but it is the relations between these 
groups of complexes that allow us to recognize them them as “co-mannered” but through different 
internal relations.  Now, for me to recognize a relation above and beyond the relation holding between 
the complexes t0 and t1, that relation must also be individuated.  So I must recognize the relation that 
holds between  t0 and t1 which allows me to recognize relation L is also the relation that holds between 
c0 and c1 that allows me to recognize relation P (the relation of being co-mannered).  Let us call this 
relation S1, the similarity in relevant respects necessary to identify co-mannered relations.
For me to recognize the relation S1 that holds between relations L and P, I must be able to 
individuate it.  Therefore, I must be able to understand the complexes now composed of relations L and 
P are similar to the complexes of relations Q and R in that they are co-mannered in the way L and P are 
respectively.  Therefore, in order to recognize the relation that holds between the relations I must be 
able to recognize this relation as holding between relations, and so it seems I must introduce a relation 
228 For example, between t0 and t1 and not c0 and c1.
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of S2 , the similarity relation in relevant respects necessary to identify the co-mannered relations 
between co-mannered relations.  And so on  . . . .
One answer, and one we do not have the right to make yet, would be to take similarity as 
primitive.  This move immediately curtails the application of the regress to the order of relations 
problem in antipositionalism.  This answer would assume, though, too much at this point and violate 
the principles of ideological economy as set out in the previous chapter.s  We are not required to make 
that move, however, as substitution and co-mannered relations have the resources to show in fact the 
regress is toothless.  
We can hold that similarity relations are similar, and that those second-order similarity relations 
are similar, and so on, but this regress is not vicious as no higher-order account is needed to explain the 
similarity relation or individuate it, nor is any additional information added at any point of the regress 
and hence it is vacuous.  A similarity relation between two sets of complexes can be identified as a 
similarity relation because the two relations are similar.  That this relation among relations is also a 
similarity relation can be individuated by reference to another relation holding between two similarity 
relations, but this may be unnecessary.  First, the similarity relations are not confined to always hold 
between relations in a single order lower than themselves.  The similarity relation holding between sets 
of relations are similar to one another and individuated; however, each individual similarity relation is 
similar to any other similarity relation no matter the order of the relation and in precisely the same way 
(see Figure 1); hence, a third order similarity has the same similarity relation with a first order 
similarity or any nth ordered similarity relation.  They are not, in fact, different types of relations, but 
instead simply another example of the multivalued operation of antipositionalist completion which 
results in a plurality of states of completion. Multiple objects may complete a relation, and it just so 
turns out that those object may be other relations.  Relations may be of types, and individual relations 
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may be tokens of those types.229  
This is not identical to the concept we considered in Chapter Two, samavāya, which was 
described as a self-linking relation, a svarūpa-sambandha, although similarity is self-linking.  That is, 
all similarity relations will bear their self-same relation to all other similarity relations, and as we will 
see, given that identity and equivalence can be given in terms of similarity, it would seem every object 
bears a reflexive similarity relation to itself, including, if relations can serve as relata, similarity 
relations themselves.  Unlike the relation of samavāya, similarity relations seem manifold.  If they were 
not, and there was simply one similarity relation, it seems then everything would be similar to 
everything else in the same respects.230  Moreover, the utility of co-mannered relations is the ability to 
sort relations and individuate relations.  Unlike substances and universals, which particulars and 
properties can be used to sort out blue pots from red balls, relations are individuated by completions, 
and identical completions may exemplify more than one relation (for example, Meas and Seyha might 
exemplify the loving relation and the adjacent relation simultaneously).  This results from, seemingly, 
the ability to identify multiple similarity relations holding between single complexes (and hence 
multiple other types of relations).  So while similarity relations seem to be of a single type, it would be 
too hasty to conclude that like samavāya the similarity relation is a single token as well.
We may even sort different similarity relations into different types of similarity relations 
depending on the respects which they are similar.  It is in ways they are dissimilar that also provides 
this sorting criteria.  Because it is not only the complexes that complete relations, but substitution 
instances as well, the differences between how complexes were formed (what we might think of as the 
operation of a relation) will determine what the relations are.  That relation's similarity in terms of 
substitution instances that preserve the relation is what allows us to recognize it as a type of relation.  
229 It is worth pointing out that this claim need not endorse or reify types. The procedure given above should set well with 
many realists, trope theorists, as with resemblance or set nominalists.  It is also worth emphasizing the procedural nature 
of the explanation. This is how we determine whether or not two sets of items are related to one another in the same way
—not what sort of entity that relation is (although this begs the question—the type of entity is a relation).  
230 This will be explored within the South Asian philosophical debates in the next chapter.
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This “sorting” of relations can occur at any order of operation, but the similarity by which a relation is 
a similarity relation will exist between similarity relations no matter what order of operation.  That is to 
say, things may be similar in different ways, but the relation we use to determine X is a similarity 
relation and Y is a similarity relation will be a similarity relation simpliciter.  
So individuation through recognizing co-mannered relations or similarity does not confront us 
with the same problems of instantiation that Bradley drew our attention to.  While we can provide a 
regress in terms of similarity relations holding between higher and higher orders of properties, it is no 
more damaging than the truth-regress that Keller and others have drawn our attention to that moves 
from “p” to “it is true that p” and then to “it is true that it is true that p” and so on ad infinitum.231  Just 
as truth is truth no matter what order of truth in the truth-regress, similarity is similarity not matter what 
the order of the relation.
A further reason, and one explored in what follows, is that similarity relations are reflexive: they 
are, to use the language of Nyāyakas, svarūpa.  That is, the similarity relation is similar to itself.  The 
implications for a Bradley-type regress should be clear: a single similarity relation can generate a 
second relation to which it will be similar in being a similarity relation itself.  Given, now, we have two 
similarity relations that are similar to one another, we have enough to individuate the relationship of 
similarity.  It is any other relation that shares a similarity relation with any other similarity relation.  
More will be said on this topic in the discussion of identity, equality, and substitution as it relates to 
similarity relations.
231 Keller, “Why Bradley’s Regress Is Harmless,” 1.
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Figure One: The similarity relation holding between sets of relations are similar to one another and individuated with 
similarity relations being indicated by blue lines; however, each individual similarity relation is similar to any other 
similarity relation no matter the order of the relation.
A second possible regress is that formulated by Russell in an attempt to demonstrate that 
resemblance nominalist theories of properties were untenable because they all must propose a universal 
of resemblance to avoid a regress.  Before providing Russell's statement of the regress, it is important 
to note that it is a critique of property nominalism and not of individuation of relations.  It clearly has 
applicablitity to a theory that attempts to do the same sort of work for relations through resemblance as 
resemblance nominalism wishes to do for properties.  Therefore, it is worth considering the regress, its 
applicability to the theory of individuation under consideration, and possible responses to it.232  The 
problem confronting the antipositionalist is not the same as that confronting the resemblance 
nominalists at least at first blush.  As we have already seen in the past chapter, however, the relational 
quality of resemblance is a very good reason to think it is not a universal, and hence to think that all 
other relations are not universals.  But this conclusion does not work for the antipositionalist account.
232 To restate Russell,   “If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose some particular 
patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it has the right sort of 
resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are 
many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things; and this is the 
characteristic of a universal. It will be useless to say that there is a different resemblance for each pair, for then we shall 
have to say that these resemblances resemble each other, and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a 
universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal.  And having being forced to admit this 
universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of 
such universals as whiteness and triangularity.”Russell, “The World of Universals,” 48.
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Rodriguez-Pereyra considered Russell's Regress as he develops a nominalistic theory of 
properties contra universals.233  He sees the regress as critically concerned with the following 
questions:  given three white objects, is the resemblance relations holding between those objects the 
same relation, or is it a particular relation?  If it is a particular relation, then do we say it is “the same” 
relation (of all being white) because the relations of similarity holding between those objects are 
similar to one another?  And if it is a particular relation, does not that relation of similarity then require 
an additional relation of similarity for it to be the same in that it is a relation of similarity?234   As stated 
by Rodriguez-Pereyra, Russell's Regress then has clear implications on our theory of individuation by 
similarity relations.  However, our answer to the Bradley-type regress will apply here as well.
The regress depends on a number of assumptions.  The first, which  Rodriguez-Pereyra draws 
our attention to, is the notion that the resemblance relation is a “thing” so there is either some 
particular, “the resemblance between a and b” aside from just a and b, or that there is just a 
resemblance between a and b, not some entity, universal or otherwise.235  If there is the first, then some 
account for the resemblance between particular similarities is needed to explain why the set of 
particular similarities between the three white objects are all considered as the same type of similarity
—similar in that they are white.  If there are merely resemblances between objects, then there is no 
regress; that is to say, the three objects are similar, simplicter.  To ask if these resemblances resemble 
one another is to beg the question and reify the resemblance.  
It is unclear that this response is not one readily available to the antipositionalists, however, as 
clearly the antipositionalist must hold that resemblance relations between relations are possible.  
Relations must be “things” because they can form complexes—if not, the antipositionalist account will, 
it will be shown, collapse in upon itself.236  But since all relations are understood in terms of their 
233 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Resemblance Nominalism and Russell’s Regress,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, 
no. 3 (2001): 395–408.
234 Rodriguez-Pereyra, 399.
235  Fine's theory attempts to avoid this very claim by only invoking complexes and substitution instances
236 The answer to the Bradley-type regress should make it clear; individuation of relations requires relations between 
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resemblance to one another, the antipositionalist is giving a fairly similar account as the resemblance 
nominalist.  
For the antipositionalist, it is true that relations are individuated in terms of their resemblance.  
However, this resemblance is not constructed in terms of relations-as-such since relations are ultimately 
to be reduced to their relata and then are to be understood in terms of “co-mannered relations.”  Like 
the resemblance nominalist, the antipositionalist is committed to ultimately reducing relations to just 
their relata, to the objects or terms of the relations.  This denial of relations' ontological independence 
sounds like double-talk at present, and although this will be explained in what follows, a brief answer is 
warranted.  Working with complexes, we are able to generate relations.  As argued in the first chapter, 
given any two objects occupying the universe, there will be some relations between them, including 
similarity relations (even if they are absolutely unique and share no intrinsic properties, given extrinsic 
properties, they will have properties in common).  Hence, we are now warranted, just with objects, to 
speak of relations.  Whether we take relations to have an independent existence apart from their 
complexes is the crux of the issue, and the antipositionalist simply denies that is the case in the same 
way the resemblance nominalist, although entitled to talk about properties, denies that properties have 
any independent existence aside from the objects to which, through similarity relations, we are able to 
assign properties.  Relations may enter relations with other relations, but without the complexes of 
individual objects, there simply will not be any relations in the first place.  Therefore, the assumption 
that there is some entity that is the “similarity relation” by Russell is inappropriate in this context.  This 
may seem disingenuous since at this point the similarity between relations has been key to 
individuating them.  Now to simply say there are actually no such things as relations seems a slight of 
hand at best and simply metaphysical cheating at worst.  There are a number of resorts available, 
however: using the analogy from resemblance nominalism, once we have generated a category, such as 
relations.
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properties, even though we deny their existence as independently existing furniture of the universe, we 
can still sort them into “color-properties” and “smell-properties,” for example.  Just because we can do 
this sorting does not mean we are conferring any independent ontological status to what is being sorted. 
A second resort would be to introduce talk of relations as supervening on objects—relations as different 
from and dependent on objects.  The denial of relations as ontological entities is not the only option 
available to the antipositionalist, however, in response to Russell's Regress of Resemblance, and one 
can respond to the criticism an hold relations have some ontological being.
The same response given to the Bradley-type regress is appropriate here.  The regress is 
possible, but it is vacuous and not vicious.    The similarity relation holding between sets of relations 
are similar to one another and individuated; however, each individual similarity relation is similar to 
any other similarity relation no matter the order of the relation.  We do not need to resort to ever-higher 
orders of similarity to give an account of similarity.  Hence, we can make similarity claims between 
relata as well as between relations as way of individuating properties (a la resemblance nominalism) or 
relations (a la antipositionalism) without encountering this regress as vicious.  The reason is the very 
similar nature between the similarity relation and inherence—whatever the similarity relation is similar 
to (another similarity relation), it is the same type of relation.  We may not encounter different types of 
similarity relations, but everywhere the similarity relation is of the same genus.  It allows us, however, 
to sort out other relations (“both being white”) on the basis of the relational complexes. To repeat, 
things may be similar in different ways, but the relation we use to determine X is a similarity relation 
and Y is a similarity relation will be a similarity relation simpliciter.  
We might be able to generate a taxonomy of similarity relations into different  genera 
(similarities of color, similarities of smell, and so on), but the similarity between these types of 
relations—that makes them all of the same kingdom of “similarity relations”--will be the similarity 
relation simpliciter.  Yet at the same time, such a sorting of similarity relations seems unnecessary and 
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unwanted.   For the resemblance nominalist, it is similarity simpliciter that allows us to recognize 
similarity, and this recognition of similarity provides us with the tools for recognizing the respects by 
which objects are similar (“similar in respect to red,” “similar in respect to smelling loamy”).  To “build 
in” properties into the similarity relations themselves can lead to, it will be shown, incorrect inferences 
when making analogical arguments.  Given that this metaphysical assumption leads to logical 
contradictions, it must be rejected. The only way around is an incredibly abundant universe of finely-
grained similarity relations; an acceptable but perhaps bitter pill to swallow for the more frugal 
metaphysician.  
A remaining problem for this antipositionalist account is relations which have only a single 
exemplification.  If similarity to another relation is how one accounts for the differentiation of one 
relation from another, then relations with single exemplifications then are seemingly undetectable given 
we have no way of individuating or differentiating them.  This problem is similar to the one introduced 
by Armstrong as an objection to resemblance nominalism; that is, it cannot give an account of 
properties with one exemplification since it reduces properties to resemblance relations.237   With 
nothing to resemble there can be no resemblance relation and hence either the resemblance nominalist 
must admit of properties and abandon his position or provide some alternative account.  Rodriguez-
Pereyra has proposed that possible worlds theory provides just the solution needed.238  Hence, in 
resemblance nominalism with possible worlds, to be a property is reduced to resemble some object in a 
certain respect either actually or possibly.  So in a universe in which there is a single grue-colored 
object its property of being grue-colored is reduced to resembling some other grue-colored object in 
some possible world, a realist possible world or an ersatz possible world.239  Hence the problem of a 
single exemplification need not render a property unexplainable, irreducible or undetectable.  This 
237 Armstrong, D.  Universals and Scientific Realism.  I: Nominalism and Realism.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978.  51.
238 Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo, Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals, Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2006. 99.
239 It does not seem that anything rides on us being a realist about possible worlds or not, although the question about 
relations existing between actual and merely possible objects are relations is a fascinating one.
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approach provides the solution that Fine seems at a loss to discover.  A completely unique relation, 
then, can still be individuated in terms of its similarity with another possible complex that serves as the 
completion of the same type of relation albeit in a possible world rather than an actual world.  Given 
TSB also depends on such possible worlds, and has been admitted albeit with some reservations (it 
cannot be the complete theory of truthmaking), there seems no good reason to balk at appealing to 
possible worlds here.
One might still feel a bit of discomfort given the seemingly mysterious nature of similarity 
relations.  On one hand, it serves a unique purpose among relations, individuating relations including 
itself.  On the other hand, we could deny that similarity is any sort of special relation; it is reducible to 
substitution as all relations are but it simply plays a special role of individuating other relations as well 
as itself but is not a special type.  Just as the relation “beside of” allows us to distinguish things that are 
beside one another, “similar (or the same) to” allows us to distinguish “loves” from “is beside of.”  The 
fact that the relation that holds between the relations oLa, aLo, mLs and sLm and between the relations 
aBo, oBa, mBs and sBm is the same relation—the relation of similarity—is given just because the 
relation holding between those two relations is similar.  This does require a second-order relation 
(“these two similarity relations are similar”) but it need not be a vicious regress if we hold that beyond 
second-order similarity relations any higher-order similarity relation will simply be vacuous.  Only a 
second-order similarity relation is needed to individuate similarity as a relation, and in this context, that 
of “completed in the same manner,” individuating similarity as a relation is all the work the relation 
needs to do.  Just what “completed in the same manner” means is the topic we will explore in the 
following section.
While similarity plays a unique role among relations, as the relation which we can use to 
individuate relations and recognize identical relations, it functions no differently from any other 
relation even when used to individuate itself.  However, this resemblance relation itself must be hashed 
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out in such a way that makes sense given the ontological nature of relations.
THE ANALOGY OF RELATIONS AND SET-BUILDING
Fine suggests that the process of “completed in the same manner” is similar to set-building; 
certain sets may be constructed in different ways and yet contain the some or all of same members but, 
given we understand how we constructed the sets, we may distinguish them.  The relation between 
“relation construction” and set-building is an analogous one, but it is very helpful in addressing two of 
the key demands that Fine suggests any adequate theory of relations must address:  identity, which 
holds that any completion of a relation is identical to the completion of its converse, and second, 
uniqueness, that holds that no complex is the completion of two distinct relations.  Set-building 
provides a demonstration that uniqueness is false in that two identical sets may be the result of non-
identical functions.  Analogously, a single complex may be the completion of two non-identical 
relations.  The ability to distinguish sets on the basis of their construction and identify differing 
relations on the basis of a single complex requires a similar process of individuation.  
Bijective functions provide an illustration of differentiating sets on the basis of their 
construction although these such functions are not the only such illustration.  A simple function like f(x) 
= x2 can have the domain of just the positive natural numbers {1,2,3,...}, and the range will therefore 
be the set {1,4,9,...}.  This means that all the members in the range set will also be members of the set 
of positive natural numbers.  In this case, the sets themselves may be distinguished from one another, 
given the set, in that they do not have the same set membership, and even without understanding how 
the sets were constructed, given their dissimilarity, they can be distinguished.  But this is not the case in 
sets formed by bijective functions.  A function f (from set A to B) is bijective if, for every y in B, there 
is exactly one x in A such that f(x) = y.240  The two sets then could be identical in terms of set 
240 For example, the function f: R → R, f(x) = 2x + 1 is bijective, since for each y there is a unique x = (y − 1)/2 such that 
f(x) = y.  Therefore the function is bijection since the function from a set A to a set B  is both injective and surjective . 
Therefore a bijective function is both one-to-one and every value in the set A is mapped onto the same value in the coset 
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membership.  The first set was given (by a previous function, as an assumption, et cetera) while the 
second set, the coset, was formed by the bijective function.  Set membership could be identical, and 
therefore the only way to individuate the sets from one another is to understand how the set was 
formed.   Identity is an ideal bijective function.241  However, identical sets can be formed by more than 
bijective functions.  The set of all even numbers should be identical to the set that begins with two and 
adds two ad infinitum to all subsequent sums, yet if we know how each set was formed, we can 
differentiate them not by set membership but by how they were formed.
Such individuation of identical sets may seem trivial, but it can be shown otherwise.  Consider 
two theoretical data sets.  Assume that each process for building the data sets is carried out perfectly.  
One data set is pulled from a national government computer database and is the passport number of 
every individual passport issued and active from that nation.  Simultaneously an international census of 
every individual person from that nation is carried out to collect from active passport holders' passports 
numbers from their physical passports.  Ideally, these two data sets should match.  It is not trivial, 
however, that they should match or how each set was formed.  If they do not match, it indicates the 
possibility of such problems as forged passports from that nation, passports that have gone missing, or 
errors in the national government database.  Understanding which set of data was collected from the 
computer data and which was collected from the international census group would remain essential 
even if the data sets were perfectly identical in terms of numerical members.  Such examples illustrate 
that while the members of the sets will or may be identical, we can distinguish the sets by how they 
were constructed and such individuation of one set from another is non-trivial.  
The analogy with relations is this: co-mannered relations are relations “formed” or represented, 
as it were, in a similar manner just as sets.  An identical function fed identical inputs will have an 
identical output and therefore will be the same.  In just the same way, an identical representation of 
B.
241 Formally, if S is a set, the identity function f on S is defined as that function with domain and codomain S which satisfies 
f(x) = x for all elements x in S. 
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identical completions will be just the same.  Different completions “formed” by the same 
representations will represent the same relations analogously to how sets formed by the same function 
are similar.  And just as, when given just the set, the function which was used to construct the set is not 
apparent, just so, given just a single complex, the relation of which the complex is the completion is 
also not readily apparent.  Even given an identical state of affairs, this state of affairs may be the 
completion of one or more relations depending on how we understand the representation of that state of 
affairs.  However, we need not posit that the “manner of construction” or the representation of the 
relation is an entity in itself just like we do not need to reify functions.  But the similarity between such 
ways of representing allows us to individuate such ways of representing just as the similarity between 
functions allows us to recognize the same function.  
We must be careful here to emphasize this “construction” of relations, for otherwise, we 
encounter the aporia faced by resemblance set nominalism in the case of coextensive properties.  In 
naïve resemblance set nominalism, a universal is simply to be identified with all the objects that 
exemplify that quality, the set of those objects that are similar in that way.242  Hence, in the case of 
relations, it would simply be the set of all completions of that relation; the universal (or relation) is 
simply reduced simply to the set of objects (or completions) that exemplify it.  While there are several 
intractable problems with naïve resemblance set nominalism, this naïve notion of quality set-identity is 
the most problematic as it entails qualities (and relations) with coextensive sets (or completions) are 
identical.  The classic example then becomes “having a heart” and “having a liver” become identical 
qualities under this description since the sets of objects with hearts and objects with livers—creatures 
with cardiopulmonary systems—are identical, while intuitively we believe that even though 
coextensive, “having a heart” and “having a liver” are not the same quality.  Analogously, we also think 
relations with identical sets of exemplifications are not necessarily the same relation.  This raises one of 
242 For an excellent overview of nominalistic set theory, see the eloquent essay by David Lewis, “Nominalistic Set Theory,” 
Noûs 4, no. 3 (1970): 225–40.
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the critical questions of our exploration here: is there something else, in addition to the completion, that 
is the relation—some third thing?  
Of course, antipositionalism denies that there is some third thing, and we should resist the urge 
to consider “a manner of completion” as a separate ontological object just as we should resist the urge 
to assign to functions existence as separate ontological entities. It is worth again emphasizing the 
procedural nature of this determination.  However, clearly we can individuate identical sets from one 
another in meaningful ways based upon how they were constructed, and likewise, we can distinguish 
different and meaningful relations holding between a single complex.  These conclusions should be 
strong arguments against the claim of naïve resemblance set nominalism that relations or properties just 
are the sets of their exemplifications.  Furthermore, it introduces an element of consideration we do not 
often encounter in metaphysics: historicity.  We must not just consider what is, but also how it came to 
be.  
PROBLEMS WITH SUBSTITUTION 
The remaining problem for Fine's antipositionalist account, where substitution plays a key role, 
is how to account for biased relations where the order of the relation seems important (such as in the 
case that Anne loves Ollie but Ollie does not love Anne), the very problem to which it was the proposed 
solution.  Fine appeals to the idea that substitution provides an adequate account for the seeming order 
of relations.  Taking substitution as primitive, Fine argues that one need not impute biases to relations 
but only to consider whether one object can be substituted into the relation for another.  This 
substitution is also Fine's explication of “same manner of completion.”  In Fine's defense, he admits 
that he offers no argument for taking of substitution as the primitive but rather does so because of an 
intuition.  Hence Meas loves Seyha and Anne loves Ollie just in case in the relation xLy Meas can be 
substituted for x and Seyha can be substituted for y and Anne can be substituted for x and Ollie can be 
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substituted for y and the relation is seemingly preserved through the substitution instances (which we 
understand in terms of the first complex being similar to the second).   This approach is seen as an 
alternative to “structural resemblances” that would seemingly impute biases to many relations such as 
those just mentioned.  In what follows, it is demonstrated that any account we provide of substitution 
will either be dependent on similarity, or it will fail to preserve our theory of individuation that depends 
on the analogical notion of set-building.  Hence, antipositionalism is dependent on similarity, and 
therefore substitution cannot be used to give an account of similarity relations.  
We encounter the first major set of problems with substitution when we ask simply what is 
being substituted and how.  In the “loves” relation, as in most relations, the substitution must be of the 
entire complex (both objects in the relation), or, similarity determines what object is suitable for 
substitution into this complex.  Under the first account,  the substitution must be of the entire complex 
as otherwise substitution will, in many cases, render the assertion of the relationship false.  Hence it is 
true that Seyha loves Meas (sLm) but it is not true that Seyha loves Annie (sLa).  Hence the relation 
that Seyha has to Meas does not resemble the relation that Seyha has to Annie even though in stating 
the relation both Meas and Annie occupy the “second position” of the beloved.  The risk here becomes 
making the relation sLm itself a unique relation, so that “loves” is a different relation in every 
exemplification (for otherwise, anything occupying the “beloved” position should be able to be 
substituted for the “beloved” position in any other complex and remain truth-preserving—this is the 
problem raised above in considering different types of similarity relations).  This  accusation in part 
motivated Russell's Regress.  
We may be perfectly willing to accept, however, that every exemplification of a relation is 
unique but deny the relation itself is unique in that they are tokens of a type.  Such a conclusion is 
perfectly compatible with the nominalistic spirit of antipositionalism's endeavor.  All relations, it could 
be claimed, are unique (as tokens), but the types of relations are to be identified on the basis of 
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similarity relations holding between unique relations while the relations themselves are merely 
representations of the complex.  But substitutions are then irrelevant.  No work is being done by 
substitution at all, but only by the similarity.  “Seyha loves Meas” is no substitution for “Seyha loves 
Anne” nor for “Ollie loves Anne” but rather is is just the similarity that holds between the complexes of 
Seyha and Meas and Ollie and Ann but does not hold between Seyha and Anne that allows us to 
recognize the relation of love in two complexes but not the third. If complex substitution is the 
substitution in play, substitution offers no more basic an account of relations than what was already 
reached in the above section.
Under the second account of substitution, a single object can be substituted into the relation but 
similarity determines whether the substitution is truth-preserving.  For example, Seyha loves Meas but 
Seyha also loves Bopha.  The relation “loves” is individuated in terms of the similarity of the relation 
that holds between both Meas and Bopha to Seyha.  Alternatively, a “what-it-would-be-likeness” could 
also provide a criteria for substitution.  Right now, the coaster is on top of the table.  The relationship 
“on top of” is what remains similar to when the coaster is on top of the counter, but what does not 
remain similar if I use the coaster under one of the legs of the table in order to balance it.  In the second 
relation, the complex has remained the same but not the relation that was once exemplified by the 
coaster being atop the table and atop the counter (now in fact the table is on top of the coaster, so the 
relation is actually still exemplified but now in a different order).  As long as the “what-it-would-be-
likeness” of the relation is truth-preserving throughout different substitutions, then the same relation 
holds between the new complex (the new complex is a new completion of the same relation).  This 
reading is, this author believes, the most charitable and faithful reading of antipositionalism's 
substitution.  This account, however, also fails to make substitution more basic than similarity as it is in 
terms of the similarity that holds between the substitution within the complex that determines whether 
or not the relation-claims about the complex are truth-preserving.  Without appealing to an established 
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understanding of similarity, it does not seem clear how to determine whether or not any substitution is 
or would be relation-preserving.
Part of the appeal of substitution, according to Fine, is that it is a generally understood and 
specific application, and while it requires a structure, structural operations can be given in terms of it.243 
There are, however, various models and contexts for substitution that make the claim that it is a 
generally understood and specific application more problematic.  Semantic, syntactic, algebraic, and 
type and token substitutions all raise specific questions as to what is meant by substitution.   There are 
three central problems, however, with the second account above of substitution.  First, substitution is 
unable to preserve the insight that set-building is analogical to relating, and cannot preserve the insight 
that similarity in a respect can individuate relations.  Second, similarity is still used to assess whether or 
not the substitution is relation-preserving or the new relational claim is true.  The third problem relates 
to a possible response to the second.  One response to the second problem is that similarity relations 
can be understood themselves in terms of substitution, as substitution is merely an application of the 
properties of equality.  However, these properties of equality can be given in terms of similarity, and 
from them substitution can be derived.  That is, substitution can be reduced to similarity.
The first problem with the substitution account is related to the problem of co-extensive sets in  
naïve resemblance set nominalist.  Consider a set A and its coset  B that was formed by a bijective 
function.  These sets will have identical substitution applications.  If the function is ignored and the sets 
are given purely in account of their substitution applications, with co-mannering in terms of 
substitution applications providing the criteria for similarity relations and similarity relations providing 
the criteria for individuation, these sets will be exemplifications of the same function (as they are in 
terms of set membership).  While it is true that an identical set could have been constructed by the same 
function, the case remains that they were not constructed by the same function and hence could be 
243 Fine, “Neutral Relations,” 28.
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individuated on that basis.  Any identical sets, regardless of how they were formed, would suffer from 
having identical substitution instances unless our notion of substitution is extended to include 
construction: remember our passport census.  However, substitution was resorted to in order to explain 
construction, and analogously, co-mannered relations.  In the case of relations, substitution erases any 
notion of the relation just like it ignores the function in set construction.  Even given the application of 
similarity, assuming a faithful account of similarity relations can be given in terms of substitution 
alone, all relations that have coextensive completions would have identical substitution instances.  
While such a substitution application would retain the ordering of all relations, it encounters the same 
problem of coextensive sets.  It provides an account of biased or ordered relations but at the cost of 
accepting uniqueness and being unable to give an account individuation. Substitution alone 
(particularly if our account of similarity must also be given in terms of substitution) will collapse all 
coextensive relations.
The second problem comes from evaluating substitution applications.  It seems prima facie that 
similarity is used to determine whether a substitution instance is successful or a failure.  A substitution 
instance that is successful is one that preserves the truth of a relation-claim.  A substitution instance that 
fails is one that does not preserve the truth of the relation-claim. As already argued, such substitution 
claims can be modal as long as they preserve the “what-it-is-likeness.”  But this “what-it-is-likeness” is 
clearly no more than a similarity claim.  We access a substitution instances by whether or not they are 
sufficiently similar to what they are a substitution for.  Hence an account of the similarity relation itself 
could not make use of any such notion.  Brute substitution will collapse relations with co-extensive 
completions.  That is to say we have no idea of what is an appropriate substitution without the criteria 
of similarity.  There is a response to this, however: that substitution is just an application of the 
properties of equality.
I can only give a sketch of the possible response that substitution is just an application of a 
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property of equality, and this response would be different enough to distinguish it from the general 
notion substitution as so far considered so we may label it “Strict Substitution.”  The idea is this: 
substitution applications are merely the result of a property of equality.  Therefore it is in terms of 
equality, not similarity, that substitution instances are to be evaluated.  Given this restriction on just 
what we mean by substitution, we evade the challenges of the first two problems in two ways.  First, 
substitution under this construct perfectly preserves set and completion integrity by allowing no other 
functions or methods of substitution aside from those stemming from applications of equality 
properties.  Second, similarity is removed from consideration as only equality (and identity) are 
considerations in accessing the veracity of a substitution instance.  All that is needed, then, are the 
postulates of the (in this case algebraic) properties of equality: the Reflexive Property (a = a), the 
Symmetric Property (if a = b, then b = a), and the Transitive Property (if a = b and b = c, then a = c).  
Given these postulates we can construct a proof for the Substitution Property of Equality (if a = b, then 
a can be substituted for b in any equation or inequality) as long as we stipulate the set is reflexive and 
closed to addition.  Given that we must be able to construct a proof for any such substitution 
application in terms of these postulates, we have sufficiently restricted substitution to ensure perfect 
fidelity to the relata being replaced.  
Strict Substitution does not rid us of the problem for many relations, however, unless we think 
about the relata quite quixotically.  In the relation in which Seyha loves Meas what would be an 
appropriate strict substitution for Meas or Seyha?  Clearly the proof we can construct for the 
Substitution Property of Equality in which Meas is a relata means finding another relata equal to Meas. 
What operation can be carried out to demonstrate we have substituted the equivalent of Meas?  The 
only criteria I can think of is that of truth-preservation.  But in this case the evaluation of truth-
preservation requires that we already understand what is the  equivalent of Meas and hence begs the 
question.  Part of this problem is because relations may be formed on the basis of extrinsic properties, 
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not merely intrinsic properties (for example, “beloved of”).  In such cases, to understand what 
substitution is truth-preserving we could know all the intrinsic properties of an object and still not be 
able to determine whether or not it is a successful substitution.  Instead, we must rely on our 
understanding of extrinsic properties that themselves can depend on the relation, as in the case of 
“beloved of.”  But given we resorted to Strict Substitution to determine just what substantiation 
instances would be successful, it begs the question since it requires us to already know  what 
substitution instances would be successful.  A substitution could “fit,” but without the relevant respects 
given by similarity we would have no criteria to identify such a possible substitution aside from, again, 
question-begging truth preservation.  While we may be able to give arithmetical and algebraic accounts 
of substitution in the strict sense (and perhaps in the physical sciences, also), they are of no help in 
analyzing non-mathematical relations.  
Strict Substitution does at least seem to offer promise to provide an account of relationality 
where there is some procedure for establishing equivalence.  But that procedure is always executed 
given the normativity of equivalence, a notion best understood in terms of relevant similarities, 
demonstrated above, and is itself always relational as is demonstrated below.  General substitution does 
not work without an implicit working notion of similarity, and therefore fails to be an adequate 
explanation of relations given that similarity is relational.  In fact, it can be demonstrated that Strict 
Substitution is itself relational.  One only need to consider the properties of equality to see that the  
Substitution Property of Equality is a relation (equality) that holds between two relata, and the proof of 
which is constructed from postulates that are also explicitly relational, the Transitive Property and 
Symmetric Property.  Furthermore, the Transitive Property of Equality is a relation that only holds 
between a complex if they share something that objects in the world such as Meas and Ollie only hold 
in relation to themselves: complete similarity in all respects.  This is the Reflexive Property, and it is 
not a proper identity property or identity relation.  But it does stipulate that for equality to hold, a and a 
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must be exactly alike.  The claim that the Reflexive Property of Equality is dependent on a notion of 
similarity is defensible given that similarity is likewise a reflexive property.  Building on the work of  
Douven and Decock,244 we can provide a paraphrase of all the Properties of Equality in terms of 
similarity.  However, these paraphrases depend on the reflexive property which is a relational property, 
albeit one that requires merely one relata.  It is in this sense that similarity is relational.  Douvan and 
Decock propose the following formal definition of identity in terms of similarity in the relevant 
respects:
IdC (a,b) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : dr (a,b) ≤ trC245
a and b are identical if, for any given context C, for all relevant respects r where r is an element of the 
similarity space S in context C such that where the distance function d for that respect r for a and b 
where dr is the distance between a and b is equal to or less that the tolerance limit for r in context C trC 
and given 0 ≤  trC. 
Part of the strength of the definition is the fact that it is contextual. Depending on how the 
distance function and the relational space are defined, the definition should operate within any context.  
An example of identity obtaining and identity not obtaining from within a mathematical context can 
help illustrate an application of the definition.  So, for example, (2) and (1+1) are identical if within the 
context of the positive whole numerals number line in the similarity space with distance from zero as a 
respect (position on the number line), such that distance being defined by the function (|(f(a) = 2-x) - 
((f(b) = 2-y)|) where the function yields an absolute value and where the tolerance limit in this context 
given this respect is equal to or less than 0.  The distance function determines if there is any distance 
between a and b on the number line.  With a tolerance limit of zero, any distance greater than zero will 
mean that in respect to position on the number line, given the distance function, a and b are not 
identical.  
244 Igor Douven and Lieven Decock, “Identity and Similarity,” Philosophical Studies 151, no. 1 (2010): 59–78.
245 Ibid., 68.
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IdC ((2), (1+1)) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : (|(f(a) = 2-(2)) - ( f(b) = 2-(1+1))|) ≤ 0.
IdC ((2), (1+1)) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : (|(0) - (0)|) ≤ 0.
IdC ((2), (1+1)) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : |0|  ≤ 0.
 (2)=(1+1)∴
IdC (2, 4) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : (|(f(a) = 2-(2)) - ( f(b) = 2- (4))|) ≤ 0.
IdC (2, 4) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : (|(0) - (-2)|) ≤ 0.
IdC (2, 4) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : |2|  ≤ 0.
 2≠4∴
These examples are merely illustrations of the possible power of identity defined in terms of 
similarity in relevant respects.  Furthermore, armed with this definition, we can produce a paraphrase of 
all of the Properties of Equivalence, and using those paraphrases, construct a proof of general 
substitution and Strict Substitution built out of the “Properties of Similarity Postulates” that extends 
beyond mathematical equivalences and into non-formal spaces.246  It is worth considering that the 
algorithm by which Pixy, the image-recognizing robot-camera we met in the first chapter, operates in 
almost precisely along such lines, with the distance function as providing the degree of tolerance for 
similarity to account for such things as changes in size (one context) due to distance or changes in hue 
(another context) due to a shadow falling over an object.  Contextualization of relevant respects means 
that unlike Strict Substitution there can be a clear criteria for equivalence outside mathematical 
applications.  This criteria, understood as relevant similarities, then allows us a procedure by which to 
make truth-preserving substitutions into relations and therefore a way of understanding “co-mannered 
246 Reflexive Paraphrase: IdC (a,a) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : dr (a,a) ≤ trC
Symmetric Paraphrase: IdC (a,b) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : dr (a,b) ≤ trC  ≡ IdC (b,a) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : dr (b,a) ≤ trC
Transitive Paraphrase: IdC (a,b) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : dr (a,b) ≤ trC  & IdC (b,c) ↔ ∀r  S∈ C : dr (b,c) ≤ trC  Id⊃ C (a,c) ↔ ∀r  ∈
SC : dr (a,c) ≤ trC  
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relations” in terms of similarities of relations.  Both individuation and substitution can therefore be 
explained in terms of similarity.  
However promising this approach there are still a number of underlying difficulties that depend 
on subsequent research to answer.  In terms of mathematical identity in the context we have defined it 
is clearly necessary for it to have a tolerance limit as without a tolerance limit there would be no 
process to verify if, given the output of the distance function, if two objects were identical.  In the 
examples above, which analyze similarity in terms of distance from zero on the number line, the 
tolerance limit is clearly essential.  Note, however, that the tolerance limit imports the notion of 
equality into the definition of identity.  Our paraphrases give us postulates of similarity, but they 
depend on the reflexive nature of similarity (the fact that a will be similar to itself) and through that 
reflexivity some brute notion of equivalence.  This “Similarity Model” (as opposed to the “Substitution 
Model”) must hold that this equivalence can be understood only through similarity relations: bare 
equivalence cannot provide the criteria for substitution aside from Strict Substitution, and even in Strict 
Substitution there may be a case that equivalence can only be understood in terms of relevant 
similarity.
There is a highly intimate and problematic relationship between identity, equivalence and 
similarity.  Two twenty dollar bills are identical in value and therefore equal in value.  This “identical in 
value” means similar in all relevant respects in the contextual space of monetary value.  The two bills 
are not identical in that they are two different physical objects.  They are not similar in terms of the 
extrinsic spatial relations with other objects although they likely are in terms of their chemical 
composition.  We may broaden the respects and context to completely universalize the definition, but 
that still does not remove its dependence, in many situations at least, on the equivalence relation that 
relates the value of the distance relation to the tolerance limit.  At the risk of flogging a dead horse, 
given the reflexive relation of similarity, this dependence on the equivalence relation should not come 
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as a surprise and should not be thought of as a fatal flaw.  The reflexive nature of similarity is of a 
metaphysical, not a formal nature: it is given by what similarity is qua similarity.  As such it may offer 
the most promising metaphysical basis for an account of both equivalence and identity.  What remains 
to be seen is that given similarity is also a relation, can it fare any better in giving an account of 
relations?  To see this, we must backtrack a bit while keeping in mind that why general substitution nor 
Strict Substitution are adequate accounts of relations.  
THE SIMILARITY MODEL 
Fine suggests that his antipositionalist view has transferred the complexity of relations from the 
relata to “a network of connections.”247  Even with the aforementioned difficulties of using substitution 
as the concept to unpack these complexities, we can still preserve this notion and remain true to what 
this author takes to be the economical, theoretical, and ontological motivations of our cheap 
metaphysician as all good metaphysicians are cheap, forever seeking two-for-one deals.  To do this 
work of relations cheaply, rather than taking substitution as primitive and using it to explain the 
similarity of relations, similarity should be taken as primitive and used to explicate relations with 
substitution being one among many.  Paired with the theoretical tools of modal logic, both the complex 
versus relata substitution problem and coextensive problems of substitution disappear since the 
problem was, after all, “sneaking in” notions of similarity into substitution applications.  However, the 
question remains: what help can similarity, itself a relation, be to providing a theory of relations?  We 
saw in the earlier section its value of individuating relations.  But can similarity provide any analysis of 
relating given it is itself a relation?
Similarity is able to provide a further analysis of relations.  Not only does similarity provide a 
way of individuating relations through their similarity to one another, but it also provides criteria for 
247 Fine, “Neutral Relations,” 32.
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substitution instances.   It can provide an account of ordered or biased relations.  Only through the 
notion of similarity can the notion of correct substitution instances be made sense of in part but not 
only because equality is simply the strongest similarity relation meaning similar in all respects.  Given 
the notion of similar in all respects, the properties of such similarity can be made explicit in terms of 
the Properties of Equality postulates from which a proof of the Substitution Property of Equality can be 
constructed.  Given that similarity provides both a criteria for individuating relations as well as the 
criteria for assessing whether a relata's substitution instance into a relation is truth-preserving, it 
accomplishes everything that general substitution and Strict Substitution set out to do while providing a 
more fundamental account of substitution.  However, similarity remains a relation.
Our cheap metaphysician set out to offer an a reductive account of relations and one that did not 
encounter the “plus one” problem of any relation being composed of three things—two relata and 
something else, a relation, that related them.  What will be termed the “Similarity Model,” in taking 
similarity relations as a justified primitive, can give a solution to the “plus one” problem as it does not 
posit any independent ontological entity that is the similarity relation.  Rather, similarity is a relation 
that can be abstracted either from sets of relata (in terms of qualities) or sets of complexes (in terms of 
relations).  It need not posit any third thing aside from these sets of complexes or the state of affairs 
constituted by and only by those complexes and can be agnostic towards the question of whether or not 
relations represent independent ontological category.  It does seem, however, unsympathetic to the idea 
that relations exist in any way independently of relational complexes yet the relata of those complexes 
seem to be very rich, including non-actual objects.  The resemblances need not be found in the 
relation248 itself, as something floating around “out there” and “for real” but rather can be explained in 
how it is represented among a “network of connections,” an explanation that can also serve to explain 
how it is differentiated and how complexes are assigned different relational properties based on those 
248 Or quality for that matter
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representations.  Furthermore, there is no difficultly in explaining both how converse relations are 
exemplified by the same complex of objects and no difficulties in accounting for symmetrical relations. 
There is nothing so far in our analysis to prevent us from introducing ontological talk of relations above 
and beyond these ways of representing (at least not without further argument) but likewise there is 
nothing to compel us to do so.
The fact remains, however, that similarity is fundamentally a relation and for it to serve as a 
reduction of relationality we must give a non-relational account of similarity.  Substitution offered that 
hope, but we saw by analysis that it failed.  There is the possibility that identity could offer a non-
similarity dependent analysis of equality, given which, substitution could be resuscitated in some form.  
Recently, Douven and Decock, as we have seen, have pointed out that instances of identity claims can 
be analyzed in terms of similarities in relevant contexts, work that does not pull from but echoes W. V. 
O. Quine's early and influential critique of analyticity.  Their work is in part motivated by the fact that 
what we take for identity conditions vary in contexts.  If identity is a relation, it of course fails to 
provide a reduction of relationality, and if it is dependent on similarity then it fairs no better than 
equality.  
But is there hope given we need not posit any “third thing?”  Is not the coaster on top the table 
(along with the glass on top the counter) or the lovers Meas and Seyha (along with the lovers Ollie and 
Anne) all that is needed to provide an account of “on top” or “loves” given the relevant similarities 
these sets of complexes have to one another?  Is this not a successful reduction of relations to 
complexes?  Herein lies the difficulty.  Yes, we need nothing but those pair of complexes but we cannot 
even begin to analyze the relation without introducing the relationality of similarity.  Unlike material 
reductions, where all relevant talk of a supervening property can be given in terms of its supervenience 
base, we have no way of even beginning to explain the relation shared by the complexes without first 
introducing similarity talk which simultaneously introduces relations talk.  Without similarity talk, our 
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explanation of what constitutes any relation is inadequate.  And without similarity talk, we have no way 
of evaluating whether substitution applications will be truth-preserving aside from mathematical 
equivalence (theoretically—there is always some consciousness or artifact of consciousness bearing “in 
mind” that 1 and 1 are the same thing).  The Similarity Model, while it cannot provide a reduction of 
relationality, does allow us to discuss what is fundamentally required to begin talk of relations and in a 
way that accords with our own cognition, experience of the world, logical and formal properties 
observed and discovered, and deep metaphysical intuitions while at the same time not adding to the 
furniture of the universe by reifying relations or mistaking them for universals.  The Similarity Model 
allows us to substitute an individual object rather than a complex and so prevents all relations from 
collapsing into unique relations, each the one type with no other tokens; this also frees us from the 
restriction of only substituting complexes so we can explain how object substitutions that actually 
preserve relations are possible.  Similarity also allows us more elbow room in explaining just how 
relations are similar by allowing us to use such structural features as “how the relation was construed” 
that seemingly disappear in an account given using only substitution and certainly are not available 
under Strict Substitution.  While we did not get our two-for-one deal from similarity, we did get all 
other relations along with it, a worthy bargain for our thrifty metaphysician.  We find ourselves at the 
same point as Fine: able to give an account of the very essence of our idea of a relation, but in a way 
that preserves more of our intuitions about that idea than Fine is able to do merely with “co-mannered 
relations” and substitution as the account of such co-mannering.  
TRUTHMAKERS AND COMPLETIONS
One of the principles which we rejected was the principle of uniqueness, the principle that no 
complex is the completion of two distinct relations.  Taking similarity as primitive allowed us to 
explicate the notion of co-mannered relations to explain different relations (above, below) as well as to 
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explain how the same complex could be the completion of more than one relation as well as how 
relations with identical completion complexes could be individuated.  The motivation was, as we saw, 
an explication of relations that remained ontologically sparse, and in effect at the end of the last section 
we could feel confident that given similarity as a primitive relation all other relations could be 
explicated in terms of it at least in so far as their individuation (which implies their identity).  This 
introduces a much more complex problem (as if an explication of relations is a simple matter!) that 
emerges in light of a contemporary concern with truthmakers as we observed in the second chapter of 
this work.  
I have a set of two blocks before me.  There is a white block which is setting atop of a black 
block.  I have a single complex before me then, the state of affairs consisting of the two blocks.  This 
single complex forms the completion of several relations, that of the the white top being above the 
black block (wTb), the black block being below the white block (bBw), and perhaps many others.  You, 
the reader, of course are not in sight of my blocks.  But I tell you the truth when I say the white one is 
atop of the black one and the black one is below the white one.  What is it that you now know?  What 
does your knowledge of this relation consist in?  And what is the truth-maker—what is it that makes 
true—these two relational statements?
It may seem like a quite naïve question to ask.  What makes them true is the state of affairs of 
the white block being atop the black one.  But in our presentation of understanding relations we have 
already seen that any relation must invoke other higher order relations.  That is, any relation is 
understood in terms of other relations, actual or possible, through like-manner completions: similarity.  
We freed relations from any necessary ontological standing of their own, or so we thought, by 
suggesting that similarity alone can do the heavy lifting needed—only similarity and then the sundry 
objects of the world were needed.  But in asking what is known, and what makes true, in relation-
claims, the consequences of this picture of relations come to the foreground.  What makes true that 
wTb cannot merely consist of w and b because I must have other actual or possible objects that could 
stand in a similar relation.  Very well, says the Occamist defender.  We need merely to say to 
understand wTb is necessary to understand what the state of affairs would be if they were bTw, and in 
understanding the similarity of the two completions we have all we need to understand the “above” 
relation as well as why it is biased (ordered).  That is a fine answer, we may say, but then b and w are 
not the truth-maker for the relational claim as they are also the truth-maker for the opposite claim.  
Hence, we are back right where we started—a conundrum in explaining ordered relations.
Did not we already solve this?  Was not understanding co-mannered completions, possible and 
actual, through similarity relations the solution to this problem?  It was, but it was a solution that we 
saw invoked other relations, actual or merely possible, and as such invoked other objects, actual or 
possible.  Given that the relationship is to be understood in this manner is it possible that the 
completion itself represents the truth-maker for the relational claim, or must it be the complex “plus 
one” represents the relational claim—the elimination of that  “plus one” being in part our very 
motivation for tackling this problem?
What is this “plus one?”  Perhaps the best answer is also the seemingly most unsophisticated.  It 
is simply to say that the blocks do not exist in isolation but rather occupy places in a much broader 
ontological complex with many different objects.  In a universe consisting of two absolutely atomic 
blocks most of the relations we could apply to them in our own universe of concordia discors would 
simply be unavailable to us.  The notions of “above” and “below” only make sense in a conceptual 
scheme that has many other relationships inherent in it like “attracted to” or “heavier than” if we are to 
take it that talk about “above” and “below” are to be reduced to talk of gravitational forces and 
observers' orientations in light of those forces.  Without such observers with such orientations, the 
question of above and below loses its sense.  Such an answer seems so unsophisticated because it does 
not embody the sparse aesthetic of those clean lines of Occam's Razor.  But still, we can ask how much 
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is needed.  Surely a theory of truth-making for relations that invokes the entire universe is not the most 
attractive, even if it turns out to be the correct one.  It is the questions about the epistemology of 
relations, and similarity in particular, then, that will occupy us in the subsequent chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELATIONS AND SIMILARITY: KNOWING 
RELATIONS, KNOWING ANALOGIES
Relations, and similarity relations, make up part of the furniture of universe.  We need not assert 
that they exist independently of the complexes which instantiate them,249 but, hopefully at this point a 
compelling case has been put forward that the work of relations cannot be done by property-talk alone, 
and relations represent a type of ontological entity, even if supervening on other types of objects, and 
that we can talk about and individuate relations on the basis of similarity. Likeness is itself a relation 
that we have good reasons for believing is an irreducible primitive.  It may be, though, that relations 
represent something non-reducible none the less. As the concluding remarks of the last chapter made 
clear, however, there remains a lacuna in our consideration of relations and similarities: which ones 
(relations and similarities) actually are.  
Given similarity is how we individuate relations, and individuation is the way we come to know 
an entity, to know relations (as well as, the resemblance nominalist will claim, to know properties) we 
must know similarities.  Therefore, it is the epistemology of similarity claims—analogy as defined in 
the first chapter—that must be considered now.  We have a good sense of what must ontologically be 
the case in general, but whether or not the relations, which we have used to illustrate our various points, 
actually exist—“before ,” “taller than,” “master of,” “under,” “beloved of”—remains  unanswered.  The 
question remains: “What relations, and particularly what similarity relations, are actual?” What has 
occurred so far has largely been groundwork for tackling this specific problem.  
It is a problem, though, deeply explored in two great non-Western traditions: that of the 
Sanskritic tradition(s) and its progeny, and of Islamic philosophy.  We have considered some of the 
Sanskrit debates about relations in past chapters, but it is in the debates about the epistemic standing of 
249 As observed earlier, that relations may exist between actual and possible objects, or that relations may exist between 
merely possible entities, is itself a fascinating and not toothless problem for a theory of relations.  We will in fact see 
some objections from Dharmakīrti to relations on the very basis that relationality entails such relations, which, because 
they are among non-actual, non-existent particulars, are impossible, ergo, relations are unreal.
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analogy that many of the most subtle points are made.  In considering these debates about the role 
analogy, metaphysics is not abandoned as, perhaps particularly demonstrated in the Sanskritic 
traditions, epistemological arguments are taken as evidence for ontology, and ontological arguments are 
taken as evidence for epistemology.  Hence, in considering these debates, more nuance can be added to 
the metaphysical picture the past three chapters have painted as well as considerations one must 
account for in the epistemological discussions.  
Exploring these traditions is not just a scholastic exercise, however, because these traditions 
raised questions, issues, and posited answers not considered in the venerable history of Greco-Roman 
philosophy and its descendants.  It is not fanciful interest in  “quaint, quixotic traditions” that motivates 
bringing them into this study, but rather a recognition of the rigor with which they approached and 
analyzed the issue of analogical knowledge and the unique contributions that they have to make to this 
debate that have yet been largely unconsidered outside of the traditions themselves.  It is their value, 
not their geographic origin, that warrants their inclusion and consideration here.
To set the stage, first, the denial of relations outlined in Dharmakīrti's (seventh century—see 
Dunnes for problems with dating Dharmakīrti) text, the Sambandhaparīkṣā with commentary by 
Prabhācandra (eleventh century), will be considered.250  In fact, the debate about the nature of relations 
within the South Asian tradition has been called by R. K. Tripathi the “central question of Indian 
metaphysics.”251  The general outline of the positive theory, put forth by the Naiyāyika, will be recalled 
from the second and third chapters.  Beginning with the Buddhist denial of relations, however, allows 
250 John D. Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy, 1st ed, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: 
Wisdom Publications, 2004), 1.  
Many cite Frauwallner's argument on this subject, for example, Tom Tillemans, “Dharmakīrti,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/dharmakiirti/. 
Dharmakirti, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, 1-25,” accessed June 12, 2015, http://gretil.sub.uni-
goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/dhksparu.htm. 
Dharmakirti and Prabhacandra, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, with Prabhacandra’s Commentary,” accessed June 19, 
2015, http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/bsa063_u.htm.
251 R. K. Tripathi, “The Central Problem of Indian Metaphysics,” Philosophy East and West 19, no. 1 (1969): 39–43, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1398095.
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us to better understand their denial of analogy as a means of knowing.  Once setting out the broad 
contours of the denial of relations, we will plunge into the debates about the metaphysical status of 
sādṛśya, “similarity,” and upamāna, “analogy,” that occur among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Bhaṭṭa 
Mīmāṃsā, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist philosophers.  These debates interweave 
metaphysics and epistemology, considering upamāna and explanations of what knowledge from 
analogy is, whether it is reducible to other forms of knowledge, and the Buddhist denials of upamāna 
as a veridical source of knowledge.  
From there, attention will turn to another set of debates, this time in the Islamic legal tradition 
concerning the status of analogical arguments, qiyās.252  The Islamic debate is not about the 
metaphysics or ontology of similarity, although metaphysical and theological assumptions form the 
backdrop of the debates, but rather about the epistemology and within the very practical realm of 
jurisprudence.  These Islamic debates are an exploration of analogical reasoning itself and remarkably 
bear insights very close to the Buddhists in their objections, but it is largely in the defense and support 
of analogical reasoning that we see epistemological concerns come into focus.  The dimensions of this 
debate will be explored through two schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madhhab).  The first, the Ẓāhirī 
madhhabmadhhab, or Ẓāhirī school of jurisprudence (or less frequently termed Dāwūdi, after the 
founder Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (815/817–883/4 CE)), is a now defunct school of thought known primarily 
through the surviving works of Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī (994-1064 CE), the only of the Ẓāhirīs' work 
known to have survived, and in particular his Al-Nubdha Al-Kāfiya Fī Uṣūl Aḥkām Al-Dīn, “The 
Sufficient Tract on the Rules [Derived from] the Sources of Religion.”253 The second is the Shāfiʿī 
252 Hallaq, in a very interesting article, cautions us that qiyās is not only an analogical argument, and directs our attention to 
a number of arguments considered “qiyās” but which are non-analogical. Despite this caution, herein the term will apply 
only to those arguments which are analogical unless explicitly stated otherwise, and will apply the term “qiyās” to them.
[sentence?]  Wael B. Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36, no. 3 (1989): 286–306.
253 Ignác Goldziher, The Ẓāhirīs: Their Doctrine and Their History: A Contribution to the History of Islamic Theology, ed. 
and trans. Wolfgang Behn, Brill Classics in Islam, v. 3 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2008), xxii, 27.
Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Saʿīd ibn Ḥazm, “Al-Nubdha Al-Kāfiya Fī Uṣūl Aḥkām Al-Dīn,” in Ibn Ḥazm of 
Cordoba: The Life and Works of a Controversial Thinker, ed. Camilla Adang, Ma Isabel Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke, 
trans. Adam Sabra, Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1, the Near and Middle East, volume 103 (Leiden ; Boston: 
Brill, 2013), 111–60.Note that sometimes this book is referred to by an alternative title, al-Nubadh[!] fī uṣūl al-fiqh al-
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madhhab as represented by al-Shāfiʿī's  (767–820 CE) Risāla.254  While the former madhhab rejected 
qiyās as a legitimate form of legal reasoning, the Shāfiʿī madhhab constructed a cautious defense of its 
admissibility.  These debates are fascinating in the extreme, for not only do they in part prefigure the 
debates and contributions of much later thinkers such as the Andalusian Mālikī legal philosopher, al-
Shāṭibī (1320–1388 CE), but also contemporary debates in which Ibn Ḥazm has become an intellectual 
hero of the contemporary conservative “literalist” Salafi movement represented by groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami in the Middle East and North Africa, southern India's Base 
Movement, the Indonesian group Wahdah Islamiyah, and others across the Islamic world.  
A BUDDHIST BACKGROUND
We have already made some cursory remarks in chapters one and two as to how analogy, 
similarity, and relations were considered in the remarkable debates that occurred in the Indian 
subcontinent and Buddhist Southeast Asia.  It is necessary here to now present these debates in more 
detail to bring to the forefront the close relation of the metaphysical and epistemological problem of 
first relations, then the specific relation of similarity, and then finally that of analogy.255  It is helpful 
here, perhaps, to start with the Buddhist denial of relations as it provides the necessarily tools for us to 
then move on and understand their objections to analogical knowledge.  
Sometime during or immediately after the Vesāli Council, or Second Buddhist Council 
(approximately 334 BCE), the first divisions in the Buddhist community appeared as the Sangha 
Ẓāhirī.
For biographical information on  Ibn Ḥazm see José Miguel Puerta Vílchez, “Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī Ibn Ḥazm: A 
Biographical Sketch,” in Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba: The Life and Works of a Controversial Thinker, ed. Camilla Adang, Ma 
Isabel Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke, Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1, the Near and Middle East, volume 103 
(Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013), 3–24. Also see Amr Osman, The Ẓāhirī Madhhab (3rd/9th-10th/16th Century): A 
Textualist Theory of Islamic Law, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, volume 38 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2014), 77–83.   
254 Muḥammad ibn Idrīs Shāfiʻī and Joseph E. Lowry, The Epistle on Legal Theory (New York: New York University Press, 
2015).
Bernard G Weiss, Search for God’s Law Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf Al-Din Al-Amidi. (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 2010).
255 We will see, however, that the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā suggest similarity is constitutive of a distinct ontological category, 
a most novel suggestion!
147
divided into the two sects, the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas, the former being the ancestral school of 
the Theravāda though the intermediary school, the Vibhajyavādins.256  The  earliest divisions likely 
occurred due to debates about the proper code of conduct for monks and nuns, the vinaya; however, the 
latter division was on a point of doctrine, a split with the Sarvāstivādins' regarding the characterization 
of dhammas as existing in the past, present and future.257  It is believed that the present Pali canonical 
Abhidhamma literature represents the views of this tradition and their continuation and elaboration, 
particularly the Kathāvatthu of Moggaliputtatissa (approximately 327 BCE-247 BCE), traditionally 
said to have been composed at the Third Buddhist Council.  Some significant differences did develop, 
primarily in the Theravāda claim that only dhammas in the present instance exist.258  Scholars believe 
that the first compilations of the Abhidhamma texts, both by the Vibhajyavādins/Theravādins and rival 
schools such as the Sarvāstivādin, began around 250 BCE; it was also around this time that the 
Kashmiri Sautrāntikas broke from the Sarvāstivādin (the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivādins, one school of the  
Sarvāstivāda) with their rejection of the Ahbhidhamma literature (or perhaps the metaphysical 
speculations it represented) of the Vaibhāṣika.259  By about the first century BC, the Mahāyāna schools 
began to appear; however, Williams and Conze note the appearance of the Prajñāpāramitā texts 
perhaps in the century before, and so some proto-Mahayana schools or at least tendencies likely 
existed.260
256 Akira Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna, trans. Paul Groner, Asian Studies 
at Hawaii, no. 36 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 86–87. 
Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics, 23.
257 Nalinaksha Dutt, Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools (New Delhi: Dev Publishers, 2005), 
124–26.
Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism, 80–82.
Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics, 22–23.
258 Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics, 23.
Dutt, Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools, 138.
259 Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism, 128.
Amar Singh, The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy: Dinnaga and Dharmakirti (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2004), 
18.  Singh also provides a useful overview of some of the epistemological differences between the  Vaibhāṣikas and  
Sautrāntikas.  See Singh, 20–21.
260 Richard F. Gombrich, Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo, Second 
edition, The Library of Religious Beliefs and Practices (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 131.
Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism, 249.
Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed, The Library of Religious Beliefs and 
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The emergence of Abhidhamma literature, or the “Higher Teachings” as it is sometimes 
rendered in English, represents what might be called the metaphysical turn in Buddhism.  It is 
intensively concerned with the dhammas (or svalakṣaṇas), the psycho-physical events that constitute 
experience and the interactions of mind and the world.  It developed in the Theravādin tradition as an 
intensively nominalistic atomicism, only superficially resembling some of the Western Atomists such 
as Democritus (460 – c. 370 BCE), whose work is known to us only in fragments, or Titus Lucretius 
Carus (99 BCE-33 BCE).  For the Theravādins, and one supposes for their precursors in the  
Vibhajyavādins, these dhammas were real and constitutive of reality.  These were not at all the eternal 
atoms of Democritus, who supposed that the atoms were infinite and indivisible with only different 
configurations giving rise to different materials or phenomena, but rather dhammas came into existence 
and went out of existence.261  Just how long these dhammas persisted became a matter of contention 
among the tradition.  Perhaps it was only a matter of time before the reality of these dhammas was 
called into question, and indeed they were, notably by Yogācāra Buddhists as evidenced in the work of 
Vasubandhu (fourth to fifth century CE).262  Dutt, although in an older work (published 1984), provides 
a helpful overview the scholarly controversy about just who Vasubandhu was, whether there were 
perhaps two scholars named Vasubandhu, and arguments about his (or their) exact orientations among 
the Buddhist philosophical schools of the time, important in part because his orientations are seem as 
important to placing the two intellectual heirs that followed.263  These debates are unresolved.  One of 
Vasubandhu's intellectual heirs was the Buddhist logician and epistemologist, Dignāga (c. 480–c. 540 
CE), another philosopher's who exact node in the scheme of competing Buddhist schools is again 
debated.  However, his possible student but certainly further intellectual heir,  Dharmakīrti, continued 
Practices (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 48.
E. Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature (Reiyukai, 1978), 1–2.
261 C. C. W. Taylor, Leucippus, and Democritus, The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments: A Text and 
Translation with a Commentary, The Phoenix Presocratics, v. 5 = Les Présocratiques Phoenix; t. 5 (Toronto ; Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999), 64–76.
262 Matthew Kapstein, Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought (Boston: 
Wisdom Publications, 2001), 181–204.
263 Dutt, Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools, 24–46.
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and developed the line of thought seemingly first put forward by Dignāga and influenced by 
Vasubandhu.264  According to the Tibetan tradition, Dharmakīrti was born in South India and moved to 
live at the Buddhist university of Nālandā, and it is to him to which we will shortly return.265    
The  Theravāda tradition continued, too, to develop the philosophy of the dhammas, notably in 
the work of the fifth century commentator Buddhaghoṣa's work, but philosophical and speculative texts 
continue to be produced within the Theravāda tradition both in Pali as well as in the vernacular 
languages of Southeast Asia such as Mon, Burmese, Thai and Khmer up to the present day.266  By the 
time of Buddhaghoṣa, however, the Theravāda tradition was largely confined to southern India, Sri 
Lanka, the Mon states of the Tenasserim coast and perhaps even Dvāravatī in the Khorat Plateau in of 
present day Thailand (if the Cāmadevivaṃsa is to be trusted as accurately reporting the religion of 
Hariphunchai, one of the northern Dvāravatī states, although it is not our only source of information in 
this regards).267  As such, it seems that it was no longer very engaged in the philosophical dialogues and 
264 Again, Dutt helpfully overviews the controversies surrounding Dharmakīrti's assignment and place among various 
Buddhist schools.  See Dutt, 97–116.
265 There is also a popular tradition, primarily in Indonesia, that Dharmakīrti originated from Sumatra, studied at the 
Buddhist center of Śrīvijaya, and then traveled to India.  This stems from a confusion between the earlier seventh 
century Dharmakīrti and the later scholar tenth century scholar, Dharmakīrtiśrī; the later is known primarily through his 
disciple, Atiśa Dīpaṃkara Śrijñāna (982 - 1054 CE).  See Robert E. Buswell and Donald S. Lopez, eds., The Princeton 
Dictionary of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 214. 
Hubert Decleer, “Atiśa’s Journey to Sumatra,” in Buddhism in Practice, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Abridged ed, Princeton 
Readings in Religions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 532–40.
For sources on Atiśa's biography, see Helmut Eimer, “The Development of the Biographical Tradition Concerning Atisa 
(Dipamkarasrijnana),” Journal of the Tibet Society 2 (1982): 41–51.
266 For example, the École française d'Extrême-Orient and other partners have begun to digitize many of these works, and 
the present author can attest that the collection of Khmer manuscripts, from the seventeenth to late nineteenth-century 
composed in Pali and Middle Khmer, contain many texts on Abhidhamma (អភធម , /ʔaʔpʰiʔ tʰoammeaʔ) and its 
philosophical elaboration. 
“Khmer Manuscript,” accessed September 20, 2013, http://khmermanuscripts.efeo.fr/en/home.html.
“Lannamanuscripts.Net,” accessed June 20, 2017, http://lannamanuscripts.net/en.
267 See the following for additional information: Bodhiraṅsī, Donald K. Swearer, and Sommai Premchit, The Legend of 
Queen Cāma: Bodhiraṃsi’s Cāmadevīvaṃsa, Translation and Commentary, SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies (Albany, 
N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1998).  Today this area houses a number of important monastic libraries.
George Coedès, Walter F. Vella, and Sue Brown Cowing, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, 3rd ed. (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 77.
Additionally, Rohanadeera summarized (up to 1988) the justifications scholars have used to identify Dvāravatī as 
Theravāda. See M. Rohanadeera, “New Evidence on Cultural Relations Between Sri Lanka and the Dvaravati Kingdom 
in Thailand,” Vidyodaya Journal of Social Science 2, no. 1 (1988): 47–63.
For more on the early religious history of the Khorat Plateau, see Nai Pan Hla, The Significant Role of the Mon 
Language and Culture in Southeast Asia (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa 
(ILCAA), 1992); David J. Welch, “Archaeology of Northeast Thailand in Relation to the Pre-Khmer and Khmer 
Historical Records,” International Journal of Historical Archaeology 2, no. 3 (1998): 205–33; Sarah Talbot and Janthed 
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debates that continued to rage throughout South Asia and were written primarily in Sanskrit.   
Moggaliputtatissa's work is a clear engagement with other schools of Buddhist thought by the nascent 
Theravādins, with its direct refutations of  Vibhajyavāda, Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivāda and other 
schools' doctrines, and one of the last such engagements that formed part of the canon as opposed to 
commentary.  Commentaries continued to produce polemics against Mahāyāna and Tantric practices 
and even European Christian missionaries.268  In many ways, though, the doctrines the Theravādins 
developed and refined, expressed perhaps most fully in the Paṭṭhāna and later works by philosophers 
such as Anuruddhācariya (10th or 11th century CE), author of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, is 
compatible with much of Dharmakīrti's thought in general if not in the details.  It is to  Dharmakīrti's 
thought that this work now turns.
SAMBANDHO NĀSTI TATTVATAḤ:  DHARMAKĪRTI'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELATIONS 
 Dharmakīrti's thought is expansive, and deeply rooted in the debates concerning the sources of 
knowledge and processes of knowing reality, and hence is bound up in not only epistemological 
debates but metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of language.  Each of these subjects is in fact of interest 
to an investigation into similarity and analogical reasoning, and indeed similarity (or its rejection) plays 
a part in each piece of Dharmakīrti's philosophy as it is, like the earlier Abhidhammikas, intensively 
nominalistic.  As we know from the contemporary debates about nominalism and realism, such as those 
touched upon in chapters two and four, various answers can be demanded from the nominalists, 
particularly how to account for similarity and practices that seem to rely upon similarity recognition, 
such as predication and recognition of types of things.  Particularly relevant is the apoha theory of 
Chutima, “Northeast Thailand before Angkor: Evidence from an Archaeological Excavation at the Prasat Hin Phimai,” 
Asian Perspectives 40, no. 2 (2001): 179–94; Phairot Phetsanghan, Songkoon Chantachon, and Boonsom Yodmalee, 
“Sema Hin Isan, the Origin of the Temple Boundary Stones in Northeast Thailand,” The Social Sciences 4, no. 2 (2009): 
186–90.
268 Shwe Aung and Caroline Augusta Foley Davids, eds., Points Of Controversy or Subjects of Discourse: Being a 
Translation of the Kathāvatthu, Translation Series / Pali Text Society 5 (London: Pali Text Soc, 2001), I.6-9, V.5, VI.6, 
II.1-4.  
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meaning, but given the space required to do justice to this theory of meaning, with its metaphysical and 
epistemological implications, it must largely be set aside as so much has already been.269  Instead, the 
rejection of relations found within the text the Sambandhaparīkṣā will be carefully examined to lay the 
foundation for our explorations of similarity and analogy in the South Asian debates.  First, and as 
briefly as possible, some of Dharmakīrti's presumptions must be laid out in just enough detail as to 
understand what assumptions are being made behind the terse arguments that he provides.
Like the Theravāda Abhidhammikas,  Dharmakīrti is both a nominalist and atomicist in the 
sense that some normally “imperceptibly” small particulars are what give rise to our perceptions of 
everyday objects.270  It is the natures, or svabhāvas, of these particular svalakṣaṇas that account for 
their specific causal effects, including causing perceptions and judgments (“That is a pot”) within us.  
However, given that only these svalakṣaṇas exist, even though they may cause the judgment of a 
perception to be, “That is a pot,” there is a clear denial that such things as pots or people really exist.  
This denial is because  Dharmakīrti rejects the existence of any distributed entities.271  This means 
spatially distributed entities, temporally distributed entities, and recurrent entities are unreal, and hence 
universals are unreal as well as everyday objects, including people.
This rejection comes in part from a rejection of mereological sums much like his 
269 For many interesting treatments and objections to apoha theory, and not only that of  Dharmakīrti, see Mark Siderits, 
Tom J. F. Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds., Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011).
270 To say they are imperceptible is somewhat misleading, as Dharmakīrti is very explicit about this in the 
Pramāṇavārttikam: “Sattvam upalabdhir eva.”  Dharmakīrti, The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter 
with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes, ed. Raniero Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23 (Rome: Istituto Italiano 
Per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960), k.3.
271 See, for example, the explicit rejection of distributed entities which would, according to Dharmakīrti, lack causal 
efficacy because distributed: 
“Sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya eva arthakriyā-kṣamaḥ /idam eva hi vastv-avastunor lakṣaṇaṃ yad arthakriyā-yogyatā 
ayogyatā /ca iti vakṣyāmaḥ / sa ca /arthakriyā-yogyo arthaḥ na anveti yo anveti na tasmāt kārya-sambhavaḥ 
tasmāt sarvaṃ sāmānyam anarthakriyā-yogyatvād avastu / vastu tu viśeṣa eva tata eva tan-niṣpatteḥ.”  Dharmakīrti, 
k.166-167.
Dharmakīrti (below) further emphasizes that in fact it is the particulars, svalakṣaṇas, that actually cause perception, 
have causal efficacy (by which they can cause perceptions at the least), and that other objects are merely “exclusions” (here, 
“vyāvṛtti”), which, being a negative, cannot actually have cause efficacy.  
“ato viśeṣa eva / sa eva arthas tasya vyāvṛttayo apare / tat-kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ca uktaṃ tat svalakṣaṇam iṣyate /  tat-
tyāga-āpti-phalāḥ sarvāḥ puruṣāṇāṃ pravṛttayaḥ / yad arthakriyākāri tad eva vastv ity uktam / sa ca viśeṣa eva.”  
Dharmakīrti, k.171-172.
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Abhidhammika cousins: what can be analyzed into constituents is ultimately unreal, and only those 
ultimately unanalyzable constituents will constitute ultimate reality.  The  Abhidhammika explanation 
as to why these particulars cannot form sums is that to do so would mean that they have extrinsic 
properties, but that would mean that analytically they are divisible (so their properties could be 
abstracted from them).  These particulars, however, are absolutely indivisible, both logically and 
spatially.  For the Abhidhammikas, these particulars have only intrinsic properties, and they are 
identical to those properties.  Therefore, it would be wrong to predicate of them, “Particular x has 
property y” because particular x is nondifferent from property y—it just is property y.  Therefore, there 
is no division between particulars and their properties, and therefore no substance ontology as with the 
Nyāya, Plato, or Aristotle and most realist philosophies.  The same seems to hold true for 
Dharmakīrti.272  Svalakṣaṇas cannot be spatially extended, because then, at least analytically they 
would be divisible (top part, bottom part, and so on) and likewise they cannot be temporally extended 
(earlier part, later part).273  Moreover, and perhaps stated even more forcefully by Dharmakīrti than the 
Abhidhammikas, these particulars are utterly unique and non-repeatable.274  Hence, each svalakṣaṇa is 
unique, sharing nothing, it would seem, with any other svalakṣaṇa.  
One can already see how such a metaphysics would entail the rejection of similarity.  Were there 
to be such things as relations, they would fly in the face of two of the central commitments of  
Dharmakīrti: that there are no real extended beings, since it appears relations would be extended to two 
272 “Tatra apy anyāpohe na vyāvṛttir anyā anya eva vyāvṛttas tad-vyāvṛtter nivartamānasya tad-bhāva-prasaṅgāt / tathā ca  
vyāvṛtterabhāvaḥ / tasmād yā eva vyāvṛttiḥ sa eva vyāvṛttaḥ / śabda-pratipatti-bhedas tu saṃketa-bhedāt / na vācya-
bhedo asti /nanu ca vācya-viśeṣa-abhāvāt saṃketa-bhedo apy ayukto dvayor eka-abhidhānāt / tathā ca vyatirekiṇyā 
vibhakter ayogas tasyā bheda-āśrayatvāt /dvayor eka-abhidhāne api vibhaktir vyatirekiṇī /bhinnam artham iva anveti 
vācye leśa-viśeṣataḥ.” Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikam, k.59-60.
273 It is worth nothing that here the Abhidhammika make a concession and state that their particulars last only a moment, 
and are not actually temporally extended, but analytically all existing things have three temporal “parts”--a rising to be, a 
being, and a passing away.  These are logically necessary for any existent thing, claim the Abhidhammas, and so it is 
possible that their dhammas have logical “constructed parts” but these do not mean the dhammas are reducible or 
analyzable into these parts.  
274 That the  Theravāda  Abhidhammikas organize their dhammas into types seems to suggest some commonality among 
them, and ultimately it is argued that although utterly unique, the can be put in a typology as conditions or causes, with 
sameness of effect not implying sameness of properties.  There is a tension there, certainly.
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relata, and that the particulars would bear relations to one another and hence have separable, dependent 
properties or extrinsic properties.  “But what about these judgments, 'That is a pot,' that do not seem to 
be in error?” one might ask.  That is, given that similarity and repeatability are key parts of our 
cognitive lives, and that we are able to successfully deploy concepts such as types,  Dharmakīrti owes 
us some account of concept formation.  This account is elaborated on in his aforementioned theory of 
apoha, which can only be glossed over here to understand its employment in the Sambandhaparīkṣā. 
Concepts are not formed, claims Dharmakīrti, by recognition of similarities, say between one 
pot and another, but instead by excluding all other concept-objects which, if treated like pots, would 
lead one to error or inappropriate action (such as putting one's hat on the cooking fire or trying to store 
water in one's cow).  This denial of similarity recognition are a veridical cognition occurs by a rather 
complex causal theory of perception.275  The svalakṣaṇa are, as we have noted, causally efficacious.  
They cause in us perceptions.  So for example, one sees the blue of the sky and the blue of the ocean, 
and one has the judgment, “Here are two blue things.”  But what one actually has are two mental 
images—one of the ocean, and one of the sky.  As effects caused by distinct particulars, these two 
images are particulars in themselves.  And as particulars, they are, like all particulars, completely 
distinct and unique, and hence it is impossible that they actually share any qualities or properties, such 
as “being blue,” with one another.  However, each of these images, which we might then assign 
secondary causal powers, can elicit only a certain range of judgments.  Hence when one, without any 
defects, looks upon the ocean and the sky, one will not form the judgment, “Here are two orange 
things.”  Some such judgments (concepts) are therefore excluded from being formed given particular 
causes of perception.  The uniformity of judgment (“two blue objects”), however, requires more than 
just this exclusion (vyāvṛtti).  It is that the images result in the exclusion of the same judgments that 
accounts for their sameness—they are alike in what they are different from, not because they share the 
275 See Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikam, k.68-75.
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same intrinsic properties.276 Both exclude judgments such as “This is red,” or “this is orange” while 
perhaps, given the different images, also differ in their exclusions (for example, “This is wet” might be 
a judgment made about the ocean and not the sky, and hence would exclude the sky but not drinking 
water, while “this is salty” would exclude drinking water but not table salt).  While we might want to 
say then that it is their identical extrinsic properties, then, that makes them both “blue,” recall that 
extrinsic properties have been flatly rejected by the tradition.  Instead, these “exclusions” are 
considered negatives, without existence (which means, without causal efficacy).277  Here, the pragmatic 
expectations that we have come into play since our expectations and (linguistic) conditioning in turn 
effect the judgments which we make about perceptions.278  Therefore, the judgments caused by mental 
images, which are in turn caused by the svalakṣaṇa, may be metaphysically in error although 
pragmatically successful.  It is this theory that provides Dharmakīrti many of the tools he will use in his 
critique of relations, along with some that seem to be very novel for his time yet instantly recognizable 
to us today.
In the Sambandhaparīkṣā, two main sorts of objections are raised based on the assumption that, 
following the classical definition of a relation, that relations exist between two (or more) relata 
(dvisṭhaḥ sambandhaḥ).279  The first considers the nature of specific relations, such as dependence, 
contact, and cause and effect; the second approach focuses on the “combinatorial” nature of relations 
since they relate two relata and seem therefore to exist “between” the two relata yet not wholly in either 
of them.  This allows what could be characterized as a “locative” line of questions, asking where the 
relation exists.  The strategy is to ask where the relation exists, and then show that either each answer is 
unsatisfactory because the relation itself “disappears” or the result is a contradiction or absurdity.  For 
example, dependence (pāratantrya) might be taken as a paradigm of relationality, in which one thing 
276 Dharmakīrti, k.109, 169.
277 Dharmakīrti, k.169.
278 Dharmakīrti, k.61.
279 Dharmakīrti states the definition clearly: “dviṣṭho hi kaścit sambandho nāto 'nyattasya lakṣaṇam / 
bhāvābhāvopadhiryogaḥ kāryakāraṇatā yadi.” Dharmakirti, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, 1-25,” k.11.
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depends upon another—for example, the way a tree may depend on a seed for its existence.  And given 
all the talk by the Buddhists of interdependent co-origination (Pali: paṭiccasamuppāda; Sanskrit: 
pratītyasamutpāda), this seems to be a relation that Buddhists would happily accept.  
Here, though, Dharmakīrti attempts to show the relation of dependence is nonsensical.  First, 
dependence would result in relations between things that exist and things that do not exist.  In the 
example of a tree, if dependence was a relation, and relations require two relatas, then either the non-
existent tree depends on the existent seed, or the non-existent seed depends on the existent tree.280  How 
can the existence of the tree require the seed given the seed is non-existent?  What is more, how can 
there be a relation when admittedly one of the relata is non-existent?  The answer for Dharmakīrti is 
that they cannot.  A similar critique is given of cause and effect, and in fact, occupies the bulk of the 
text.  Despite the fact it is quite exciting, it, too, must be for the most part set aside as we examine the 
selections from the work that can be generalized to all relations. 
The more general approach of Dharmakīrti's line of attack seeks to demonstrate his interlocutor 
cannot locate where the relation is.  For example, if the relation is taken to be a union of the two relata 
(rūpaśleṣa), then there is one thing: the union, and not the two relata. Yet relations are taking as relating 
(at least) two relata, and hence if there is only one thing, then there cannot be any relation between 
them.281  Pursuing this line of questioning,  Dharmakīrti considers what if we concede that there is 
something that is a relation.   Dharmakīrti brilliantly suggests then that a Bradley-Type Regress will 
emerge.282, 283
280 “para-apekṣā hi sambandhaḥ so asan katham apekṣate saṃś ca sarva-nirāśaṃso bhāvaḥ katham apekṣate” Dharmakirti, 
k.3.
281 “rūpa-śleṣo hi sambandho dvitve sa ca kathaṃ bhavet tasmāt prakṛti-bhinnānāṃ sambandho na asti tattvataḥ” 
Dharmakirti, k.2.
282 “dvayor eka-abhisambandhāt sambandho yadi tad-dvayoḥ/ kaḥ sambandho anavasthā ca na sambandha-matis tathā” 
Dharmakirti, k.4.
283 Stephen Phillips also brings our attention to this regress by Dharmakīrti, and suggests it was from Dharmakīrti that the 
twelfth century Advaitin philosopher Śrīharṣa became aware of the regress.   Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics: 
Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of “New Logic,” 22–23.
Also see Phillips translation of the relevant sections of  Śrīharṣa: Śrīharṣa, “Śrīharṣa on Distinctiveness and the Relation 
Regress,” in Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of" New Logic, trans. Stephen H. 
Phillips (Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1997), 221–22.
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This regress argument, as explained by Prabhācandra, should be familiar enough to us now.284 If 
we concede there are relations, we have two options.  Either the relation just is the union of the two 
relata, in which case we have the union, which is one thing, and given a relation requires two relata, 
then, in fact, we do not have a relations—the earlier argument.  The second option is we not only have 
the two relata, but we also have a third thing, the relation.  However, how are the two relata then to be 
connected to this third thing, the relation?  Such a connection would require a relation to connect the 
original relation to the two relata.  However, what then connects this second order relation to the first 
order relation?  Again, it seems a third order relation is required, and so on ad infinitum.  Hence, as  
Prabhācandra concludes, “ .. . . knowledge of a relation between relata is unreal because there is 
nothing to a relation but the relata.”285
Relations, however, are part of our lived experience; they order the universe around us in ways 
that properties do not, and therefore they seem veridical, and given the proclamation observed earlier 
that “sattvam upalabdhir eva” it would seem we have some reason—perception—for believing there 
are in fact relations.  As we already observed above, however, although perception is of reality, our 
judgments of perception do not necessarily concur with reality.  This difference between perception and 
judgments of perception, as discussed in the Sambandhaparīkṣā, will foreshadow the rest of this 
chapter.
Although the relata are in fact distinct, it is the cognitive function of “imagination” (or perhaps 
“conceptualization” is a better word), “ kalpanā,”286 that results in their “mixture/joining.”287 The exact 
284 Dharmakirti and Prabhacandra, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, with Prabhacandra’s Commentary,” k.4.
285 “tanna sambandhinoḥ sambandhabuddhirvāstavī; tavadyatirekeṇānyasya sambandhasyāsambhavāt.” Dharmakirti and 
Prabhacandra, k.4.
286 Tillerman points out the following definition of kalpanā given by Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu I.5: 
“abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā.”  “Conceptual thought is a cognition in which there is a 
representation that can be associated with words. “  Tillerman's translation, Tom Tillemans, “Dharmakīrti > Notes,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed February 2, 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dharmakiirti/notes.html.
287 “tau ca bhāvau tadanyaśca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ / ityamiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvāstān miśrayati kalpanā.”  Dharmakirti, 
“Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, 1-25,” k.5.
Prabhācandra commentary further clarifies this: “So the relata are unmixed in nature; the imagination mixes/joins 
them.”  “tenāmiśrā vyāvṛttasvarūpāḥ svayaṃ bhāvāḥ, tathāpi tānmiśrayati yojayati kalpanā” Dharmakirti and 
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nature of this imagining or conceptualizing as it relates to relations is brought out more clearly in the 
critique of cause and effect, and although space does not allow a thorough investigation of the specifics 
of the argument, some key points from it may be generalized to the critique of relations in general, and 
specifically how the extreme nominalism of the Buddhists can “explain away” similarity relations.  In 
developing the critique, first, the structure of language itself is pointed out as a source of error in the 
subject-predicate structure that suggests that there is an agent and an action.288   Prabhācandra, in his 
commentary, invokes momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) as the reason this cannot be so, as the agent cannot 
seemingly exist at the same time of the action she was the cause of if the cause and effect are both 
momentary.289  This response echoes kārikā two on dependency, and the following kārikā (the two are 
presented back-to-back) seemingly reinforces Prabhācandra's explanation.290  This explanation, when 
generalized, is a weak one, however, as it depends then on the doctrine of momentariness, a doctrine 
that one cannot describe as well accepted outside the Buddhist philosophers.  While the previous 
arguments against relations are general, the denial that the chef can be present at the dinner he prepared 
is unlikely to strike many as obvious, and at worst, obviously false.  While arguments like that 
illustrated with the example of a seed and a tree (how can there be a relation between them since when 
one exists the other does not) are general, the argument that an actor cannot exist at the time as her 
action is unlikely to find much traction unless bolstered by the entire argument for momentariness or 
for an event ontology as developed by Dharmakīrti and the Theravāda Abhidhammikas.291  
Prabhacandra, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, with Prabhacandra’s Commentary,” k.5.
288 “tāmeva cānurundhānaiḥ kriyākārakavācinaḥ / bhāvabhedapratītyarthaṃ saṃyojyante 'bhidhāyakāḥ.”  Dharmakirti and 
Prabhacandra, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, with Prabhacandra’s Commentary,” k.6.  
289 “na khalu kārakāṇāṃ kriyayā sambandho 'sti; kṣaṇikatvena kriyākāle kārakāṇāmasambhavāt.” Dharmakirti and 
Prabhacandra, k.6.
290 “kāryakāraṇabhāvopi tayorasahabhāvataḥ / prasiddhyati kathaṃ dviṣṭho 'dviṣṭhe sambandhatā katham.”  Dharmakirti 
and Prabhacandra, k.7.
291 The Theravāda Abhidhammikas' argument for momentariness is actually quite simple, however.  
1. All entities have all their properties necessarily and all properties are strictly intrinsic.    
2. Necessarily, for any and all x and any and all y, x is identical to y iff for any property x has, y has, and for 
any property y has, x has (the Identity of Indiscernibles).
3. For any and all x, if x at t1 and x at t2 differ in differ in their properties, then x at t1 and x at t2 are different 
entities.
4. For any all effects y of any and all causes x, y must differ from x in at least one of its properties; 
otherwise, no effect has been caused as x has remained unchanged.
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Had the argument against causation have ended here, much of what followed in the  
Sambandhaparīkṣā could possibly be chalked up to philosophical dogmatism.  But Dharmakīrti is in no 
dogmatic slumber, and takes his form of empiricism to that logical conclusion Hume reached centuries 
later.  The arguments against causation do not end with the invocation of momentariness.  Instead,  
imagination/conceptualization (here, vikalpā) is invoked again in the explanation of causation, and not 
as the product of the subject-predicate divide, but instead as responsible for the (faulty, for  
Dharmakīrti) inference of causation from constant conjunction.292  This is the culmination of a 
discussion as to how one comes to discern a cause and effect relationship.  One learns that something is 
an effect of a cause by observing when the cause is present, it leads to the effect, but when the cause is 
absent, the effect is absent.293  However, this knowledge is just that—the presence or absence of the 
“cause” and the presence or absence of the “effect.”294  There is not something in addition to that; there 
is not knowledge of some third thing, the relation between the “cause” and the “effect” and hence 
knowledge of the relation of “cause and effect” is in fact imagined and therefore false.295,296  
5. For any time, and for any and all x, x at t1 causes x at t2.
6. For whatever time, whatever changes from  t1 to t2 is momentary.
7. Therefore, all entities are momentary.
 Rospatt, in his study of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, provides a cursory discussion of the doctrine among 
Theravādins and suggests that the doctrine was possibly introduced by Buddhaghoṣa.  The sole evidence he provides for 
this is a single passage in the Kathāvatthu, which states that the the Uttarapathakas held a doctrine of momentariness, 
and the Uttarapathakas were “a people from North India, from which  Buddhaghoṣa also hailed.”  Alexander von 
Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of This Doctrine up to 
Vasubandhu, Alt- Und Neu-Indische Studien 47 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag, 1995), 34.This is hardly incontrovertible 
evidence, particularly given that elements of what would become the fully-developed doctrine of a khaṇika (Sanskrit: 
kṣaṇika) are present in the Yamaka, usually dated by scholars to around the first century CE—four hundred years before 
Buddhaghoṣa.  
Wan Doo Kim's research has instead shown the the doctrine of momentariness is present in Old Sinhalese commentaries, 
drawing on elements of the canon.  See Wan Doo Kim, The Theravadin Doctrine of Momentariness: A Survey of Its 
Origins and Development (University of Oxford (United Kingdom), 1999), 
http://search.proquest.com.eres.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/docview/900288379.
292 “etāvanmātratattvārthāḥ kāryakāraṇagocarāḥ / vikalpā darśayantyarthān mithyārthā ghaṭitāniva.”  Dharmakirti and 
Prabhacandra, “Dharmakirti: Sambandhapariksa, with Prabhacandra’s Commentary,” k.17.
293 Dharmakirti and Prabhacandra, k.8.
294 Dharmakirti and Prabhacandra, k.16.
295 Dharmakirti and Prabhacandra, k.17.
296 One could accuse Dharmakīrti of begging the question, since one could very reasonably hold that “presence” and 
“absence” are themselves relations, that is the relation between an object and a spacial location, and just such an analysis 
has been given by Indian philosophers.  For an interesting discussion of absences, see Arindam Chakrabarti, “The 
Unavoidable Void: Nonexistence, Absence, and Emptiness,” in Nothingness in Asian Philosophy, ed. J. L. Liu and D. 
Berger (New York, N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2014), 3–24.
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We can compare this argument with the familiar one from Hume.  Hume claimed that, based on 
experiences (as the presumption cannot come from the pure relation of ideas) that “we always presume, 
when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to 
those we have experienced, will follow from them.297”  Yet, our observations of causation are “This 
this, then that.”  Yet Hume, like Dharmakīrti, notes that there must be some link, some third thing, from 
the first proposition to the second given that there is no logical (“analytic” or a priori) connection 
between the first element and the second.298  Hence, if one eats meat, and then feels ill, there is no 
logical connection between “eating meat” and “feeling ill” that allows one to determine eating meat 
causes one to feel ill, and no contradiction is implied when one considers the possibility that eating 
meat did not cause the ill feeling.  Rather, it is custom and habit, principles of association, that lead us 
to the general form of reasoning that, given constant conjunction, there must be causation, and creates 
the expectation that “for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the 
past.”299  Hence that “third thing” is actually imagined by us and reified as the causal relation.  Hence, 
according to Hume and Dharmakīrti, analogical reasoning gives rise to the notion of causation!
To summarize the general attack on relations, then: through imagination/conceptualization 
through conventions of language and association (kalpanā) or the related act of 
imagination/conceptualization (vikalpā), when presented with two objects, relations are constructed.  
Relations, then, are a product of conceptualization, and concepts fail to align with the ontological 
realities of the world.  Hence, talk about relations is ultimately false.  The knowledge expressed in 
relations is reducible to talk about the relata, in that it can be shown that, if the relata are two and 
distinct, it is impossible some third thing, a relation, “link” them; or that in fact there is only one thing, 
not two, and logically therefore there cannot be a relation given the definition as requiring (at least) two 
297 David Hume, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 
4.2.16/33.
298 Hume, 4.2.16/34.
299 Hume, 5.1.5/43, 5.1.6/44.
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relata; or, in one way or another, that what is taken as relational knowledge is reducible to other 
information as in the case of causation reducing to knowledge of presence and absence rather than 
some third thing, a relation.  The claim that relations are merely the results of vikalpā, and that the 
relation of similarity can be explained by exclusion (apoha or vyāvṛtti), will largely shape the Indian 
debates on the nature and knowability of similarity.  However, as we will see, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā 
offer a positive theory of similarity as radical as the Buddhists' negative theory.
SĀDṚŚYA AND UPAMĀNA: SIMILARITY AND ANALOGY 
In what follows, similarity (sādṛśya) and analogy or comparison (upamāna) are explored 
together as the two concepts, one ontological and the other epistemological, are inseparable in the 
context of the South Asian debates.  The very fact that we did so much to unpack the metaphysics in 
previous chapters, only to realize we could not say what relations in fact exist, perhaps is an illustration 
of the value of this approach.  The views of three different philosophical alignments will be explored.  
First, we will then return to the Buddhists to examine their arguments against sādṛśya and 
upamāna.  Here, works from Ratnakīrti's (eleventh century CE), the Sarvajñasiddhiḥ and 
Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇam, will be useful for the Buddhist arguments against upamāna,  having 
already explored their rejection of relations in general.300, 301  Although chronologically later than some 
of the other texts that will be shortly considered, beginning with the rejection is useful as it allows us to 
300 There is a certain objection to be made for “mixing philosophies” here as  Ratnakīrti lived nearly 400 years after  
Dharmakīrti.  The present author does not mean to put  Dharmakīrti's words into Ratnakīrti's mouth, but does not think that 
the arguments presented in the Sambandhaparīkṣā are unlikely to have encountered any strong disagreement from 
Ratnakīrti, and that the spirit of  Dharmakīrti's earlier arguments accord with those of Ratnakīrti on upamāna and sādṛśya.
301 “Ratnakirti: Nibandhavali,” accessed March 9, 2014, http://gretil.sub.uni-
goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/bsa075_u.htm.
“Ratnakirti: Nibandhavali,” accessed March 9, 2014, http://gretil.sub.uni-
goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/bsa075_u.htm.
Ratnakīrti, “Sarvajñasiddhiḥ,” SARIT - Search and Retrieval of Indic Texts, accessed March 22, 2017, 
http://sarit.indology.info/exist/apps/sarit/works/Sarvaj%C3%B1asiddhi%E1%B8%A5.html.
Ratnakīrti, “Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇam,” SARIT - Search and Retrieval of Indic Texts, accessed March 22, 2017, 
http://sarit.indology.info/exist/apps/sarit/works/Pram%C4%81%E1%B9%87%C4%81ntarbh%C4%81vaprakara
%E1%B9%87am.html. 
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reconstruct how each view might respond to the objections which the Buddhists have laid out. The 
Buddhist view of veridical cognition and conceptualization will be just as key as they were in the 
rejection of relations in general, and as such coincide with the challenge stated at the end of the 
previous chapter.
Next, we will consider the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views up to Udayanācārya (tenth century CE) as 
expressed in the Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama (perhaps as early as second century BCE or late as second 
century common era; for dating of Gautama, see Popper302), the Nyāyalīlāvatī of the Vaiśeṣika 
philosopher Vallabha (1479–1531 CE) , and other sources such as Vātsyāyana's commentary (c.450–
500 CE), the Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakāra (c. sixth–seventh century), and Vācaspati Miśra's (nineth 
century) Tātparyatīkā.303  Some consideration will be given to the  “New Nyāya,” or Navyanyāya 
school, primarily as expressed in the Nyāysiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśwanātha Pañcānana (1600 – 1699 
CE) and its commentary by Dinakarī (eighteenth century CE).304 We will have occasion to refer to the 
Upamānacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa (late twelfth century CE) as we consider the views of the Prābhākara 
Mīmāṃsā, but Gaṅgeśa's views will not be presented themselves. This short exposition of the Nyāya 
perspective(s) forms what we might think of as a common sense realist view of relations yet, as we 
have already seen, not one that makes the mistakes of Russell and others who have tried to treat 
relations as of the same type as universals.  
Following a brief exposition of the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (seventh CE) to better set the 
302 The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-
Vaisesika up to Gangesa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 220–21.
303 Akṣapāda Gautama, Nyaya Sutras of Gautama, n.d.
Gautama, “Gautama: Nyayasutra, with Bhasya.”
Vallabha, Nyāyalīlāvatī.
Uddyotakāra, Nyayabhasyavartikka of Bharadvaja Uddyotakara, ed. Anantalal Thakur, First edition (New Delhi: Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research, 1997).
Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, ed. Anantalal Thakur (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research, 1996).
Vācaspati Miśra, “Gautama: Nyayasutra with Vacaspatimisra’s Nyayavarttikatatparyatika,” accessed July 16, 2017, 
http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/nyaya/nystik_u.htm.
304 Phillips, Stephen H. Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyaya School. New York, N.Y.: 
Routledge, 2013.
Vattanky, Nyaya Philosophy of Language: Translation and Interpretation of Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, and Dinakarī.
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stage, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view will be considered primarily through the Prakaraṇapañcika of 
Śālikanāthamiśra (tenth century CE) but also in the Upamānacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa.305  It is of interest 
because, as we shall see, not only do they, like the Nyāya, hold that upamāna is a pramāṇa but further 
argue the extraordinary view that, given knowledge from upamāna, sādṛśya is itself a unique 
ontological entity, irreducible to other entities such as properties or relata, attacking the Nyāya and 
Buddhists views along the way.  These debates will deepen our understanding that there are both 
ontological and epistemological dimensions to this question, “What is knowing by analogy?”  From 
there, we will be prepared then to move on and explore this question within the logical and 
jurisprudential traditions of Islamic in the subsequent sections of the chapter.
THE BUDDHIST REJECTION OF  SĀDṚŚYA AND UPAMĀNA
 Ratnakīrti's rejection for upamāna as a verdicial means of knowing is based upon an 
ontological rejection of the possibility of similarity, which is based itself on an epistemological 
argument!   He argues that since epistemologically there is nothing to be experienced as sādṛśya, and 
sādṛśya must be the metaphysical basis of upamāna; therefore upamāna cannot be a veridical means of 
knowing!306 Both examining the view of Kumārila Mīmāṃsika and echoing the Nyāya Sūtras of 
Gautama (“prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanamupamānam iti”) that the knowledge of similarity 
results when one sees an object and recognizes in it a property known to inhere in some other object, 
and hence one comes to have knowledge, “This is similar to that,” with “similarity” being the object of 
305 Śālikanāthamiśra and Krishnacharya Tamanacharya Pandurangi, Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikānātha: With an Exposition 
in English (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2004).
306 It is worth noting that this also depends on the Buddhists not making a distinction between an act of knowing and what 
is known.  
“Indian thinkers generally adopt a causal approach to knowledge. Knowledge is taken to be an outcome of a particular 
causal complex in which the most efficient instrumental cause (karaṇa) is technically known as pramāṇa. In the 
Buddhist tradition, the word pramāṇa refers to both the process of knowing and the knowledge acquired on that basis. 
Buddhists do not entertain the distinction between the process of knowing (pramāṇa) and its outcome 
(pramāṇaphala=pramā).”  S. R. Bhatt and A. Mehrotra, Buddhist Epistemology, Contributions in Philosophy 75 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 13.
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knowledge, Ratnakīrti provides his working definition of upamāna.307 It is the view of Kumārila, 
however, that the upamāmiti or resulting knowledge of upamāna is sādṛśya, upon which Ratnakīrti sets 
his philosophical sights.
Ratnakīrti seems to accept that picture to a large extent, but he simply denies that there is any 
third thing, sādṛśya.  That is, there are just the two relata (the two svalakṣaṇas, or the two likewise 
unique yet misleading conceptualized perceptions, recalling that there is no difference in the relata and 
their properties).308  There is an experience of this, and there is an experience of that.  There is no 
experience of some third thing, similarity.309  We here hear the echoes of Dharmakīrti on relations in 
general.310  Therefore, the conclusion that this is like that is the result of a mental construction and not 
something that is experienced when experiencing this or experiencing that, in part because it is 
nowhere to be experienced (not being in this, and not being in that).  Hence, he concludes: “ato 
nopamānaṃ pramāṇamiti.”311
 Dharmakīrti's earlier attack on universals (and the establishment of the apoha theory of 
meaning) likewise denies that similarities exist.  Because of habituation of conceptualization, one 
comes to erroneously believe that “this is like that” and hence forming notions of similarities (shared 
307 Ratnakīrti, “Ratnakirti: Nibandhavali,” Niband 97.
308 Ratnakīrti, Nibandh 101.
309 Ratnakīrti, Nibandh 102.
310 Dharmakīrti  delivers a different attack of sorts on this question. Since all veridical knowledge is of either a svalakṣaṇas 
or a sāmānya svalakṣaṇas, and svalakṣaṇas and sāmānya svalakṣaṇas can only be known by perception or inference, 
then if upamāna results in veridical knowledge, upamāna must be either a perception or an inference because only these 
pramāṇa result in veridical knowledge.  Upamāna is not perception or an inference, and therefore upamāna is not a 
pramāṇa.  Hence, if I am doing justice to Dharmakīrti here, his critique of upamāna is based primarily in his theory of 
epistemology rather than an attack on the ontology of sādṛśya (which is treated separately in his attack on universals).  
Although this presentation makes the argument look a bit like one from dogma, it critically rests on Dharmakīrti's larger 
epistemological theory in which something that does not result in definitive and determinative knowledge 
(bhāvābhāvaniyata svabhāva) cannot be a pramāṇa, such as testimony.  For a more detailed discussion on this matter, 
see Dunne pages 71-91 and 113-116.  Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy.
Two other useful works are Lata S. Bapat, Buddhist Logic: A Fresh Study of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy (Delhi, India: 
Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1989), 95–222; Bhatt and Mehrotra, Buddhist Epistemology.
This argument is, however, certainly similar to the argument given by Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasaṅgraha that, since 
there are only two pramāṇas, perception and inference, anything else proposed is either not a pramāṇa or is one of the 
former two.  He states, “In fact, there cannot be any form of cognition except the two (already discussed); because all the 
others that have been postulated either do not peocess the character of the "right form of cognition" or are includes in 
these two.” Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, The Tattvasaṅgraha of Shāntarakṣita:: With the Commentary of Kamalashīla. 
Vol. 2: [...], trans. Ganganatha Jhā, Repr. [of the ed.] : Baroda, 1939, vol. 2 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), k.1488.
311 Ratnakīrti, “Ratnakirti: Nibandhavali,” Nibandh 101.
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universals or shared identities) through conceptualizing things as similar.  Hence, this mistaken 
conceptualization is itself applied to the unique particulars, and they are thought of as similar when in 
actuality, they are not.312  Similarities, then, for both Dharmakīrti and his predecessor, Ratnakīrti, are 
illusory and both offer arguments, albeit different ones then, on why analogy cannot be a means of 
knowing.  
NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA AND NAVYA-NYĀYA VIEWS OF SĀDṚŚYA AND UPAMĀNA
 As we have already observed, as early as the Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama was upamāna accepted 
as a pramāṇa: “prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam:” or “analogy (upamānam) is the 
knowledge (of the sādhya) from known (prasiddha) similarity, or  “Comparison is the knowledge a 
thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.”313  Just what this passage means, 
however, is not entirely clear as it takes for granted an understanding of just what constitutes known 
similarity, and it is unclear whether what is being defined is knowledge that results from similarity 
(upamiti) or the cause of such knowledge.  The commentaries of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakāra and the 
extensive comments of Vācaspati Miśra clarify that upamānam is here meant to signify upamiti, and 
therefore Gautama is defining what is knowledge from analogy rather than the process or cause of such 
knowledge.314  This clarification does not resolve the remaining problem—what is meant by “known 
similarity” or prasiddhasādharmya?  What is analogical knowledge?
Vātsyāyana explains that it is knowledge of the relation of word to its object through known 
similarity—that is, the knowledge of the meaning relation.315  Hence, a sentence “The bison is like the 
312 “ekapratyavamarśasya hetuvād dhīr abhedinī/ ekadhīhetubhāvena vyaktīnām apy abinnatā.”  Dharmakīrti, 
Pramāṇavārttikam, k.109.
313 Gautama, Nyaya Sutras of Gautama, 1.1.6.  Vidyabhushan's translation.
314 For example, see Vātsyāyana's commentary: “prajñātena sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamānam iti/ yathā 
gaur evaṃ gavaya iti”.  Gautama, “Gautama: Nyayasutra, with Bhasya,” 1.1.6.
315 “kiṃ punar atropamānena kriyate? yadā khalv ayaṃ gavā samānadharmaṃ pratipadyate tadā pratyakṣatas tam arthaṃ  
pratipadyata iti, samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārtha ity āha/ yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity upamāne prayukte 
gavā samānadharmam artham indriyārthasannikarṣād upalabhamāno 'sya gavayaśabdaḥ saṃjñeti 
saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhaṃ pratipadyata iti/”  Gautama, 1.1.6.
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cow” then is an analogy, and the understanding of the meaning relations of word and object (taking 
meaning to be correspondence) is the resulting knowledge, or upamiti.  The problem here, however, is 
that in this case, it seems that knowledge from analogy is purely linguistic; this undermines the claim 
that upamāna is a distinctive means of knowing, since it is possible it could be reduced to knowledge 
through words, or śabda (often translated as “testimony”), and indeed some the opponents of the Nyāya
will attempt just such a critique of their theory.316  This still fails, however, to explain what is the known 
similarity that girds this linguistic understanding as sure surely similarity, upon which this knowledge 
rests, is not purely linguistic.317 To answer this question, we must turn our attention for the moment to 
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of sādṛśya.
The classical definition of similarity that we find in the Nyāyalīlāvatī of  the Vaiśeṣika 
philosopher Vallabha has already been referred to multiple times, and it is this that forms the definition 
taken up and expanded upon by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers: taddhi 
sāmānyāderanekavṛttitvam  . . . sādṛśyam, that is: similarity is the presence of the same property (or 
properties) (sāmānya) in multiple substrates.318  As we have already observed, the  Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 
philosophers saw that this definition also distinguished similarity from universals (sāmānya) in that 
316 The recognized four means of knowing or pramāṇas of the Nyāya: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), 
analogy (upamāna), and word or testimony (śabda).  Kumārila Mīmāṃsika argues that  upamiti is not reducible to 
linguistic knowledge.  The objections of  Kumārila, who argues that if upamāna is to be understood as the relation of 
word-meaning, it can be reduced to śabda and is therefore would not a separate pramāṇa, but in fact this is not the case, 
cannot be rehearsed here.   For a useful discussion drawing primarily on Śabara, see Uma Chattopadhyay, “Mīmāṃsā 
Theory of Upamāna,” in Dishonoured by Philosophers: Upamāna in Indian Epistemology (New Delhi: D. K. 
Printworld, 2009), 29–36.
317 Recall the earlier observations by Monima Chadha that we recognize the same types of things even if bereft of 
knowledge of their names; note, however, this “similarity recognition” is analyzed as pratyabhijñā, recognition, an 
element of perception (pratyakṣa), and it not thought to constitute upamāna.  See Chadha, “On Knowing Universals.”  
In fact,  Vācaspati Miśra observes that the definition of Gautama alone would open up the possibility that recognition is 
upamāna, and therefore seeks in his commentary to restrict it.  See Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, 1.1.6.
However, as it was suggested in chapter one and will be argued near the conclusion of this chapter, a distinction between 
recognized X again as X and recognizing Y as like X seems to be illegitimate as both seem to result from the same 
perceptive and cognitive processes, the only difference being matters of degree or content rather than the ways of 
knowing themselves.  For example, one can mistake a blue pot that one sees before oneself as a blue pot one saw earlier; 
clearly, this is a case of false recognition because of misidentification, but clearly a case of correct perception of the 
similarity between the two pots; the only mistake is thinking that the present pot is absolutely similar to the previous pot, 
when in fact, it is not.  What else, though, could recognition be, however, than the perception of very high degrees of 
similarity (not always absolute because, for example, we may recognize a former teacher despite him or her having gray 
hair now, and so on.  This is the issue of recognition of a respect to a degree of tolerance.)?
318 Vallabha, Nyāyalīlāvatī, 1:70.
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while a universal could be said to inhere in one substrate, and hence could be predicated of it (“The sky 
is blue”), the same was not true with similarity as similarity could not be predicated of a single 
substrate (“The sky is similar”).319  Furthermore, there cannot be a universal of “having a property in 
common” because such a universal would be imperceptible unless one were to perceive that other 
which had such a common property, but as universals do not require counter-correlates, such a 
universal as “having a property in common” is disallowed as being a true universal.320  Therefore, while 
properties (we should include logical constructions, or upadhi, among these and not only those 
properties recognized as what we might term “natural kinds” or sāmānya) can be predicated of 
individual substances, similarity cannot be, and therefore similarity and properties must be 
ontologically different.321  This also accounts for the justification of why we may say that “horseness” 
and “redness” are similar in they are both universals without implying that they share the universal of 
“universalness.” On this analysis then, it would seem that similarity is just a logical construction, much 
like “universalness,” and just like universalness, then, it would ultimately be unreal. This could, it 
seems, make it the result of vikalpā and put the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers in bed with the 
Buddhists.  It is not something else, sādṛśya, that is the object of knowledge (prameya) of upamāna but 
rather the meaning relation of word and object.  Vattanky, in his introduction to the 
Nyāysiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśwanātha Pañcānana, has usefully summarized the “modern Nyāya 
319 This is the jist of Vardhamāna's commentary on the verse in the footnote immediately below. Vallabha, 1:76.
320 “taccaikavyaktigraha.nasamaye 'ag.rhiitamapi pratiyogigrahe 'vagamyata iti siddhim.” Vallabha, 1:76.
321 The  Nyāya philosophers distinguish between true universals, sāmānya or jāti, perhaps best understood as natural kinds, 
and logical concepts, or upadhi, in order to avoid a number of problems associated with a theory of universals 
particularly when paired with their understanding that only universals can only inhere in substances.  A simple problem 
illustrated the utility of this distinction: consider redness, blueness, and whiteness.  All of these are universals of color, 
so they form a type of universals.  This type-class could be explained by saying that the universal “colorness” (or maybe 
even “colornessness”) inheres in the universals.  Not so, say the Nyāya, as since universals are not substances, they 
cannot serve as the substrate for other universals (hence, there can be no “nested” universals).  As such, this “type of 
universals” is to be explained as a merely constructed or merely logical type, an upadhi, and not a natural type or 
explained by predicating universals of universals.  However, to say to a colorblind person, “Red is like green [in that it is 
a color],” the colorblind person who can see red (via redness) gains knowledge of green (greenness) though upamāna 
although not through the same sāmānya inhering in both redness and greenness.  In the context of the discussions of 
similarity,  sāmānya encompasses both jāti and upadhi.  This is still very contemporary and hotly debated issue in 
Western philosophy, and the present author has been at several heated discussions on the issue at national philosophy 
conferences over the past several years in which the idea of “the properties of properties” seems almost to bizarre to 
even contemplate.
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view.”  
A forest-dweller informs a villager that the denotative function of the word gavaya is in 
that which is similar to a cow.  Then going to the forest the villager sees an animal similar 
to a cow.  Such a knowledge of similarity (gosādṛśyajñānam) is the instrumental cause 
from the knowledge arising from Comparison [upamāna]. The recollection of the 
sentence conveying the meaning of similarity (atideśavākyārthasmaraṇam) which was 
uttered by the forest dweller is the operation of the instrumental cause.  The resulting 
knowledge of the denotative function of words like gavaya etc. is upamiti, knowledge 
arising from comparison.322
Although this is not the only Nyāya view discussed in the Nyāysiddhāntamuktāvalī, it is the 
only one accepted by its author.  But this view, it seems, is just as vulnerable to the earlier critiques of 
Kumārila Mīmāṃsika as the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.  That is, this view collapses into verbal 
knowledge or knowledge from testimony rather than being a distinct pramāṇa.  Not so, comes the reply 
by the Naiyāyika, because the knowledge arises not when the villager is told “the denotative function 
of the word gavaya is in that which is similar to a cow” but rather when he sees the gavaya and 
recollects this earlier testimony.  Were the knowledge purely linguistic, then the villager would have 
gained  upamiti just upon hearing, “A gavaya is like a cow.”  Nor is the knowledge purely perceptual, 
because through perception alone one does not have knowledge of the form “the denotative function of 
the word gavaya is in that which is similar to a cow” because knowledge of such a form can only come 
from the recollection of the previous testimony.  Hence, while language and perception both play a role 
in  upamāna, it is not reducible to one or the other, and hence must be a different pramāṇa.
There is a problem with this analysis, however, that have not been, as the present author knows,  
encountered in the debates.  Let us say that the village-dweller has led quite the sheltered life, and in 
322 Vattanky, Nyaya Philosophy of Language: Translation and Interpretation of Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, and Dinakarī, 5:1–2.
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venturing out to the forest for the first time, he encounters a buffalo (Sanskrit: mahiṣa).  Now, he 
recollects what he has been told by the forest-dweller, and seeing that the buffalo is similar to the cow, 
he concludes that it is the buffalo which is the denotative function of the word gavaya (which refers to 
the gaur or gayal, two different animals and not buffaloes).  Hence, he errs, and we should deny he has 
knowledge if knowledge is just that of the object-word relation.  When, however, he perceives the 
buffalo, he comes to understand it is similar to the cow without needing any linguistic knowledge, and 
therefore can express such knowledge in a sentence using a demonstrative pronoun, such as “That is 
similar to a cow.”  Such knowledge and such an expression clearly is a result of knowledge of 
similarity, it seems, but does not concern understanding the denotative function of any word.  This 
objection will be considered again shortly in a form that was considered in the debates.
A BHAṬṬA MĪMĀṂSIKA INTERLUDE
Before moving on to discuss the particular views of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, a consideration 
of some of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā philosophers' general objections against the Nyāya is helpful to lay the 
groundwork.  Most importantly is that the Mīmāṃsāka view avoids the objection immediately above.  
In the Śābarabhāṣyam, a commentary on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini by Śābara (second to fifth 
century CE323),  upamāna is defined without further discussion as follows:  “‘ Upamāna,’ ‘ Analogy’ — 
i.e. similitude — also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, 
the sight of the Gavaya (which is similar to the cow) brings about the remembrance of the cow (as 
being similar to the Gavaya).”324  Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 700 CE), in his Ślokavāritika, restates the view 
by which the forester saying, “The gavaya is like the cow” is upamāna (not adding the additional 
323 O. Gächter, Hermeneutics and Language in Purva Mimamsa: A Study in Sabara Bhasya, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1990), 9.  There is some debate about  Śābara's date, but  Gächter accepts this as a reasonable range based 
on the work of other scholars.
324 Śabara, Shabara Bhāsya, trans. Ganganatha Jha, vol. 1, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, LXVI (Calcutta: Oriental Institute 
Baroda, 1933), 15–16.
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details of later seeing the gavaya which was important in the Navya-Nyāya explanation above).325  
Kumārila notes that Śābara has already pointed out that were this view the actual case, then upamāna 
would be no more than verbal knowledge, and hence not a separate pramāna.326  Therefore, he rejects 
this view.
If, Kumārila proceeds to ask, upamāna is “just recognition of an object by means of (the 
perception of) another object similar to it—such recognition being exactly similar to remembrances 
brought about by constant pondering etc.” then how can it have any validity as something different 
from these remembrances?327  The suggestion is twofold: first, that just the invocation of a memory by 
something else has only the status of a recollection triggered by other means (such as wondering, 
“What color was her car?” and then recollecting that it was blue), and second, that recollection 
(pratyabhijñā) is specified by spatio-temporal markers (“The cow in the market,” “The man who as 
here”), while cognition of similarity is not “time-stamped” so to speak.  
This argument seems deeply unsatisfactory, however.  When I recognize my wife, that is not 
accompanied by a cognition of, “This is my wife from before” or “This is my wife from that place.”  
Likewise, when I recognize my home, or recognize the word “home” written on this page, my 
recognition is not marked by an accompanying cognition of “This is the word “home” which I learned 
before,” or “This is my house from yesterday.”  There seems to be a failure on both  Kumārila's part as 
well as the Naiyāyikas on how closely related, if not identical, perception of similarities and 
recognition are, even though ultimately Kumārila does not accept the argument of recognition.  
However,  Kumārila continues this line of attack.  If, for example, the villager sees the gavaya, having 
been told it is like the cow, and has a cognition “twinged with the idea similarity to a cow,” then is not 
this upamāna?  In this case, too, though, Kumārila suggests, we just have a perception of the gavaya 
325 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, Slokavartika, trans. Ganganatha Jha, Second, Sri Garib Das 
Oriental Series 8 (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications,Delhi, 1983), 222–23, 
http://archive.org/details/slokavartika015341mbp.
326 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 223.
327 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 223.
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and we have a remembrance of what were were told—if nothing new is added (besides the perception 
of the gavaya and the remembrance of the forester's words) there is is nothing else besides perception 
and remembrance (and recognition being “no more than remembrance” and being described as just a 
“repetition of a former cognition”), and therefore not some additional and unique pramāna.328,329  And 
even though the recollection of the testimony of the forester seems to preclude the knowledge being 
merely from perception,  Kumārila wisely notes that if one who knows of cows sees a gavaya in the 
forest, without having been told “a gavaya is like a cow,” one will still be able to recognize its 
similarity with the cow.  Remembrance of the foresters words seem to add nothing, and he flatly 
rejected that it is the knowledge or the relationship between word and object that then is upamiti.  
Because, again, the similarity can be cognized even in the absence of a word to attach meaning to, the 
word-object analysis of upamāna is thrown out.  This approach also overcomes the objection raised 
before about the misapplication of names, since the village-dweller will recognize the similarity with 
the cow when seeing a buffalo or a gaur, but if the knowledge is not linguistic, he will not err in his 
cognition, “That is like a cow.”  Here, though,  Kumārila seems to imply that since this is the case, then 
upamāna is just perception.  
In fact, it is this view that perception is involved that comes to shape his understanding.  For he 
claims, if there is perception, there must be something perceived, and it seems clear that we perceive 
similarity just as we perceive other ontological entities such as universals.330  Hence, similarity must be 
a positive entity.  It is worth here quoting at some length from Kumārila:
328 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 223.
329 Here there seems to be a failure to differentiate remembrance and recognition.  We may remember things such as our 
twelfth birthday party, something that is in principle impossible to recognize since it is an event that (assuming it was 
undocumented) is inaccessible except through remembering.  If one supposes it was documented, and one sees a 
photograph taken of it, one may recognize that photograph as of that event.  That may in turn lead one to remember 
details about the event, but recognizing the photograph as of the event is not the same as remembering the event.  In fact, 
we often have the experience of recognition without any accompanying memories.  For example, the present author has 
often seen a face that he recognizes but cannot recall from where.  We are unlikely to remember how we came about our 
present vocabulary, but we do not fail to recognize words.  Moreover, we know that just in terms of the neurology of 
memory and recognition that different neural structures seem to be involved in recognizing faces and snake-like objects 
apart from those areas involved in long-term memory (see the first chapter). 
330 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, Slokavartika, 225.
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And Similarity differs from the (classes) in that it rests upon a conglomeration of 
classes; whereas the classes appear also severally among the objects of sense perception. 
In such cases too as where we recognize the similarity of parts, we have the Similarity 
resting upon the fact of the homogeneity between the parts of each of these parts . . . .  
In cases where we have the recognition of a single class as belonging to the principle 
objects themselves (and not to their parts), there we have the notion (of identity) such as 
"this is that very thing"; and where there is difference, we have the notion of Similarity 
only.331
This passage requires some unpacking.  First, there is a concern to differentiate similarity from classes 
(jāti) or universals.  Universals are seen in different objects, but similarity requires groups of objects.332 
Hence, the perception of similarity is not identical to the perception of classes or  jāti.  That is not to 
deny that there is similarity, and indeed there is similarity between individuals (vyaktīsādṛśya), and 
there is similarity within a class (jātisādṛśya). Furthermore, similarity can be perceived between parts 
of objects, even though other parts (of the objects) differ.  Hence, a water buffalo is similar to a 
(brahma) bull in that they both possess a dewlap, but only the bull has a hump.  Therefore, the 
similarity between parts is not due to the buffalo and bull being of the same class (not due to 
jātisādṛśya) but rather to the existence of the same “part-universal” in each of them (avayavasāmānya), 
thus it could be argued that “dewlapness” inheres in a part of each of them.333  However, this 
recognition of the same universal (“dewlapness”) is not necessary for real similarity to exist.  For 
example, in a painting of a cow, one can recognize the similarity to the actual cow although one would 
331 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 226.
332 Kumārila seems to undercut his own argument, as will be seen in what follows, with the claim that similarity can be 
perceived in a single object, but this is actually not the case.  Kumārila claims that in seeing one object, we can perceive 
its similarity with a previously known object.  Recall the example above of the villager who sees the gavaya and 
perceives its similarity with the cow, even though the cow is not present.
333 There is some debate in the tradition about similarity and its relation to parts and mereology; for example, could not we 
specify the properties of a cow that inhere in its parts (“hornness,” “hoofness,” “dewlapness”) in such an exhaustive way 
as to preclude all other animals that may share many of these same properties.  While interesting and worthwhile 
pursuing, they introduce another layer of complexity that is best dealt with outside of the present discussion.
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not say that the quality of  “dewlapness” inheres in the painting; hence, the similarity is actual, is 
related to a correspondence between the cow and the painted image of the cow, but does not come from 
the cow and the image actually sharing all these part-universals.334  If we accept this argument, then the 
classical definition given by Vallabha must also be in error since similarity can exist even when the 
same universal does not inhere in two different substrates.  Kumārila claims that while it may be true 
that the painting does not have a dewlap, there can still be shared universals, such as color, between the 
representation and the object represented, and it is brought out further by commentators who note that 
the two may have “structural resemblances.”335  In fact, as we will shortly see, Kumārila argues in fact 
similarity can exist in a single object.
Finally, there is the idea that similarity is different from identity (a relationship we extensively 
explored in the last chapter).  Here, identify is understood as identity qua some class of thing.  Hence, 
“cowness” inheres in the entire cow, and any cow will have “cowness” inhering throughout it.  That 
“this is a cow” is a statement of identity qua class.  However, that “this cow is like this cow” is a 
statement of similarity via jātisādṛśya.336  We might distinguish both from an identity statement such 
as, “This is Meas,” which is a statement of identity qua particular.337  
We have already noted that for Kumārila, similarity is known through perception.  However, it 
is a uniquely qualified perception, so unique in fact it is, for Kumārila, a separate pramāna.  This idea 
can be illustrated by considering the rather queer suggestion that similarity does not require two objects 
but that in fact similarity can exist in a single object.  The illustration Kumārila provides is 
straightforward: we do not need to see both objects at the same time to recognize similarity.  Hence, the 
334 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, Slokavartika, 226.
335 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 226; Nandita Bandyopadhyay, “The Concept of Similarity in 
Indian Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 10, no. 3 (1982): 250.
336 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, Slokavartika, 226.
337 Based on the previous chapter, one can provide an analysis of this in terms of similarity in a certain respect.  Identity 
qua particular is absolute similarity, while identity qua class is similarity in respect to a specified property, such as 
“cowness,” or it can be analyzed as two objects which share a similarity relation in respect to cowness (as the 
resemblance nominalist will do).
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gavaya's similarity with the cow exists within the gavaya alone.338  If it did not exist within the gavaya 
alone then, when perceiving the gavaya in the absence of the cow, one would not be able to perceive its 
similarity with the cow.  Now this perception is different enough from other sorts of perceptions, like 
the perception of universals, that it is a unique form of perception, and hence upamāna is a separate  
pramāna (from “regular” perception).  
Here we can provide a a critique of Kumārila's argument built in part with the previous chapter's 
analysis of similarity while at the same time preserving his intuition.  Consider, for example, that there 
exists a single, actual Pegasus that sprang from the blood of a slain gorgon or perhaps was created in 
some genetics laboratory—whichever the reader prefers to imagine.  Now, further imagine that a child 
who had never seen a horse before sees this single, unique creature that is the Pegasus.  Now, the child 
ventures out into the world. Unbeknownst to her, though, in the meantime the Pegasus is destroyed and 
no longer exists. Sometime after that, she encounters her first horse and has the cognition, “This 
creature is similar to the Pegasus.”  Now, the Pegasus does not exist.  Therefore, either (1) the 
similarity with the Pegasus is solely within the horse, (2) similarity relations can exist between existent 
and non-existent entities, or (3) similarity relations can exist between the actual world and possible 
worlds, either simply ersatz possible worlds or concrete possible worlds.  If the Pegasus never existed 
(nor, we may wish to add to strengthen the point, was never even imagined and never existed in any 
possible world, even in the most ontologically maximal possible world), then it is very hard to see how 
“The horse is similar to the Pegasus” could be true.339  It seems this is precisely the sort of statement 
that should have a truthmaker, but in this improbable scenario in which the Pegasus is an impossible 
being, it just does not seem like there is anything that can play the role of the truthmaker, and perhaps 
338 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, Slokavartika, 227.
339 Of course there is a simple objection to this point: if the Pegasus is both impossible and unimagined, this claim could 
never be made, and therefore this scenario begs the question.  Thus, we can weaken it, and perhaps say that even through 
the Pegasus is an impossible animal, it can be imagined.  And, as it can be imagined, it can be structurally similar in the 
way that it is represented in the imagination to the actual horse.  The present author sees nothing amiss about suggesting 
similarity relations can hold between imagined and actual objects, and for those skeptical of even ersatz possible worlds 
(and even if there are in fact no such skeptics, we can imagine a possible world in which they are!) perhaps this relation 
between representations and actual objects is more amenable and less “spooky.”
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the statement is simple nonsense (see the previous footnote).  However, if (2) or (3) is correct, and 
relations of similarity can span between existence and non-existence (which seems a bit more 
problematic than (3)), or relations can span between actual and possible worlds, then the relation of 
similarity can provide the truthmaker for the statement, “The horse is like the Pegasus” even if, in fact, 
there is no actual Pegasus in existence but either there was once, or we can imagine a Pegasus in some 
possible world.340  It is this same appeal to possible worlds that provides a resemblance nominalist 
explanation for properties with a single exemplification as well as the argument, encountered briefly in 
the first chapter of this work, that similarity is a necessary relation in any possible world, even one 
composed of only a single unique particular.  There is of course another option, and that is that the 
perception of the horse was qualified by the memory of the previously perceived Pegasus.  This would 
entail too, however, that the similarity is not wholly within the horse, but rather is the result of a 
relation with the Pegasus-memory and the presently perceived horse.  Such an approach risks 
internalism but that is no reason to think it might not be true. 
In both this argument and in Kumārila's argument, the presupposition is that for one to 
recognize similarity, one still requires some previous experience of the second relata, even if it is not 
present, and Kumārila grants his Nyāya opponents this.341  That is, either two objects together are 
perceived as similar, or one perceives something similar to an object previously perceived.  But this 
perception is unique,  Kumārila argues, because it is a perception not just of a cow, and not just of 
“dewlapness” in its dewlap, but instead a perception of “cow as qualified by similarity.”342  If one is 
perceiving a cow for the first time, and have never perceived representations of cows, cow-like 
creatures, or representations of cow-like creatures, then one will not have this uniquely qualified 
340 Of course, the other possibility is simply that there is a relation between one's memory of Pegasus and the perceived 
horse, or between the memory and the cognition of perception of the horse, but this may turn out to also hinge upon our 
philosophy of mind and theory of memory and perception.  For example, if we are first-order representationalists in our 
theory of mind, we might very well hold that these relations of similarity exist between the representations rather than 
necessarily between external objects.  Again, sadly, this is another fascinating philosophical road that will have to be 
traversed elsewhere.
341 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, Slokavartika, 227.
342 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 227.
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perception.  Hence again, upamāna is a separate pramāna albeit conceived quite differently than the 
Nyāya and independently of language.
Yet again, what is the nature of this similarity that is uniquely perceived?  It is the having of the 
same properties (widely conceived) by two individuals that constitutes the nature of similarity.343  The 
definition of similarity, in the end, is strikingly close to that given by Vallabha; the primary difference 
is that what can constitute similarity is taken to be wider given it is conceivable that structural 
resemblance alone with no actual shared universals could constitute true similarity.   Yet, there is an 
awareness that this means similarity is relational.  Indeed, in his commentary, Pārthasārathimiśra states 
that similarity is a relation and that the relation is inherent given the properties an object has.344  That 
similarity just is the relation of similarity, then, entails it is knowledge of this relation that is upamiti.
What is most unique, then, is the way similarities are perceived and the nature of upamiti, or 
analogical knowledge (that is, the epistemology of similarity), rather than the nature of similarity (the 
ontology of similarity).  This view leads to the rejection of the Nyāya account of what knowledge of 
similarity consists of, or how analogical reasoning works, but the acceptance of an ontology of 
similarity likely to be very amenable to the Nyāya philosophers.  As we shall see in what follows, 
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsāka's account of knowing similarity is quite similar to Kumārila's, but they draw a 
much more radical ontological conclusion about similarity.  
THE PRĀBHĀKARA MĪMĀṂSĀKA'S VIEWS OF SĀDṚŚYA AND UPAMĀNA
Prābhākara, in his commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya, threw down a gauntlet regarding the 
nature of similarity, breaking with previous schools by declaring that although some schools of thought 
accepted that similarity was simply the universal itself in more than one substrate, that could not be the 
case.345  Universals are unchanging, and are cognized as “that X” while similarity is cognized as “that 
343 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 225.
344 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, and Sucarita Miśra, 235.
345 Prābhākara, Vṛhatī of Prābhākara, ed. Pandit Madhava Sastri Bhandari, vol. 1 (Madras: Madras University, 1934), 109.
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X-like.”  Given this difference, and given that this difference between cognizing a universal and 
cognizing a similarity are clearly marked by different qualities and hence are different types of 
perceptions, therefore what is perceived must likewise be different as the cause of such knowledge 
(upamiti), functioning as a distinct, knowable category (prameya).346  Thus, given that similarity is 
knowable as something distinct from universals, there must be something which is known that is 
likewise distinct, and hence similarity is a distinct ontological category.
The Prakaraṇapañcika of Śālikanāthamiśra provides an exposition of the the  Prābhākara 
Mīmāṃsāka account of upamāna and sādṛśya.347  Śālikanātha considers, in a series of epistemological 
and ontological arguments, both how similarity is a positive entity and in fact its own ontological 
category as well as why upamāna is a separate pramāna. The first argument is simply that similarity is 
attested to by knowledge and experience.  We experience similarity, and we know things are similar.  
This attests to the existence of similarity.348 The second argument is developed through a process of 
elimination, by which it is shown that sādṛśya cannot be any of the other accepted ontological 
categories.349  It cannot be  considered as substance (dravya) since something can be similar in quality 
(guṇa) as well as action (karma), and likewise, it therefore cannot be quality or action.  It cannot be 
considered a universal (sāmānya) because “it is not the ground for the notion of continuity.”350 
To better understand this last objection, one must have some grasp of the way that a universal is 
conceived by the  Prābhākara Mīmāṃsākas.  The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsāka believe, as do the Nyāya, 
that universals are directly perceptible, yet also hold that they may not be cognized qua universal until 
one has at least another experience of that universal in another substrate.351  This is because the nature 
346 Prābhākara, 1:109.
347 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikānātha.
348 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 235.
349 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 235–36.
350 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 236.
351 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 70–71.  Here we should also recall Armstrong's objection to resemblance nominalism, 
discussed in Chapter Two, in that properties with only a single exemplification are inexplicable by the nominalist's 
theory.
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of the universal is continuity.352  This seems a bit odd, for it seems to claim if we perceived a wholly 
distinct object, with qualities completely foreign to us, we would not cognize any of its qualities as 
universals.  Rather, it is only with the experience of the repeatability of a quality can it be cognized qua 
universal.  This is the “continuity” which Prābhākara and Śālikanātha are speaking of—a continuity 
“through” individuals.  This continuity is denied as a feature of similarity, yet is seems this is a weak 
argument for ruling out similarity as a universal for, it seems, that similarity between individuals will 
exist throughout any such continuity given the presence of the same universal in multiple individuals, 
and likewise, similarity will not be cognized as similarity the first time a quality has been encountered, 
only after that quality has been re-encountered.  However, when a universal is first cognized (even if 
not qua universal) that cognition is still distinct from the cognition of similarity, and when it is 
cognized subsequently, it is not necessarily marked with a “that X-like” quality while any cognition of 
similarity must be marked with that quality.  Furthermore, the statement A that two objects share 
property x is not equivalent to the statement B that two objects are similar: one may deduce B from A, 
but one cannot deduce A from B.  Therefore, conceptually similarity is distinguishable from sharing 
universals or properties.  Given the supposition that differences in types of cognitions (based on the 
qualities of said cognitions) are proof for different types of objects as the cause of such cognitions, and 
that different types of objects as the cause of different cognitions is proof for these different types being 
different ontological categories, similarity and universals are of different ontological categories.353  We 
may remain skeptical, however, that our first perception of a property fails to recognize it as a property. 
It is denied, too, that is falls under vīśeṣa, or “particularity” (used in part as a theoretical 
construct (but taken as an ontological reality) to distinguish and individualize atoms which are without 
qualities and therefore otherwise indiscernible).354  This is unsurprising since the Mīmāṃsākas reject 
352 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 48–49.
353  So, for example, the cognitions caused by “redness” and “cowness” would be of the same type, hence proof that 
“redness” and “cowness” are of the same type of object (a universal), and therefore of the same category. 
354 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikānātha, 236.
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this category in general.  Furthermore, similarity is not an absence (abhāva), so it cannot belong to that 
ontological category, either.  What perhaps is surprising is the denial the similarity is a samavāya or a 
relation given that Pārthasārathi clearly identified it as so; this denial is one of the differentiators 
between the two Mīmāṃsāka schools.355  
Clearly, similarity is not being treated here explicitly as a relation in much of the tradition.   
Ratnakīrti's argument, that there “is no third thing” besides the two objects that is “similarity” certainly 
parallels the argument of Dharmakīrti against relations in the Sambandhaparīkṣā, but even Ratnakīrti's 
argument does not explicitly invoke similarity as a relation.  The Nyāya accounts we have examined 
thus far also do not make the relational nature of similarity as explicit.  Now, given what we saw in 
Kumārila's account, we might think here that perhaps Śālikanātha has in mind the idea that similarity 
can exist in a single object; however, we saw even under that account that there had to be some 
previous experience of some other similar object for an object to be perceived “that-X like” (the 
previous object being X, of course).  Such a supposition would not be the whole story, however, for 
what Śālikanātha has in mind is the relation between the two similar objects.  The gavaya in the forest 
has no relation with the cow in the village.356  The similarity between the gavaya and the cow does not 
emerge from them having some relation to one another.  This is a common sense objection.  The 
American bison is also similar to the gavaya, but surely a bison wondering around in the wilds of 
Alaska is not in a relationship with a gavaya roaming in India.  Luckily, this is not the strongest 
argument the Prābhākaras have. 
Prābhākaras may grant that relations, and perhaps particular relations such as sharing 
substances, properties, or even actions, determine similarities.  However, they are not the similarities 
themselves.  Bandyopadhyaya, citing Bhavanātha, a Prābhākara, provides an excellent analogy against 
the understanding of the relations themselves as sādṛśya: “Contact between the object and the sense-
355 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 236.
356 Śālikanāthamiśra and Pandurangi, 237.
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organ is the causal determinant [prayojaka] of perception, but is not part of the perception itself.”357  
That is, relations may indeed be the causal determinant for similarity, but they are not similarity itself.  
One is then left to ask, “What then is the nature of these relations that give rise to the perception of 
similarity?”  The precise nature of these relations and what gives rise to them, along with why they do 
not constitute similarity but instead similarity is something over and above them, requires explanation.
There is a second argument, too, found in the literature.358  Other relations, such as conjunction, 
are only perceptible when the two relata are perceptible such as two lovers holding hands.  When only 
one of the lovers is present, the relation of conjunction is not perceived and therefore not said to exist 
in this instance.  To insist that similarity is a relation, then, means that when the relata are not present to 
perception, similarity cannot be perceived.359  Whether we consider similarity as a relation between the 
properties of the two similar objects or somehow between the two objects directly, this conclusion 
would still be entailed.  But, this conclusion is false, and therefore similarity must not be a relation.360  
The justification for this conclusion is further strengthened from the perception of similarity.  When 
one sees the bison or cow, one perceives its similarity with the known gavaya.  One need not go 
through a cognitive process of “matching” the properties of the bison or cow to the gavaya (dewlap, 
four legs, tail, hooves, and so forth), but one directly perceives the similarity, and one does not perceive 
it as a relation between two relata, for like Kumārila's account, the Prābhākaras accept similarity can 
exist wholly within one similar object as must be the case from the argument above.  Furthermore, it is 
not only the perception of the common properties, either, as the perception of the properties is argued 
to be distinct from the perception of similarity as in the Bhaṭṭakas, and, as it is not a relation, it cannot 
be analyzed as sharing properties or the having of properties in common.
There is a necessary and difficult pill for the Prābhākaras to swallow.  Kumārila claimed, it will 
357 Bandyopadhyay, “The Concept of Similarity in Indian Philosophy,” 262.
358 Gaṅgeśa, “Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-Viracitas Tattva-Cintā-Manau Upamāna-Khaṇḍaḥ,” in Epistemology in Classical India: 
The Knowledge Sources of the Nyaya School, trans. Stephen H. Phillips (New York: Routledge, 2013), 107–8.
359 Gaṅgeśa, 108.
360 Gaṅgeśa, 107–8.
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be recalled, that similarity can exist wholly within a single object; however, we saw the justification for 
this brought in a second object through the back door so to speak since one must be acquainted with the 
absent similar object to recognize similarity in the present similar object, but that perception is a unique 
sort of perception and hence a separate pramāna; still, similarity was conceived of as a relation of 
shared properties.  The Prābhākaras, because they posit that similarity is not a relation, are stuck with 
an even more difficult problem: while the cow and gavaya are similar, their similarities are different.  
The argument runs as follows.  If similarity is non-relational, then it is not constituted by two relata  
Therefore, similarity cannot be symmetric as only relations are symmetric.361  It is not the “sharing” of 
something, for as we observed earlier, sharing is relational and therefore does not offer a reduction of 
the relation of similarity to something non-relational.  Yet, similarity is observable when the villager 
sees the gavaya having known the village cow.  Therefore, either the similarity observed in the gavaya 
is not that that is observed in the cow; that is, the gavaya is perceived as “cow-like” while the cow is 
perceived as “gavaya-like,” or, the similarities are the same.  If they are the same, either the similarity 
of the cow and the gavaya are of the same type as all other similarities, or they are of a different type of 
similarities.362  
There seems a way out of this conundrum, but one with its own drawbacks.  That is to suggest 
that while similarity is an independent ontological category, it consists of one entity.  That is, there is 
one similarity, and all similar things partake in it.  The Prābhākaras do not make this argument, and at 
first, it is difficult to see how it could do any violence to their metaphysical system.  Similarity can 
remain non-relational.  It seems, following Bhavanātha, that there are clear resources from 
361  For example, if we remark of a painting that it is symmetrical, we are properly speaking of a relation between one side 
of the painting to another.
362  There are two other problems,  the first of which being addressed below.  First,  if similarity is an independent category, 
and the similarity of the cow is not the similarity of the gavaya by which  “The cow is like the gavaya” and, “The 
gavaya is like the cow,” then on what properties or features are the two similarities to be distinguished.  
The second problem, not addressed, is as follows: if the similarity of the gavaya and the cow are the same similarity but 
distinct from other similarities, then they are similar because they share the same similarity, and similarity is understood 
relationally contra the Prābhākaras.  If similarity is a category of only one object, the it is also shared, but in that case the 
distinctiveness of the similarity of the gavaya and cow (as contrasted with that of the red apple and red rose) comes from 
the grounding of similarity rather than the sharing of similarity which is everywhere the same.
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distinguishing similarity from the grounds of similarity.  Therefore, while the grounds of similarity can 
preserve the different grounding for the statement, “The cow is like the gavaya” and, “The gavaya is 
like the cow,” it could preserve that what is perceived in each case is similarity (recall that samavāya, 
inherence, is considered like this; although many inherences ground it, there is only one singular self-
relating samavāya).  The similarity of the cow and gavaya would be the same, and it would be the 
same similarity between a triangle and pyramid, or a red apple and a red rose, or the two men who are 
not my father, but the respects by which two or more things are similar could be preserved as distinct.  
For the Prābhākaras, the test would be to examine the perception of similarity and see if the 
similarity perceived in the gavaya is different than the similarity perceived in the apple.  If, however, 
we distinguish the similarity perceived in the gavaya from the similarity perceived in the apple, some 
rationale for distinguishing between one similarity from another must be given (if it is not only the 
grounds of similarity).  This is the problem of individualizing similarities, but in this case, non-
relational similarities.  The only way the present author can conceive of doing this is by imputing 
properties to similarity, and therefore similarity must be able to be a substrate for properties and 
perhaps actions, or suggesting that there is some “particularizer,” that is vīśeṣa.  However, this clearly 
would disrupt the Prābhākaras' metaphysical system since they accept that properties can only inhere in 
dravya and reject the category of vīśeṣa; part of their argument to the existence of similarity as a 
distinct ontological category depends on these taxonomic assumptions.  Therefore, there seem to be 
good metaphysical motivations for the Prābhākaras to accept that the category of similarity has only 
one object, and it is differentiated merely on the grounds by which it is cognized.
Yet, for all its metaphysical appeal, this is not a solution to the Prābhākaras' woes as there is an 
even more motivating epistemological argument against this solution.  Recall the example of the child, 
who had never seen a horse before, that sees the singular, unique creature that is the Pegasus. If the 
similarity of the Pegasus (with the horse) is non-relational, wholly within the Pegasus, and distinct 
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from that of the horse, why is it not perceptible to the child since it is held by the Prābhākaras that 
similarity is directly perceptible?  Why should this perceivable entity, similarity, be invisible to those 
without prior knowledge of horses when one perceives the Pegasus?  The answer must be that only 
with prior acquaintance of a horse can the similarity that exists wholly within the Pegasus (and which 
is different from that within the horse) be perceived.  But if similarity is everywhere the same, why are 
these special conditions necessary for its perception?  Why would the prior acquaintance with 
similarity (for example, red roses and red apples) not be enough to perceive similarity in the Pegasus as 
in the case with universals?
Here, the Prābhākaras can only resort to analogies which tie the conditions of perception to the 
distinct perception that is upamāna.  So, just as the redness of a pot cannot be perceived unless the 
condition of light being cast upon it is met, so too the similarity of the Pegasus cannot be perceived 
unless the condition of prior knowledge of a horse is met.  Yet, while not a direct argument that there 
must be different similarities, it strongly suggests it.  For, if similarity were everywhere the same, then 
the similarity cognized when one see the red apple and the red rose together would be the same object 
as that which is cognized when one sees the Pegasus (even without seeing the horse). Therefore, it is 
not acquaintance with similarity in general that provides the condition of the perception of similarity in 
a specific object, but rather acquaintance with an object similar to that very object that is the condition 
of the perception of similarity.   This strongly suggests, then, that the similarities of horses and Pegasus 
is of a different type than that between red apples and red flowers.  And if that is in fact the case, 
similarity is not everywhere the same, and again the Prābhākaras have the burden of explaining how 
we may sort the category of similarity into different sorts (that perceivable in the horse and then the 
Pegasus, and that in the red apple and the red rose), which again only seems feasible to the detriment of 
their overarching metaphysical edifice.363  
363 The answer might be simple enough, though: an appeal to upadhi.
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 The Prābhākaras, too, have their own arguments for not accepting that sādṛśya is a single 
entity, an argument that can be seen in the Upamānacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, the chapter on upamāna in 
the Tattvacintāmaṇi.364   The first claim is that similarity must not be a single thing throughout the 
categories “since the supposition entails the unfortunate consequence that everything would be similar 
to everything else and everyday speech about this as a lot or little similar with be impossible (or 
inappropriate) were it a unity.” 365  This first observation contradicts Greenlee's Similarities of 
Discernables introduced in the first chapter.  In fact, everything is similar to everything else, a notion 
reinforced, as we saw, by Donald Davidson's truth-functional analysis of similes as trivially true 
(similarity claims of the form, “x is like y.”), and the first chapter gave an argument that this is in fact a 
necessary feature of any possible world.  A charitable reading, then, takes both aspects of this objection 
to sādṛśya being a single entity not as metaphysical objections, but claims about the function of 
everyday language.  Clearly, given the way we speak, one would think it deserving of further 
explanation to claim that that “My dissertation committee is like the moons of Jupiter” since there is no 
obvious similarity between them.366  We also have paradigms of difference (“Black and white,” “up and 
down,” “wrong and right,” “both are impossible,” et cetera).  Yet, as we saw, there can always be some 
similarity drawn between any two objects, even objects that do not exist and perhaps are even 
impossible objects (both are colors; both are directions; both are moral judgements; et cetera)!  This 
charitable reading, though, cannot turn this objection into a metaphysical counterargument, however, 
because as we have already seen, ordinary language is not the best guide for ontology even if it is able 
to give us some clues, and the claim that everything is not similar to everything else is, in fact, not only 
364  The author will be following S. Phillip's translation.  Gaṅgeśa, “Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-Viracitas Tattva-Cintā-Manau 
Upamāna-Khaṇḍaḥ.”  For a more exhaustive study on this section of the Tattvacintāmaṇi, see the 2015 work, Uma 
Chattopadhyay, Faultless to a Fault: Gangesha on Upamana in Indian Epistemology, 2015 edition (New Delhi: D.K. 
Printworld, 2015).
365 Gaṅgeśa, “Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-Viracitas Tattva-Cintā-Manau Upamāna-Khaṇḍaḥ,” 107.  Italics added.
366  The almost irresistible urge to interpret combined with the richness of analogy has no doubt left the very committee 
members here wondering by what respect they are similar to the moons of Jupiter since perhaps the most obvious 
respect, number, is ruled out since Jupiter has 53 moons. The example was random, but no doubt the individual members 
can find some interpretation whereby it is true that “Jarrod's dissertation committee is like the moons of Jupiter.”
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false but necessarily false.  
That some things are more or less similar is, though, an intuition many share.  Just what we 
mean, however, by more and less similar is a surprisingly and staggeringly complex problem.  One is 
inclined to think that the Pegasus has more in common with a horse than a buffalo.  This very way of 
phrasing (“has more in common”) presupposes a certain sort answer: that the Pegasus and the horse 
have more qualities in common, and hence to say that the Pegasus is more similar to the horse than the 
buffalo is to say that the Pegasus and horse share more properties with one another.  This is, in fact, the 
explanation Gaṅgeśa puts into the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsika's mouth as an objection to the Prābhākara 
interlocutor.367  
For the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsikas, the interpretation that similarity is a relation constituted by the 
relata which are shared properties is open.  This interpretation allows for what shall be termed the 
“quantitative measure of similarity.”  Under this interpretation, properly speaking things do not 
resemble each other in greater or lesser degrees, but rather in more or less ways.  That is “more similar” 
is actually a pre-theoretical way of saying, “has more similarities” and hence is a quantitative claim 
about the number of resemblances (even though we may be unable to provide a number). Properly 
speaking, objects are not more similar to one another, but rather, they have a greater number of specific 
similarities.  If objects resembled each other qua objects then similarity is more likely to be a transitive 
relation.  If, as objects, a (red) rose is like a (red) Corvette and a (red) Corvette is like a (blue) Mack 
truck then a rose is like a Mack truck.  But if a rose is like a Corvette in that they are red (or share the 
property of redness, or have a resemblance, et cetera) it does not follow that a red rose is like a blue 
Mack truck because the truck is like a Corvette in that they both have combustion engines.  This idea 
will be revisited towards the end of this chapter.
Yet there is a lurking problem remaining in all this: the picture of similarity we have painted is 
367 Gaṅgeśa, “Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-Viracitas Tattva-Cintā-Manau Upamāna-Khaṇḍaḥ,” 108–9.
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one of abundant similarity of a staggering magnitude since all two objects are similar in that they are 
not some third object, and we may be comfortable with trans-world relations like those between actual 
and possible objects.  What this means is that it is practically impossible for anyone to quantify the 
number of similarity relations between any three objects at a glance and determine if two are more 
similar to each other than the third even when, practically speaking, one can easily make that 
determination: say between a cow, a buffalo, and a Ming vase.  Any theory of quantifying similarity 
that makes such determinations a practical impossibility must, it seems, be misguided.  
There are at least three ways forward here.  
One way forward is just to bite the bullet and say that actually we are not any good at 
determining really how similar objects are.  This reply accords with the Buddhist responses to the 
problem.  What we take to be similarities are really just useful fictions, and that we have other 
inventions based upon these fictions that are likewise erroneous should be no surprise.  Consider 
Frege's attempt at the reduction of arithmetic to logic, the so-called logistic program.  Having 
unwittingly accepted a contradiction at the core of his set theory, he was able to build a beautiful yet 
misguided edifice upon that error.  Just because we can develop something that pragmatically seems to 
work most of the time does not mean that we have things right, so this line of argument goes.
The second way forward is to take an intermediate position and object to the extravagance of 
similarities.  This position, too, has a distinctly Buddhist flavor.  Since the “similarity” that comes from 
two entities both being different from some third entity should not be understood as a positively 
existing entity, but instead as a non-existences or absences (abhāva).  Such absences are not to be 
counted as existing things, and therefore the similarities of our objects are greatly reduced in 
magnitude.368  Other sorts of relations might also be rejected.  For example, one might hold other 
368  This is simply an argument that rejects negative properties or negative universals.  There seem to be some very good 
metaphysical reasons for wanting to reject these as entities.  For an “opinionated” discussion of the problem, see David 
M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals: Volume 2: Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 2 (CUP Archive, 1980), 23–
29.
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additional metaphysical tenets, such as the rejection of concrete or ersatz possible worlds, the rejection 
of mereological sums, presentism or a growing block theory of time, or three-dimensionalism.  Such 
tenets would, particularly if we accept the sorts of arguments Dharmakīrti advanced against causal 
relations we examined above, lead to rejecting the respective relations holding between objects in the 
actual and possible worlds; the rejection of relations between parts and wholes; the rejection of 
relations holding between objects in the present, past or future; or relations between temporal parts.  
Presumably, these could include similarity relations, although there would certainly be additional 
complications in the details (for example, if there are no relations between temporal parts and we are 
presentists, then do I have no relation to the entity I see in the family album that everyone identifies as 
“me?”).  These intermediate positions, although perhaps successful in eliminating many similarities, 
are not a solution because we can conceive of enumerable others similarities on just as vast a scale—
for example, being equidistant from Paris (or any other location), co-existing at this very moment, or 
similar in being constituted by at least one subatomic particle that was generated from the Andromeda 
galaxy.369  Therefore, there is still an abundance of similarity relations between any two objections even 
if one can develop principled reasons for excluding many sorts of such relations.  
The third possible way forward here is to accept that indeed there are these manifold similarities 
between any two objects, however limited by our other metaphysical commitments, but it is not 
actually the number of resemblances that account for our determination of similarity.  Instead, this 
position insists that to think objects as being “more or less similar” is a matter of quantification is, in 
fact, entirely misguided.  To expand just what this position would be, it will be useful to elaborate 
further the debate regarding more or less similar objects between the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsikas and 
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsikas, and it will be demonstrated that in fact neither can be an accurate description 
369  This last example seems a bit outlandish, but such facts could, in principle, be known about objects' constitutions.  For 
some discussion, see Daniel Anglés-Alcázar et al., “The Cosmic Baryon Cycle and Galaxy Mass Assembly in the FIRE 
Simulations,” Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 470, no. 4 (October 1, 2017): 4698–4719, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mnras/stx1517.
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of what we mean by saying objects are more or less similar to one another.
Gaṅgeśa surveys a number of definitions offered by both the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsikas and 
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsikas.  The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsika argue that “similarity is the abundance of common 
characteristics in terms of parts, qualities, and actions” given that there are two different objects.370  
This definition, and three related formulations of it, are rejected by the  Prābhākaras on the grounds 
that “there is no uniformity about what counts as abundance . . . .”371  The Prābhākaras here seem to be 
making a trivial objection: we simply do not know what qualifies as abundance like we do with plural, 
three or more, and so on.372  The reply is straightforward: abundance is taken to be uniform and 
therefore there is no quantitative threshold that must be met to say that similarities are abundant.373 
Rather, when we claim two things are similar, we are claiming the commonalities are many while 
simultaneously  the differences are little.374 But the Prābhākaras' objection is actually not so trivial, 
because again appealing to ordinary language, they note that we talk of similarity in cases in which 
things may have a few or uncountable differences.
There is a deeper point to drive home here, and it constitutes our third position.  That is, degrees 
of similarity are not based on on the quantity of similarities.  Rather, that things may be more or less 
similar depends instead on the weight that we assign particularly resemblances.  As I look around the 
room I am presently sitting in, there is an end table, a cabinet, and a picture frame that all match; they 
are all the same color of light blue, and painted in such a way as to appear weathered.  They are very 
different objects.  The end table is small and square.  The cabinet stands chest high, has two doors and  
ornate bronze handles in the form of a Naga goddess.  The picture frame is large and rectangular, 
370 Gaṅgeśa, “Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-Viracitas Tattva-Cintā-Manau Upamāna-Khaṇḍaḥ,” 108.
371 Gaṅgeśa, 109.  The other three definitions which are rejected are as follows.  (2) Similarity “is abundance of properties 
existing in one thing with respect to the properties of something else.”  (3) Similarity is “the possession of properties that 
are abundant with respect to those had by [the counter-correlate] given that the things are not identical.” (4) The 
posession of properties that are abundant with respect to those had by the absentee [counter-correlate] of a absolute 
absence that rests in the thing itself (the thing y perceived to be similar to x [the counter-correlate].”  Ibid.
372 Gaṅgeśa, 109.
373 One possible reading, however, is that the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsikas are suggesting that at least three is needed to be taken as 
abundant, but this does not seem reasonable.
374 Gaṅgeśa, “Gaṅgeśopādhyāya-Viracitas Tattva-Cintā-Manau Upamāna-Khaṇḍaḥ,” 109–10.
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containing a photograph from inside one of Kanchipuram's many temples.  There are other similarities; 
they all seem to be constructed of wood, for example.  There are also similarities that might not be 
known to an uniformed viewer.  For example, I know that they had a common origin, in that I built 
them all.  But when someone else enters the room, they immediately recognize that the furniture 
“matches.”  They pick immediately the similarity in respect to color because that similarity is weighted 
in some way.  That is, when we make determinations of similarity, we are privileging some respects by 
which objects are similar over other respects.  Making determinations of similarity simply does not 
require that we invoke numeracy.  Instead, we give more conceptual weight to some similarities than 
others.
This position, though, does nothing to rescue the peculiar position of the Prābhākaras.  The 
inference from the distinctiveness of the perception of similarity to similarity as an independent 
ontological category that is non-relational creates more problems that it solves.  Indeed, it fails to stand 
up under further epistemological inquiry.  Instead, the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsika position, subsequently taken 
over and modified by Gaṅgeśa who abandons the earlier “word-relation” theory of analogy, seems a 
much stronger position to account for our perceptions of similarity and the ontology of similarity.  They 
preserve a relational understanding of similarity.  As argued in the previous two chapters, this similarity 
relation may be a special relation, but it is a relation none the less.  The  Prābhākaras' insight that there 
is something irreducible about similarity, however, and that there is something more than just two 
objects with a common property, is an insight that our model developed in the previous chapter 
preserves.  
The South Asian traditions' debates are so valuable in part because of the strong link between 
epistemological principles and ontological commitments.  Epistemological claims are tested against 
ontological grounds, and ontological claims require epistemological justifications.  Just as the Quinian 
mantra of “no entity without identity” ties epistemology to ontology, so does the Indian mantra of 
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“what is knowable is nameable.”375  The previous chapter developed a theory of relations and 
individuating relations on the basis of similarity.  Such an approach assumed relationality and 
similarity, and with those two resources developed a robust explanation of what relations are and how 
individual relations can be individuated.  It lacked the resources, however, to determine whether or not 
relations were “real” and offered a universe of relational extravagance.  
But still, while the South Asian debates perhaps clarifies some of the mysteries about similarity, 
it does not answer all of our questions.  For example, if the third position above is correct, and we have 
good reason to think that it is, it becomes the sister question to the question with which we ended the 
previous chapter.  That is, how do we know what relations or similarities are actual, and now, how do 
we know what conceptual weight they should be assigned as we make determinations of more or less 
similar?  We will return to this question at the end of the chapter and attempt an answer to these two 
questions.  Before we are ready to do that, however, it behooves us to spend more time thinking about 
how such questions practically play out in reasoning.  The Islamic jurisprudential debates offer a rich 
way to explore this very issue.  It is to the debates concerning analogy and legal and ethical reasoning 
between the Ẓāhirī madhhab and its proponent, Ibn Ḥazm, and Shāfiʿī madhhab and its proponent, al-
Shāfiʿī, to which we now turn.
A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE DEBATES CONCERNING “QIYĀS,” 
OR ANALOGY
While it is beyond the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive history of the debates 
concerning qiyās (analogy), some historical context is necessary to understand why analogical 
reasoning became a matter of such importance in the uṣūl al-fiqh, the science of jurisprudence, within 
the Islamic context.  In part because, as far as this author knows, no similar debate occurred with such 
375 W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 10th-11. print ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 
65; Roy W. Perrett, “Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?,” Philosophy East and West 49, no. 4 (1999): 401–
14, https://doi.org/10.2307/1399945.
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rigor or rancor within the debates regarding ecclesiastical law in the European traditions or even Judaic 
law, some understanding of just why this was the case within the Islamic context is needed.376   The 
philosophical inquiries in which analogy was discussed and debated after Aristotle, while certainly of 
interest to the scholar of analogy, never took on the urgency that it did in an Islamic context.377  This 
difference is perhaps because not only was analogy bound up in religious contexts within the Islamic 
world as in Europe and the greater Roman world, but given the predominance of religiously derived 
law, the concern was also deeply practical.
It has been the practice of historians of Islamic law to note a division that emerged sometime 
late in the second century of Islam (about the eighth century CE) between the Ahl al-Ḥadīth and Ahl al-
Raʾy.  These different movements are often presented as  exclusive of one another and in opposition to 
each other, although it seems doubtful that such a clear division existed.378  The Ahl al-Ḥadīth were 
scholars who considered the textual sources of the Islamic faith, the al-Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth (the 
reports of the actions, words and behaviors of the Prophet Muhammad) to be the only authority in 
religious and legal matters.  It has been typical of scholars, both Islamic and otherwise, to identify this 
"movement" as emerging first out of the scholars of Ḥadīth who were interested in the collection and 
authentication of the Ḥadīth.  The Ahl al-Raʾy was primarily identified with a jurisprudential approach 
that accepted the use of “human reasoning” to reach legal decisions,and has been variously branded the 
“rationalists” or “common sense” school by Western scholars, with ra’y being the practice of giving a 
376 Donna Litman, “Jewish Law: Deciphering the Code by Global Process and Analogy Symposium: Law and Religion,” 
University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, n.d., 563.
377  See for examples, E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009, 
https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/spr2010/entries/analogy-medieval/; E.J. Ashworth, “Analogy, 
Univocation, and Equivocation in Some Early Fourteenth-Century Authors,” in Aristotle in Britain during the Middle 
Ages, vol. 5, Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 5 (Brepols Publishers, 1996), 233–47, 
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.RPM-EB.4.000087; James F. Ross, Portraying Analogy, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1981); Roger M. White, Talking about God: The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of 
Religious Language (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2010).
378  See, for example, J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammad Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 253–
54; Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Themes in Islamic Law 1 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 74–77; Christopher Melchert, The Formation of The Sunni Schools Of Law, 9th-
10th Centuries C.E, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, v. 4 (New York: Brill, 1997), 1–10; Goldziher, The Ẓāhirīs, 3–7; 
Amr Osman, The Ẓāhirī Madhhab (3rd/9th-10th/16th Century): A Textualist Theory of Islamic Law, Studies in Islamic 
Law and Society, volume 38 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2014), 100–105.
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considered opinion.  Hallaq argues that Ahl al-Raʾy was defined negatively vis-à-vis the Ahl al-Ḥadīth: 
“A rationalist is one who does not rely, or tends not to rely, on Ḥadīth.”379  However, both early Islamic 
and Western scholars have acknowledged that the practice of ra’y predated the practice of collecting 
and verifying Ḥadīth. This fact was true in theology, as evidenced by the Muʿtazila, as well as in 
jurisprudence.380
Ibn Khaldūn's Muqaddima (circa 1377 CE) is helpful for understanding how these traditions 
were thought of by later Muslim scholars.  Particularly useful are its sections on tafsīr, or Qurʾānic 
interpretation.  Ibn Khaldūn writes that when the traditions of the Prophet were confined to Arabs, who 
had a native understanding of the language of the Qurʾān, there was little need for interpretative 
tools.381  But as the religion spread outside the Hijaz, and as the customs and language of the Arabs 
changed, such tools were needed, and therefore early scholarship on the Qurʾān focused on balāgha 
(stylistic form) and i‘rāb (nominal, adjectival, or verbal suffixes), occupying itself with primarily 
philological concerns.  Two approaches then emerged, one which looked at earlier “traditional” 
interpretations and relied on those, and others that looked primarily at the texts themselves and applied 
philological methods.382  While explicitly acknowledging that these two approaches were usually 
united, Ibn Khaldūn writes the former approach was lacking because many of the earlier traditions 
were transmitted by converted Jews whose interpretations also made use of their previous knowledge 
of the Torah and therefore conflated their previous faith's teaching with their new one. 383  As Muslim 
scholars became increasingly aware that the traditions that had been transmitted to them were possibly 
corrupt interpretations, a new science emerged that was to transform the Muslim world: ʻilm al-Ḥadīth, 
379 The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 74.
380  For a helpful overview of the rise of rationalism and rational theology (ʿIlm al-Kalām), see Majid Fakhry, A History of 
Islamic Philosophy, 3rd ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 43–66.  For a useful discussion of the relation 
of Ḥadīth and the Muʿtazila, see Usman Ghani, “The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought,” in The Sunna and Its 
Status in Islamic Law: The Search for a Sound Hadith, ed. Adis Duderija, Palgrave Series in Islamic Theology, Law, and 
History (Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 59–74.  
381 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History; in Three Volumes, Electronic version, vol. 2 (Princeton 
University Press, 1969), 566.
382 Ibn Khaldūn, 2:566–67.
383 Ibn Khaldūn, 2:566.
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the science of Ḥadīth.
 ʻIlm al-Ḥadīth became one of the central concerns of many Muslim intellectuals as  they traced 
the lines of transmission for various sayings or actions attributed to Muḥammad, the Sunna384 of the 
Prophet.  Ibn Khaldūn describes in brief the processes by which scholars determined the relative 
strength or weakness of a Ḥadīth and its authenticity, classifying them as ṣaḥīḥ (sound, authentic), 
ḍaʿīf (weak), or mawḍūʿ (fabricated) as well as classifying them regarding the links back to the original 
sources, considering if a link in the transmission was missing, or if two were missing, or if something 
was suspicious about the line of transmission, and so on.385, 386   Ib Khaldūn saw it as a noble 
undertaking.
The purpose of the discipline is a noble one. It is concerned with the knowledge of how to 
preserve the traditions (sunan) transmitted on the authority of the Master of the religious law 
(Muhammad), until it is definite which are to be accepted and which are to be rejected.387
In Ibn Khaldūn's understanding, ʻilm al-Ḥadīth was contemporaneous with the actual establishment of 
a science of jurisprudence.  Before, he writes, scholars had worked with only an oral tradition, and he 
fantastically writes that all legal reasoning before the advent of the Ḥadīth sciences contained “no 
speculation, no use of opinion, and no intricate reasoning” and hence an implicit denial that raʾy was a 
384  “Ways of acting” might be an adequate translation of sunna (plural, sunan).  It is discussed by Duderija as first being 
understood ". . . as a general, unsystematically defined ethico-behavioral practice of the early Muslim community that 
had been formulated, preserved, and transmitted either orally and/or through the practices of the Prophet’s Companions" 
and, following Guaraya's work on the Mālikī school, "recognized Islamic religious norms and accepted standards of 
conduct derived from the religious and ethical principles introduced by the Prophet."  Adis Duderija, “The Concept of 
Sunna and Its Status in Islamic Law,” in The Sunna and Its Status in Islamic Law: The Search for a Sound Hadith, ed. 
Adis Duderija, Palgrave Series in Islamic Theology, Law, and History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 2.
385 Ibn Khaldūn, 2:567–68.
386  For an excellent introduction to ilm al-Ḥadīth, see John Burton, An Introduction to the Ḥadīth, Islamic Surveys  
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994). For another introductory approach that connects the science of Ḥadīth 
to contemporary practices (including online resources and collections), see the excellent text by Aisha Y. Musa, Hadith 
as Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic Traditions in Islam, 1st ed (New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008). And while not “scholarly” the following text, likely meant to be used as a textbook in a madrasa with Arabic-
language learners, is extremely useful in understanding the practicalities of Ḥadīth scholarship: Dr. Abu Ameenah Bilal 
Philips, Usool Al Hadeeth The Methodology of Hadith Evaluation, 2nd edition (Riyadh: Hijaz, 2007). Finally, for a more 
in-depth treatment of the period under discussion here, see G. H. A Juynboll, Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, 
Provenance, and Authorship of Early Hadith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
387 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History; in Three Volumes, 2:569.
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practice that predated the collection of ahadith.
It is difficult to underestimate the importance that the Ḥadīth took on in the Muslim world as a 
second source of religious knowledge beyond the Qurʾān and the possibly unreliable oral traditions 
that communicated the Sunna.  As Musa describes it, 
The Ḥadīth are the only vehicle through which, according to the vast majority of 
Muslims, we can access the Prophetic Sunna: that which Muḥammad said and did, and of 
which he approved or disapproved. As such, these stories have been instrumental in 
shaping the development of Islam as we know it in its various forms.388
Elsewhere Musa notes that “it is discourses in fiqh that have had perhaps the greatest impact in forging 
the seemingly necessary and inextricable link between Sunna and Ḥadīth . . . and establishing Ḥadīth 
as an indispensable source of law.”389  These were such important sources of information because 
Muḥammad himself functioned as the paradigm Muslim; as Hallaq observed, the authenticity of his 
biography in the form of the Ḥadīth is of paramount importance because it “enhanced the value of the 
Prophetic biography as a superior model [given] the Quranic insistence on this model as a unique, 
nearly divine, example.”390  To restate, it meant that analogical reasoning formed the core 
understanding of what it was to be a Muslim in that to be a Muslim was to be like the Prophet; to be a 
good Muslim is to be like Muḥammad.  While there are various speculations as to why ʻilm al-Ḥadīth 
did not emerge earlier, by the end of the second century of Islam it would occupy many scholars and 
see its influence over the understanding of Islam, including Islamic jurisprudence, increase.  
Despite Ibn Khaldūn's assertion that early Muslim judges and experts (qāḍī, “appointed judges;” 
muftī, “independent jurists;” faqīh, a legal expert) in no way engaged in speculation or complex 
reasoning, this does not seem to be the case, and under the rule of the Umayyad caliph, Sulayman bin 
388 Ḥadīth as Scripture, 1.
389 “The Sunnification of Ḥadīth and the Hadithification of Sunna,” in The Sunna and Its Status in Islamic Law: The Search  
for a Sound Hadith, ed. Adis Duderija, Palgrave Series in Islamic Theology, Law, and History (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 78.
390 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 69.
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Abd al-Malik (c. 674 – 22 September 717), judges were being centrally appointed to the provinces by 
the caliphate outside of Islam's home in the Hijaz and bereft of the aḥādīth collections.391  Fakhry draws 
our attention, however, to the fact that a division between “traditionalism” and “rationalism” had 
already emerged by this time within the realm of theology, and although Fakhry agrees with  Ibn 
Khaldūn that the early fuqahā' were avowed “literalists,” he also writes that they “did not altogether 
fail to perceive the obvious logical incongruities of the sacred texts and the problems of interpretation 
and harmonization which they inevitably raised.”392  That is, in an expanded empire, now with the 
challenges of governance on a vastly larger and culturally more diverse scale than the Hijaz and early 
conquests under Muḥammad, judges were without doubt giving “informed decisions” in ways that 
either sought to apply earlier precedents in the form of the received Sunna or al-Qurʾān or were 
necessary innovations.  Such innovations were unproblematic in so far as there was no precedent within 
the canon—that is, as long as they were not subjects that would fall under Sharīʿa, religious law.  In 
extending precedents to cover similar situations, however, over-extension was possible, and over-
extension would result in an illegitimate innovation, bid'a.  Some understanding of this term, bid'a, as 
well as the extension and possible over-extention of the law will help clarify the nature of the debate 
between the Ahl al-Raʾy and the Ahl al-Ḥadīth as well as the nature of qiyās.
A classical example is the prohibition of wine, khamr.393  Khamr means grape wine.  The 
question arises whether this prohibition applies to other alcoholic beverages such as those made from 
fermenting barley or other fruits.  For the sake of the argument, let us assume that this prohibition on 
khamr was the only prohibition within our legal sources and was in the form, “Khamr is ḥarām” (in 
actuality, there are a great many aḥādīth related to other intoxicants394).  So, whether or not this applied 
391 Hallaq, 57.
392 Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 44.
393  See Saheeh International and Muntadá al-Islāmī, eds., The Qurʼān: English Meanings and Notes (London: Al-Muntada 
Al-Islami Trust, 2011), vv. 5:90; 12:36,41; 2:219; 5:91; 47:15.
394  For examples from Ḥadīth collections of prohibitions against intoxicating beverages, see Muhammed Ibn Ismaiel al-
Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari: The Translation of the Meanings, trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Riyadh-Saudi Arabia: 
Darussalam Pub. & Distr., 1997), 1:4:243, 7:69:503, 7:69:491.  
Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim: Being Traditions of the Sayings and Doings of the Prophet 
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to barley wine, for example, might be a legitimate application of qiyās (analogy); khamr is ḥarām 
(prohibited) because it is intoxicating; hence, barley wine, which, like khamr, is also intoxicating, is 
likewise ḥarām. A literalist, given our hypothetical lack of other sources, might object that since the 
text only prohibits wine made from grapes, other intoxicating beverages are de facto permissible 
(mubāḥ) to consume.  To assume that wine is ḥarām because of one of its properties (intoxicating) is to 
attribute something not found within the text itself and therefore would represent impermissible 
innovation due to overextension of the rule since the text does not state that whatever is intoxicating is 
prohibited.  Furthermore, there is no principled way, alleges the literalist, to stop the application of 
analogy, echoing Umberto Eco's concerns we heard about in the first chapter, that “Once the 
mechanism of analogy has been set in motion there is no guarantee that it will stop . . . .  The image, the 
concept, the truth that is discovered beneath the veil of similarity, will in its turn be seen as a sign of 
another analogical deferral.”395  For example, khat, the leaves of the Catha edulis shrub that were 
known to al-Bīrūnī in the eleventh century CE, likewise has a somewhat intoxicating, stimulating effect 
when chewed.  By extension of the analogy in respect to intoxication, should it also be ḥarām 
(forbidden)?  Moreover, more recently a number of pharmacological products from allergy medicines, 
cough syrups to pain killers and cancer treatments intoxicate individuals.  Should these likewise be 
ḥarām?  While this debate in fact did not actually occur, given the strong sources for the 
impermissibility of other intoxicating beverages (see footnote 394), such debates did occur with the 
introduction of intoxicants such as opium and its derivatives.  Another such example is the debates that 
took place over the use of dog and pig leather.  The flesh of both animals is ḥarām, but the question 
arose whether or not wearing their skins after tanning was ḥarām or mubāḥ since the wearing of the 
tanned skins was not mentioned.396  Such disagreements in jurisprudence gave rise to deeper critiques 
Muḥammad as Narrated by His Companions and Compiled under the Title Al-Jāmiʻ-Uṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ, trans. Abdul Hameed 
Siddiqui (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2004), 23: 4953.
395 Eco and Collini, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 164.
396 “Fatwas of Ibn Baz.” Accessed December 9, 2018. http://www.alifta.net/fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?
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and criticisms against the practice of using qiyās and the validity of analogical reasoning.397.
Along with the new materials for jurisprudence, with the rise of ʻilm al-Ḥadīth, there also rose a 
number of competing schools of Sunni jurisprudence, the madhhabs, of which the Ẓāhirī madhhab and 
Shāfiʿī madhhab were two.  In some ways, both can be seen as a reaction to the two other schools, 
centered around Medina and Kufa (Kuffah) respectively, Mālikī and Ḥanafī. Both are attacked by al-
Shāfiʿī, even though al-Shāfiʿī  himself seemed to identify with the Mālikī school.  The former school 
was critiqued for its over-reliance on the practices of the community of Medina, and the latter for 
rulings that seemed arbitrary, departed from doctrinal sources, or used dubious sources.398  It was the 
geographical separation of these two madhhabs that perhaps most influenced their divergences, with 
scholars observing that the more cosmopolitan Kufa was influenced by Greek, Roman and Persian 
legal traditions, which were often borrowed and incorporated into Ḥanafī rulings.399  Al-Shāfiʿī then is 
often thought of as the first great system builder of Islamic jurisprudence, and while scholars 
acknowledge systemization had already begun in these earlier schools, al-Shāfiʿī's Risāla is considered 
by some scholars the first attempt to spell out a specific legal methodology, and therefore represents the 
first work of uṣūl al-fiqh proper.400,401
THE ELEMENTS OF THE ISLAMIC LEGAL DEBATE
In considering how these debates played out, two central contrasts are those between legitimate 
languagename=en&BookID=14&View=Page&PageNo=1&PageID=783.
397 For an accessible and extended discussion of these debates, see B. G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (University of 
Georgia Press, 1998), 67-87.
398 Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 7–10; Wael B. Hallaq, A 
History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 17; Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Reprinted, Islamic Surveys 2 (Edinburgh: Univ. 
Press, 1964), 50–52.
399 Mohammad Fauzi, Sejarah Hukum Islam, 2018, 36, https://books.google.com/books?id=Q-deDwAAQBAJ; Hallaq, A 
History of Islamic Legal Theories, 27–28; Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, 50.
400 Fauzi, Sejarah Hukum Islam, 57; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 21.
401 Robert Gleave remarks that while the origin of the Ẓāhirī school is not as yet well understood, it was “based in Baghdad 
and probably linked to al-Shāfiʿī (and possibly Muʿtazilī) circles.” Robert Gleave, Islam and Literalism: Literal 
Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 147.
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law and impermissible innovation on one hand and then ẓāhir and bāṭin on the other.  The first of these 
contrasts  explained above, but some brief overview of ẓāhir and bāṭin is necessary.  These terms mean 
“outer” or “obvious” and “inner” or “hidden” respectively.  As such, these terms have been central in a 
number of Islamic theological and philosophical debates in the realm of ethics, spiritual cultivation, and 
tafsīr or Qurʾānic exegesis.  In the latter of these debates, the central contention was whether some or 
all of the passages of the Qurʾān should be read literally in the most commonly accepted and least 
interpreted manner, or whether some or all of the passages of the Qurʾān had a hidden inner meaning 
that could only be found through some sort of interpretation, whether that be through a master or Imām 
as in Shīʿa traditions or through study and mediation or accompanying spiritual practices as in some 
Sufi traditions.  The literalists rely at least implicitly on the assumption that the revelation is open and 
understandable to all no matter their mental or interpretive capacities, while those who argue 
interpretation is needed, assume deeper spiritual truths or a rationality they allege are contained within 
the revelation.
So, what might be the case of a bāṭin in the legal context? To return to the case of khamr being 
ḥarām, the “inner meaning” would involve identifying the principle or quality of the action which 
makes it ḥarām—the ratio legis (ʿilla).  Simply put, the contrast with the Ẓāhiri approach is that not 
only do injunctions apply particularly to their specific described cases, as with the Ẓāhiris, but also to 
other cases which are similar in the same respect to the ʿilla of the first case, but to expand the 
application of the injunction requires interpretation.  In the case of khamr, this ʿilla would be khamr's 
intoxicating properties. Therefore, similar cases in which intoxicating properties are to be found in a 
substance would fall under the same prohibition.  Khamr is illegal because it is intoxicating, so 
whatever is intoxicating is illegal. The Ẓāhiri would balk at this interpretation.  What was stated was 
only, “khamr is ḥarām” and not that whatever is intoxicating is ḥaram. So, to identify a property of 
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khamr as the basis for the “bāṭin interpretation” is illegitimate.402
There is a deeper issue at play here that runs the course of Islamic ethics and is familiar to 
Western readers as the “Euthyphro Dilemma” from the Platonic dialogue, The Euthyphro. The dilemma 
is essentually “Does God command a particular action because it is morally right, or is it morally right 
because God commands it?” The danger according to some theologians is that if independent principles 
of morality or legality are discerned, then that would allow us to identity the reason something is wrong 
or right outside of divine command (canonical sources) and would suggest that such things would be 
wrong regardless of divine command.  That is to say, for example, that Allah prohibits an action 
because it is wrong; it is not wrong because Allah prohibits it.  This suggests that Allah would not have 
the freedom to make moral determinations.  And as an omniscient and omnipotent being, such a 
scenario would be impossible because there can be no power to  compel Allah.  The identification of 
moral principles then is, for some, categorically prohibited in uṣūl al-fiqh because it directly contradicts 
what is known about the nature of the divine.  Such theological debates then cast long shadows over the 
jurisprudential disputes.
Adam Sabra, in prefacing his translation of the al-Nubdha al-Kāfiya fī Uṣūl Aḥkām al-Dīn, has 
argued Ibn Ḥazm’s central assumption is that Qur’ānic language is static and unchanging, citing the 
earlier work by Arnaldez and Y. Linant de Bellefonds.403  This assumption leads Ibn Ḥazm through 
various disciplines of Islamic sciences but is nowhere more pronounced than in his works on tafsīr and 
uṣūl al-fiqh in which the avowed Ẓāhiri provides a careful, close, but literal reading of the texts.404
Ibn Ḥazm sets down a number of principles that guide his methodology, and while not all bear 
directly on his critique of analogical reasoning, they are necessary to understand the overall approach 
402  In some ways, this is a superficial bāṭin since one could push further for the reason why intoxicants are forbidden.  
403 Adam Sabra, “Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism: A Critique of Islamic Legal Theory,” in Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba: The Life and 
Works of a Controversial Thinker, ed. Camilla Adang, Ma Isabel Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke, Handbook of Oriental 
Studies. Section 1, the Near and Middle East, volume 103 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013), 98–99.
404 Salvador Peña, “Which Curiosity? Ibn Ḥazm’s Suspicion of Grammarians,” in Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba: The Life and 
Works of a Controversial Thinker, ed. Camilla Adang, Ma Isabel Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke, Handbook of Oriental 
Studies. Section 1, the Near and Middle East, volume 103 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013), 236.
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and perhaps other concerns that motivate the critique of analogy.  The first set of principles which he 
accepts is expressed by him as follows:
We are certain that the religion which our Lord made obligatory upon us and which He 
made our only salvation from Hell is made clear in its entirety in the Qurʾān, in the 
Sunna of His Messenger (pbuh), and in the consensus of the community, and that the 
religion has been completed; there is nothing to be added or subtracted from it. And He 
made us certain that all of this is preserved and kept accurate, for Exalted God said, “It is 
We who have sent down the Remembrance, and We preserve it” (Q 15:9).405  
We can unpack these principles as follows.  First, the knowledge of Islam is complete.  That is, all of 
Islam’s knowledge is contained in the Qurʾān, in the Sunna (as recorded in the Ḥadīth—more will be 
said about the restrictions Ibn Ḥazm places on Ḥadīth), and in the consensus of the community (ijmāʿ).  
He will provide arguments for why other modes of reasoning are prohibited, and these arguments are 
not merely appeals to theological dogma but critiques of the forms of reasoning given the demand for 
certainty.  That these sources contain the totality of what is needed for Islam and therefore for Islamic 
law, Sharīʿa, is important because it means that we need not seek anything outside of them to know 
Islam.  
The second principle is placed on ijmāʿ, or consensus, and stems from the epistemological 
requirement that Ibn Ḥazm demands of all religious knowledge: certainty.  In fact, certainty is the 
single overarching principle of Ibn Ḥazm's methodology.  Certainty rests upon proof, and the present 
author is tempted to identify Ibn Ḥazm as a sort of Islamic proto-intuitionist.  He cites the Qurʾān 
27:64: “Produce your proof, if you should be truthful.”406  From this he reaches a hard intuitionist 
conclusion: “So it is true that whoever lacks proof is not truthful in his claim.”407  For consensus to be 
true consensus, everyone must agree.  For Ibn Ḥazm, the implication is clear: only when there was a 
405 Ibn Ḥazm, Al-Nubdha al-Kāfiya Fī Uṣūl Aḥkām al-Dīn, 113.
406 Ibn Ḥazm, 114.
407 Ibn Ḥazm, 114.
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small group of Muslims, the Companions of the Prophet, was consensus possible, but now that the 
religion has so many adherents, it is nigh impossible for them to reach a consensus, and furthermore, it 
is practically impossible to determine whether or not there is such a consensus.  Therefore, the only 
true consensus was the unanimous consensus of the Companions when they exhausted the number of 
people following Islam.408,409  
This demand for certainty then influences Ibn Ḥazm's theory of consensus but also what Ḥadīth 
should be accepted or rejected: only those aḥādīth which can be established with absolute certainty—a 
clear and trustworthy chain of transmission going back to Muḥammad.410  This rejection of consensus 
has, he notes, a logical consequence:
As we have described, if there is no consensus, there must necessarily be a 
disagreement, because they are mutually exclusive.411 If one is absent the other must 
occur, there is no alternative. If this is so, one should consult the Qurʾān and Sunna 
which Exalted God obliges us to consult, when He says, may He be exalted, “If you 
should quarrel on anything, refer it back to God and the Messenger, if you believe in 
God and the Last Day.” (Q 4:118–9)412
Without consensus, there must be disagreement.  However, given the rallying cry of “no truth 
without proof” this means that where there is disagreement, one must look at the proof, and for Ibn 
Ḥazm this will be found in the sources of religious knowledge.  He takes it, given his literalism, that 
there will be no disagreement in the interpretation of these sources of knowledge as long as they are 
taken literally and apply only to their specific injunctions.  
Something must be said, however, about the “literalism” of Ibn Ḥazm that supports his claim 
408 Ibn Ḥazm, 115.
409  Ibn Ḥazm also provides an argument as to why the consensus or practices of Medina are also not taken as sources of 
legal knowledge.  While he develops seven reasons as to why the practices of Medina are not legally binding, his fourth 
point is simply it is not true all those in Medina are in agreement, and therefore there is no concensus.Ḥazm, 120–21.
410 Osman, The Ẓāhirī Madhhab (3rd/9th-10th/16th Century), 2014, 83–84; Ibn Ḥazm, Al-Nubdha al-Kāfiya Fī Uṣūl Aḥkām 
al-Dīn, 119–21 and 123–28.
411 Perhaps this seeming acceptance of the law of excluded middle demonstrates in fact he is not an intuitionist after all!
412 Ibn Ḥazm, Al-Nubdha al-Kāfiya Fī Uṣūl Aḥkām al-Dīn, 122.
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that religious sources of knowledge are unproblematic and, unless interpretation is specified, do not 
require interpretation.  As Robert Gleave states, while not privileging any language over another, Ibn 
Ḥazm takes language to be a divine invention and not a product of human ingenuity, and many clever 
arguments are offered for this (for example, God taught ʾĀdam the names of the all the animals, but 
had there not have been a language available, this would have been impossible).  Gleave argues that, 
Where [Ibn Ḥazm's] approach is, perhaps, distinctive in his insistence on God’s creation 
of language, and therefore the identity of intended and literal meaning in that language.  
By doing so, he establishes God’s unambiguous control of literal meanings (be it ab 
initio, or by subsequent decree), and avoids the possible confusion of literal meanings 
which would arise from human (and hence frail) designation of meaning to words.413
Tamara Albertini, drawing on the work of Roger Arnaldez, emphasizes this point; that divinely 
arranged language ensures clarity of meaning.414  What ensures this clarity of meaning is not a strict 
literalist reading, but what Albertini terms an “apparentist” meaning.415  Here the work of François 
Recanati is useful in fleshing out the “apparentist” position.416   Recanati, in exploring the issue of 
literal versus non-literal language from the standpoint of semantic and pragmatic meanings, reaches the 
conclusion that there are many uses of language that are in fact “non-literal” but whose meanings are 
readily apparent given the context in which they are issued.  He draws a distinction between strictly 
literal meaning, t-literal meanings (“I am going to drive south on the road to London”), and m-literal 
meanings, which are meanings that minimally depart from t-literal meanings (“I am going to run down 
the road to London”).417  Recanati writes, “Through the interaction between the context-independent 
meanings of our words and the particulars of the situation talked about, contextualized, modulated 
413 Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 153–54.
414 Tamara Albertini, “Ibn Ḥazm’s and Al-Ghazzālī’s Most Divergent Responses to Christianity: A Question of 
Epistemology and Hermeneutics,” in Nicholas of Cusa and Islam, eds.  Ian Christopher Levy et alia, (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Brill, 2014), 222, https://brill.com/view/title/25528.
415 Albertini, 221.
416 François Récanati, Literal Meaning (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
417 Récanati, 68–71.
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senses emerge, appropriate to the situation at hand.”418  There is no mystery involved in this fixed 
meaning of words and variable context, argues Recanati, a position he calls “contextualism,” for if 
there were, then language would fail (if, for example, meaning were supposed to depend on the 
intentions of a speaker rather than the intersubjectively available public meaning).  It is this sort of 
literalism that Gleave assigns to Ibn Ḥazm.  While a speaker or author may stipulate a meaning, for 
example by introducing an existing word as a technical term, Recanati terms this a secondary meaning, 
and these are not the primary vehicles of meaning.  Instead, the primary meanings, but t-literal and m-
literal, are fixed, for Recanati as other philosophers of language, by convention.  Recanati introduces a 
third term, which is not exclusive of the other two, of p-literal.  
An interpretation for an utterance is p-literal just in case it directly results from 
interpreting the sentence (in context), without being derived from some antecedently 
determined meaning by an inferential process akin to that which is involved in 
conversational implicatures, indirect speech acts, and so on.
David Lewis gives a helpful argument for meaning by convention, taking the expression of meaning as 
a human activity, and captures the intersubjectivity of meaning by convention well, applying to p-literal 
sentences:
( 1) Everyone conforms to R.
( 2) Everyone believes that the others conform to R.
( 3) This belief that the others conform to R gives everyone a good and decisive reason 
to conform to R himself.419
This position, that convention fixes the meaning language, is not that of Ibn Ḥazm as we have 
already observed.  Instead, the meanings of words are fixed by their author, in this case the 
divine.  But as we will see, with some additions, the notion of p-literal seems to nicely capture 
418 Récanati, 131.
419 David Lewis, “Languages and Language,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Keith Gunderson, vol. 
7 (University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 5.
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Ibn Ḥazm's theory of meaning.
Albertini emphasizes something that is another distinct feature of  Ibn Ḥazm's theory of 
language, and that is that individual words have a single, fixed meaning.420  While he in no way denies 
the sorts of secondary meanings Recanati identifies, such meanings do not play a role in revelation.421  
This single-meaning thesis provides grounding for certainty, but it need not be naive literalism for Ibn 
Ḥazm seems perfectly willing to accept m-literal and p-literal sentences—it is simply that there is no 
ambiguity regarding the words' departure from their t-literal meanings.  In the example of a m-literal (it 
is also p-literal) sentence given earlier, “I am going to run down the road to London,” while the use of 
the words “run” and “down” are not used in their strictly literal t-literal sense, there is no interpretation 
needed given the clarity of the expressions even though not strictly literal.  The meaning is readily 
apparent, and it is this sense, of taking the apparent and least interpreted meaning of words, given the 
clarity guaranteed by God, that is Ibn Ḥazm's theory of meaning in religious exegesis.  
However, this apparentist in itself would not rule out analogical reasoning.  Recall the 
standardize analogy exams discussed in the first chapter.  The example was, “A fish is to school as a 
_____ is to a forest.”  Clearly, no ambiguity is involved in the process of solving the analogy, and the t-
literal and p-literal meaning of both words is what allows one to complete the analogy.  Yet these are 
not the sorts of analogies involved in jurisprudence and engaged particularly when enlarging the 
domain or application of a legal injunction.  
The demand for certainty and proof then becomes a principle for legal exegesis combined with 
a commitment to the clarity of language, the apparentist position.  He admits that there may be 
religious texts which are not to be intrepreted literally, however, there will be proof (in the form of the 
accepted sources of religious knowledge) that a specific text is not meant to be taken literally.  
Although Ibn Ḥazm's arguments are not metaphysical but epistemological, they rest on the critical 
420  For a sustained discussion of a possible objection to this view that each word has a single meaning, given than there are 
homophones, see Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 157–58.
421 Albertini, 223.
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assumption that in making analogical arguments or claims (“this is like that”) we may lack proof of the 
relevant similarity, or that we lack proof that the shared quality is in fact the basis or ʿilla for the 
injunction.  For Ibn Ḥazm, it is only when the quality itself is indicated in a pronouncement (“anything 
with quality x”) that similarities can serve as the basis for legal reasoning.
Consider, for example, when analogies fail to yield true conclusions.  Take the argument below:
P1. Oranges are good to eat.
P2: Oranges are orange.
P3: This piece of plastic is, like the orange, orange.
C1: Therefore, this piece of plastic is good to eat.
The similarity (colored orange) is not an adequate basis to infer that the two items therefore share other 
qualities or properties (like being edible).  It fails to be an ʿilla.  Ibn Ḥazm's point is that all analogical 
reasoning is like this—that similarities fail to be infallible grounds for inferences to other similarities 
(even if there is no ambiguity in terms of the meaning of the words).  So, to return to the example of  
“khamr is ḥarām,” the fact that something shares a property with khamr (of being intoxicating) is not 
grounds for inferring that it is also ḥarām. This need not be a matter over the meaning of khamr, but an 
acknowledgment that without a clear injunction saying that whatever is intoxicating is ḥarām, one 
cannot, without risk of error, infer from “Khamr is ḥarām” to “Whatever is intoxicating is ḥarām.”  It 
can be made a matter of meaning if secondary meanings are introduced, and one attempts to determine 
the intentions of the author is stating, “Khamr is ḥarām.”  Yet such “reading in” is clearly antithetical to 
Ibn Ḥazm's approach both on the basis of his theory of meaning and demand for certainty in religious 
matters.
Ibn Ḥazm's demand for certainty means that he can only consider “rule-firing” systems rather 
than “mapping” systems of legal reasoning—the fact that analogies can lead to false conclusions about 
the inference of other properties is enough for him to reject analogical reasoning in theology and 
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religious jurisprudence.  Only in cases like that presented by Aristotle (see Chapter One) in which 
“induction leads to deduction” is inductive reasoning, analogical or not, permitted by Ibn Ḥazm's 
apparentism.
Jurist al-Shāfiʿī's theological assumptions also color his jurisprudential principles.  For him, it is 
the idea of both completeness and knowability.  In his Kitāb al-Risāla fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, he writes:
. .  . everything that befalls a Muslim, I said, a binding rule or something that indicates the 
way to attain the correct answer in regard thereto. If there is a rule concerning that 
specific thing, one must follow it. If there is no such rule, then one should seek what 
indicates the correct answer to the issue in question by means of legal interpretation. 
Legal interpretation is equivalent to analogical reasoning.422
For Ibn Ḥazm, religion is complete, but it is not totalized in the way it is conceived of by al-Shāfiʿī.  
For Ibn Ḥazm, those areas of life not explicitly mentioned in the legitimate sources of religious 
knowledge are essentially secular.  Although Ibn Ḥazm is often seen as ideologically conservative, his 
vision of Sharīʿa is very much restricted—Sharīʿa's scope is very limited giving his sort of literalism, 
perhaps most famously known by his discussions of homosexuality.423   For al-Shāfiʿī, the purview of 
Sharīʿa is broader, and it seems this broader conception of the scope of religious laws operates in part 
as a justification for the need for analogical reasoning or legal interpretation.
Al-Shāfiʿī writes that there are two species of analogical arguments: “one of them is where the 
matter is within the scope of the rationale underlying the basis for the analogy.”424  These analogies are 
conclusive and do not differ between persons (generalizations like, “Whatever is intoxicating is 
ḥarām,” in that the categorical generalization requires the application of similarity-based reasoning to 
determine whether the injunction holds in any given case).  He interestingly uses an analogy to explain 
422 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, The Epistle on Legal Theory, 200.
423 Camilla  Adang. "Ibn Ḥazm on Homosexuality. A case-study of Ẓāhirī legal Methodology." Al-Qanṭara 24, no. 1 (2003): 
5-31. 
424 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 201.
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this use of analogy that deals with apparent meanings.  He says that we can judge a man by his outward 
actions and determine if he is worthy to, for example, be designated as one's heir or married to one's 
daughter.425  This is like analogical arguments dealing with apparent meanings.  However, as we learn 
more about a person, we might find him unworthy despite his outward actions.426  This then is 
contrasted with the reasoning, readily available to all, based on outward appearances alone.  We are 
only obligated to act upon knowledge that we have; so, if he behaves worthily and we do not know his 
inner thoughts, we are not responsible for our mistake of finding him worthy.  If we did know, however, 
about his inner states, then we would be responsible for our mistake of finding him worthy based on 
outward appearances alone.  This consideration of inner states is an analogy for the second type of 
analogy: 
The case where the thing resembles several matters among those bases for an analogy. In 
that case, one relates it to the basis most appropriate for it and that resembles it most. The 
persons who reason analogically may differ in this case.427  
So, al-Shāfiʿī does not take absolute certainty as the criteria for legal judgements, but instead “what is 
perceived to be true.”  But this truth that can be perceived includes truths about “apparent meanings.”  
He writes, 
Am I not legally responsible for the truth in its two aspects? One of them is a truth that 
involves objectively certain knowledge of both the apparent and the true meaning, and 
the other is a truth in what is apparent, and not in the true meaning.428  
Hence, for al-Shāfiʿī, the truths that ground legal interpretation include both the ẓāhir and bāṭin.   Al-
Shāfiʿī defends the fact that analogical reasoning can, when dealing with the “inner” or “hidden 
meaning” of texts, occasionally result in differences among jurists in the grounding of their decisions 
425 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 202–3.
426 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 202.
427 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 201.
428 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 204.
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because similarities are manifold.429  Therefore, there are perhaps more than one similarity which one 
can appeal to that exists between two actions or substances that grounds the inference, “As in this case, 
so in that case.”  
It is important, too, that legal knowledge be understood as matching prohibitions, prescriptions, 
and paradigmatic examples to actual cases even when the statement is categorical.  This knowledge 
requires determining whether or not the relevant similarities hold between the present case and the law.  
Al-Shāfiʿī illustrates this point as he considers the rule for prayer.  Today, many hotel rooms feature a 
qibla on the wall, indicating the direction of the Kaʿba in Mecca that Muslims must face as they 
perform ṣalāṫ or prayers.  Al-Shāfiʿī notes that no matter where one is, one has the obligation to face 
Mecca when performing one's prayers.  How does one ascertain this direction when one is in the desert 
or in some disorienting cityscape? Al-Shāfiʿī's answer seems pragmatic: however one best can.  That is, 
the obligation is that you, to the best of your ability to figure it out, face the direction you believe to be 
Mecca.430   Al-Shāfiʿī's illustrations have two main points.  First, you have to determine if your situation 
is governed by the rule or paradigm, and that depends on whether or not the relevant similarities exist 
between the rule or paradigm and the present case. So, a person may pray outside the specific times 
prescribed for ṣalāṫ, and such prayers need not be made while facing Mecca.  The ruling is restricted to 
only those prayers that are ṣalāṫ.  Second, the illustration serves as an analogy.  There is, al-Shāfiʿī 
claims, simply no way of determining with certainty whether one is facing Mecca or not in many cases 
because Mecca is “hidden.”431  Yet, even failing to have that certainty, one may have sufficient grounds 
for praying in one direction rather than another while admitting there could be an error.  He states, 
“[This] is an example of analogizing; they approximate one another as do the goat and the gazelle, but 
are also somewhat disparate, as are the kid and jerboa.”432.  He goes on to emphasize, however, we are 
429 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 206–7.
430 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 205.
431 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 205.
432 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, The Epistle on Legal Theory.
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only legally responsible for the knowledge that we have, which can include ẓāhir and bāṭin and our 
perception of the truth.433  As Hallaq explains,
Al-Shāfiʿī analogy serves to introduce a related matter. Just as two men may determine 
the location of the Ka'ba differently, so may two jurists arrive at different solutions to the 
same legal problem. Obviously, one of them must be in error, though more often than not 
this cannot be determined. Whatever the case, they are equally obligated to attempt to 
discover the law, and they are both rewarded for their efforts. To maintain that because 
error is possible no [reasoning] should be undertaken is tantamount to arguing that no 
prayer should be performed until certainty about the location of the Ka'ba is attained — 
an argument that is plainly objectionable.434
Both men reach the same conclusions; that differences in analogical reasoning are possible.  For 
the Ẓāhirīs, this possibility of disagreement means that such reasoning is not permissible when it comes 
to legal or theological differences.  For al-Shāfiʿī, analogy need not always be resorted to, but when it 
is, it can be acceptable for as long as it is apt and accurate based on the totality of one's present 
knowledge.
This then allows us to return to the third possibility that emerged from the discussion of the 
South Asian tradition: that degrees of similarity are not based on the quantity of similarities.  Rather, 
that things may be more or less similar depends instead on the weight that we assign particular 
resemblances.  This conceptual weighting may differ between thinkers.  This is a significant issue.  
What is a compelling analogical argument for one may not be for another.  One may fail to identify 
similarities between two objects that another can.  Does this mean such appeals or arguments are 
illegitimate?  No, but we should pay attention to what al-Shāfiʿī tells us: analogy can be acceptable as 
long as it is apt abased on one's present knowledge.  With this insight, we can now begin weaving 
433 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, 205.
434 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 28.
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together a stronger response to the question of the epistemology of similarities and perhaps relations in 
general.
RESTRICTING ANALOGIES
In what we have discussed in the past chapters involved some of the metaphysical and 
epistemological problems of relations in general and similarities as a specific species of relations.  In 
closing, this work proposes that there is an intellectual virtue that is relational or analogical sensitivity 
that (1) allows one to better recognize relations and similarities, (2) allows one to both solve analogies 
and make apt analogies, and (3) is a virtue that can be cultivated.  But before elaborating on these three 
aspects of the virtue of relational and analogical insight, the problem of trivial necessitation must be 
addressed as an error in reasoning and one that points us towards (1) and (2).
 Our consideration of the ontology of similarity offers us some insight into how similarity 
claims can be properly formulated.  It is incorrect to think of similarity itself as a property, or a one-
place predicate, as argued in earlier chapters.  Similarity is not a one-place predicate, and in fact, it is 
not a proper property at all—instead, it is simply the having of a property in common however we want 
to interpret that.  We have relational properties: “longer than” is just such a relational property, hence, 
the stick (a) is longer than the pencil (b), aLb (a is longer than b). Similarity is a symmetrical 
relationship, unlike longer.  But longer is a transitive relation, unlike similarity.  But here is where the 
problem arises: we know that all analogies are trivially true.  This means that truth functionally any 
sentence of the form “x is like y” will behave as if it is transitive in terms of communicating truth 
values.  Let us call sentences with the form “x is like y” “unconstrained” similarity claims just to 
acknowledge no specific resemblance is being specifically asserted.  So, any two premises of an 
argument with that form will result in a true conclusion of that form.
P1: A pencil is like a stick.
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P2: A stick is like a club.
C1: Therefore, a club is like a pencil.
Immediately, one who wishes to hold that similarity is in fact a transitive relation will point out that 
properly speaking the conclusion is after all true, particularly if we accept Greenlee's principle of 
Similarities of Discernables, as we should, that claims that all particulars are, necessarily, similar in 
some way.  So, it is true that xRz.  Granting the opponent of non-transitive similarity this, we can still 
point out it is not from the truth of P1 or P2 that we reached C1 so it is not derivatively truth functional. 
The premises in no way logically entail the conclusion.  It is not merely a difference of material and 
formal truth, for while we accept that formally C1 is true, its truth was not determined derivatively, and 
its truth value is assigned materially.  That is, it wasn't through transitive operations that we arrived at 
our true conclusion.  
This problem raises a series of issues that deserve to be addressed since it is of particular 
importance to this discussion given that all resemblance claims of the (unconstrained) form xFy are true 
and necessarily true, and those issues concern necessitation and constraining necessitation.  Several 
problems of necessitation and truthmaking have been discussed in the context of the truthmaker debate 
and arguments that truth supervenes on being, many of which were discussed in Chapter Two, with the 
common formulation of the truthmaker thesis as, “x makes p true if and only if: x necessitates p.”  One 
such problem is now commonly know as Restall’s Refrigerator. It considers the fact that, given the 
above definition, any contingently existing entity is then a truthmaker for every necessary truth.  
Hence, Restall's refrigerator is the truthmaker for “5+5=10” and every other necessary truth.  David 
Lewis describes the core of the problem:
In a slogan: every truth has a truthmaker. Spelled out at greater length: for any true 
proposition P, there exists something T such that T’s existence strictly implies 
(necessitates) P.…if P is a necessary proposition, then for any T whatever, T’s existence 
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strictly implies P. So the Truthmaker Principle, as I have stated it, applies only trivially to 
necessary truths.435
If the principle of Similarities of Discernables is correct as well as the truthmaker slogan, 
Restall's refrigerator is the truthmaker for the “a pencil is like a club.”436  In attempting to strengthen 
the truthmaker thesis before turning to its critique and rid it of “trivial” applications, Trenton Merricks 
has suggested that it must be restricted in some way to preclude the problem of Restall's Refrigerator as 
well as other problems associated with necessitation and entailment.437  He has suggested that the 
necessitation relation be restricted by a second relationship that must hold between a truthmaker and 
what it makes true—that is an aboutness relation.  He writes that “necessitation is not the whole of 
making true . . . a truthmaker must be that which its truth is about.”438  Truthmaker, as a somewhat 
modern-day resuscitation of the correspondence theory of truth, is surely open to many criticisms, even 
in its strengthened form given to it by Merricks whom himself goes on to offer a number of reasons 
why we should reject the truthmaker thesis even in this strengthened form.  It does preserve, however, 
one of our deep intuitions about truth—that is, if something makes something true (say a state of affairs 
makes a proposition true) then that proposition should be about that state of affairs.  Restricted with an 
aboutness relation, any contingently existing object now fails to be the truthmaker of any necessary 
truth because the necessary truth and the existing object do not stand in an aboutness relation to one 
another.  In the case of analogies, this aboutness is simply the respect by which the two items of the 
analogy are similar that justifies making a claim about a specific similarity relation that holds between 
them.  
435 David Lewis (2001). ‘Truthmaking and Difference-Making’, Nous, 35: 602–15.  604.
436 See  Greg Restall (1996). “Truthmakers, Entailment, and Necessity,”  Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 331–40. 
Also see Barry Smith (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231 
– 234. 
437 Notably, John's Funeral which deals with the transitivity of entailment and necessitation.  See Barry Smith (1999). 
“Truthmaker Realism”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 274–291.  For Merricks discussion that follows, see Trenton Merricks, 
Truth and Ontology.  New York: Oxford University Press,  2007.
438 Merricks, 28.
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That the relationship between P1 and P2 are not about C1a in the appropriate way is why we 
want to resist the claim that just because the argument is true (and necessarily so, if we grant the 
Similarities of Discernables) that it follows from the premise.  It is much like an argument that says 
“Red is red, and blue is blue.  Therefore, green is green.”  While no one would debate the truth of the 
argument, one is suspicious of the “therefore.”  What we have is not a conclusion of an argument, but 
rather another tautology or necessary truth masquerading as a conclusion in much the same way that 
given Restall's Refrigerator, therefore Fermat’s Last Theorem.439  This is why we should have no 
qualms about rejecting C1 as the conclusion of an argument.  Even if the conclusion is true, it is not 
true because it follows or is derived from the preceding premises of the argument.  
We see then how we can prevent analogies from being trivially or necessarily true by 
demanding that analogies be about some specific similarity relation.  However, for those of use who 
have read a poem that we did not understand, we know that even though there may be some shared 
respects, it does not always mean that we can figure it out.  The person who can engage in such 
interpretation is able, given the totality of their knowledge, figure out what the analogy is about.  For 
additional insights into this problem, we must turn to the work of Santosi Watanabe [Watanabe?].
439  Fermat’s Last Theorem states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any 
integer value of n greater than two.  It was substantially proven in 1993 and the proof completed two years later.  See: 
Fermat last theorem. Encyclopedia of Mathematics. URL: http://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php?
title=Fermat_last_theorem&oldid=19338 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELATIONS AND SIMILARITY II: 
SEEING ANALOGIES
 In his work with Boolean lattices, Watanabe demonstrates that within this formal space all 
objects will share an identical number of similarities with all other objects.  Hence, not only is 
everything similar to everything else, but it is as similar to the same magnitude.440  As we substitute out 
objects we find no matter what we plug in, given the number of predicates available does not change, 
the two objects are always equally as similar as any other two objects.  Essentially the problem is just 
given the objects, which can be assigned arbitrary names as particulars, there is no non-biased way of 
assigning them qualities (hence a rejection by Watanabe that property-talk  “carves nature at its 
joints”).  Watanabe writes, 
 . . . that from a formal point of view there exists no such thing as a class of similar 
objects in the world, insofar as all predicates (of the same dimension) have the same 
importance.  Conversely, if we acknowledge the empirical essence of classes of similar 
objects, it means that we are attaching nonuniform importance to various predicates, and 
that this weighting has an extralogical origin.441
Given this, any two objects will have exactly the same number of classes in common if they are only 
distinguished by their names with one another, namely 2^{n-1}, of half the total number of classes.442  
The Ugly Duckling Theorem need not worry us, though, because we are already supplied, via 
language, with a set of respects or predications that we may apply, and they provide us with at least one 
440 Watanabe, Satosi. Knowing and Guessing: A Quantitative Study of Inference and Information. New York: Wiley, 1969. 
441 Ibid. 376.
442 Watanabe equates the number of predicates ŷ with a Boolean lattice Ŷ of predicates similarly satisfied by two non-
identical objects (objects of different types), x and y.  Then suppose that there are m different rows in the object-
predicate table Ŷ, which means there are m atoms in Ŷ  and Ŷ  has 2^m different members.  Any predicate ŷ in Ŷ  is a 
disjunction of a certain number of these objects.  A predicate shared by x and z “is characterized by the fact that it 
contains the two atoms corresponding to the two different objects.”  It can contain any of the remaining atoms which are 
m-2.  There are 2^(m-2) different predicates shared by x and y, and this number is not determined by the choice of x and 
y.  Therefore, any two arbitrarily chosen objects will (formally) be just as similar as any other pair of arbitrarily chosen 
objects.  Hence, the ugly duckling is just as similar to a swan as another swan.  See Watanabe (1969), 377.  Watanabe 
also provides a proof that the same number of predicates will apply to each object, but that does not need to concern us 
here (378).  
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tool to talk about similarities.  More importantly, though, and from an ontological point of view, we 
need not agree that a non-biased inferential basis of discrimination is needed to identify similarities.  
We may accept, for example, that there are certain similarities that can only be drawn by those 
with certain cultural aptitudes.  A somewhat imperfect example is that of an “inside joke.”  For 
example, many years ago I shared an extremely run-down hotel in an Asian port town called the “Hotel 
New International.”  Now we share a joke that when we encounter something shabby or dilapidated, we 
say it's “just like the Hotel New International.”  Here it is access to a shared, non-public understanding 
of the respects through which the present location or item is like the past hotel.  There are perhaps 
better examples to be found in linguistic competencies.
A fitting example of this is the use of numeral classifiers in certain languages, particularly in 
East and Southeast Asia.443  In many of these languages, such as Malay, Mandarin and Japanese, 
numbers cannot generally act as adjectives to modify nouns but instead modify a classifier.  These 
classifiers depend on resemblances, and hence there may be a classifier for round-shape objects, 
elongated objects, people, animals or fruits.  Some are easy to grasp, like the Indo-Malay classifer 
potong, used with cylinder-shaped objects like sticks, pencils, and cigarettes.  However, a speaker from 
a non-classifier using language, such as English, may be baffled by the “resemblances” that govern 
some of these classifier uses—for example, that an enormous house-sized bolder and  human-sized 
robot would use the same classifier, buah, in Malay, but a small, round stone and a medium-sized, 
round stone would not use the same classifier (biji and betul being used respectively) while the 
medium-sized stone and a bar of soap would use the same classifier.  While users and linguists can 
explain (sometimes quite ingeniously!) such similarities, they may not be evident prima facie to one 
without the linguistic and accompanying cultural competencies.  However, such competencies can be 
acquired, and one can learn to quite naturally select the appropriate classifiers even for objects that one 
443 English also has such classifiers.  “Sheet” is an example of a classifier for thin, flat objects, as in “five sheets of paper” 
or “ten sheets of lead.”
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has never had to count before.
Of course, even more esoteric examples can be found if we turn our attention to literature that 
may perhaps be from a cultural milieu with which one is unfamiliar.  First, however, we should not 
think that analogies are always difficult to determine when from an unfamiliar culture.  For example, 
consider the following examples from the four verse Malay pantun poems:
Permata jatuh di dalam rumput, 
Jatuh di rumput bergilang-gilang. 
Kasih umpama embun di hujung rumput, 
Datang matahari niscaya hilang.444 
 Gems fall into the grass, 
Fall and are lost in the grass
Love like dew glistening on the tips of the grass
Will surely disappear when the sun arrives.
One can make sense of how love will disappear with the morning just as the dew will dry from the sun.  
However, surely it will be admitted that the following analogy is decidedly more obscure.
Buluh betung batang berduri,
Dibuat lantai gelegar pengapit;
Ibarat seperti burung kedidi,
Di mana pantai tercunggit-cunggit.445
The thorned stems of the dragon bamboo
Are made into floor joist braces
So like the sandpiper
Where the waves lap the beach.
444 Winstedt, Richard. & Wilkinson, R. J.  1914,  Pantun Melayu / collected by R.J. Wilkinson and R.O. Winstedt 
 Methodish Publishing House Singapore. 483. Author's English translation.
445 Ibid,  915.  Author's English translation.  
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Here we are charged with finding the respect in which the sandpiper on the beach is like the bamboo 
made into flooring.  I must admit that this one was a bit puzzling for me as well.  That is because the 
respect in question is very contextual.  It requires both understanding that the sandpiper is seen as a 
creature that ekes out its living in what is considered as detritus, and the thorny bamboo, buluh betung 
berduri, is seen as inferior for flooring, the buluh betung being preferred.  In making one's floor joists 
out of thorny bamboo, one is likewise eking out an existence with what has been left behind by others.
Therefore, given that these already form part of our linguistic, cultural and cognitive arsenal, we 
simply do not find ourselves in the situation the Ugly Duckling Theorem posits in which we must 
produce non-abritary predicates ex nihilo.  The formal world cannot supply any content, but similarity 
in forming analogies is necessarily a contentful concept and is a given.446  What the Ugly Duckling 
Theorem does show us is that on both accounts similarity is not a logical, formal feature of the world 
but instead a cognitive, cultural, linguistic or metaphysical feature of the world that is a given whether 
construed as primitive or as reducible.  What is often ignored in discussions of the Ugly Duckling 
Theorem is Watanabe's own consideration of the theorem’s implications that follows its presentation:
In reality, of course, there do exist clusters of similar objects, and there are usually good 
reasons for placing a new sample in one or the other of the classes that have been 
indicated by the given paradigm.  This can be understood, in light of the Ugly Duckling 
Theorem, as meaning that the properties shared by similar objects are more important 
than those shared by nonsimilar objects.447
We should not ignore that Watanabe's proof depends on just this similarity as a practical cognitive tool; 
were its originator unable to recognize similarity through time and in different contexts, he would not 
446 It is also my understanding that the statistician Jean-Paul Benzécri in his work on cross tabulation (work on Boolean 
lattices) has developed an alternative account that challenges the Ugly Duck Theorem, but I am unacquainted with the 
details.  Rodriguez-Pereyra also addresses Watanabe's Ugly Duck Theorem but through an alternative approach:  
Watanabe's theorem allows for conjunctive, disjunctive, and negative properties, none of which are admitted into 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's sparse natural properties, so Rodriguez-Pereyra does not see Watanabe's theorem as applicable to 
his project (61-62).
447 Watanabe, 283.
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have had the cognitive apparatus necessary to write his proof.448   We live in a world in which we 
recognize and weigh similarity constantly.  We are already in our house.
In the previous chapter, we developed a workable theory of relations.  It first suggested that our 
analysis of properties will not yield an analysis of relations, and further argued relations are neither 
universals not tropes.  Instead, it suggested that relations are part of the fundamental furniture of the 
universe, and strongly suggested that these relations were ontologically supervenient on complexes of 
objects but that object-talk alone would not give us relations-talk.  Relations-talk is fundamental, 
because only with relationship talk can we invoke concepts, and as all take necessarily, to be 
meaningful, invokes concepts.  The relation necessary here is the relation of similarity.  Given the 
relationship of similarity, we have the tools to individuate and recognize relations holding between 
objects, and this is enough for some, at least, such as the resemblance nominalist, to even supply us 
with all of our property-talk.  Individual relations are particulars, it seems, and we can sort relations out 
into types because of the similarity relations that can hold among relations just as we can sort out 
objects like balls, cars, and roses or even properties like orange, red, round and square, through the 
similarity relations holding among them.  
The exact ontological nature of relations is still an open question.  We should be cognizant of 
Quine's arguments concerning ontological relativity.449  We have certainly ruled out several theories of 
relations, and in fact a metaphysics that would deny relations as well as one that would have relations 
persist even if they were not exemplified by any complex.  We have, however, invoked relations 
holding between actual and merely possible objects, and perhaps past and nonexistent objects 
(depending on our theory of time) with present existing objects. This invocation of possible worlds not 
448 Watanabe makes explicit the importance of similarity in cognition.  He argues that cognition and recognition depend on 
three main (and simultaneous) factors: (a) selection and weighting of predicates and variables [objects], (b) 
determination of intensity of similarities and other interobject relationships, and finally (c) placement of objects into 
classes.  Watanabe 403.
449 W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 7 (1968): 185–212.
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only allowed us to deal with problems of relations with a single exemplification, but also a larger and 
more successful theory of truthmaking, Truth Supervenes on Being, which, although unacceptable as a 
complete theory of truthmaking, provides valuable tools and insights for the metaphysician concerned 
with truth.  What we did reach was a workable theory, however, that had the resources to explain both 
symmetric and asymmetric relations including the unique relation of similarity.  IN our investigation of 
the South Asian debates, we also reached an understanding of what knowledge or similarity seems to 
be: it must be knowledge of a relation that holds between some complex.  What are acceptable 
constituents of that complex remains an open question, but everything that preceded the investigation 
suggests the answer points towards an ontological abundance of possible relata, including relations, 
properties, and objects, all both actual and possible.
We can now return to the idea of the epistemic virtue of relation and similarity sensitivity that 
(1) allows one to better recognize relations and similarities, (2) allows one to both solve analogies and 
make apt analogies, and (3) is a virtue that can be cultivated.  First, in proposing an epistemic virtue the 
emphasis is shifted from the evaluation of a single analogy or analogical argument and instead to the 
intellectual qualities or character of an individual, shifting the emphasis from individual acts to agents.  
Ernest Sosa's version of virtue epistemology is presented in his discussion of sight.
 . . . there is a broader sense of “virtue,” still Greek, in which anything with a function—
natural or artificial—does have virtues.  The eye does, after all, have its virtue, and so 
does a knife.  And if we include grasping the truth about one's environment among the 
proper ends of a human being, then the faculty of sight would seem in a broad sense of 
virtue in human beings; and if grasping the truth is an intellectual matter then that virtue 
is also in a straightforward sense an intellectual virtue.450  
450 Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 271.
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Given that knowledge of relations is so central, particularly knowledge of similarities, then it would 
seem that the facility by which we come to grasp analogies or identify similarities would likewise be an 
intellectual virtue.  
While this “faculties” or outcome approach of Sosa's is attractive, it is not the only way of 
conceptualizing epistemic virtues.  Following  Zagzebski, we might identify several approaches are 
possible, including “pure virtue theory” which would take the correctness of a belief or claim as purely 
derivative of the believer's character.451  Or such theories can be “good-based” in which either the 
motivation to act is deemed “good” or “bad,” or perhaps certain virtues are seen as intrinsically good, 
and acts then morally evaluated on the basis of whether they conform to good motivations or result 
from intrinsically good virtues.452  Or such theories can be “happiness-based” theories in which 
something is considered a virtue in that it is necessary for human flourishing, and acts are then 
evaluated on the basis of springing forth from such virtues.453  It seems, however, that no matter how 
we parse out our virtue-theoretic approach, given the absolutely fundamental nature of similarity and 
similarity recognition to cognition and knowledge or wisdom, it seems inescapable that such a facility 
is epistemically virtuous.  Perhaps some philosophical acrobatics would be required to argue similarity 
detection is a good in itself, as might be demanded by “good-based” theories, but with some 
contortions it seems possible.  It may be helpful, though, to speak of the epistemic virtue of relation and 
similarity detection as a faculty, and given it is productive of knowledge, lay aside just how “epistemic 
goodness” is defined with the unargued assurance that, however we explicate the epistemic good, we 
will find this faculty of similarity and relation sensitivity to be epistemically virtuous.  An example 
might help illustrate it as a virtue conceived of as a faculty.
451 Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of 
Knowledge (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79.
452 Zagzebski, 89.
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, “The Search for the Epistemic Good,” in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, ed. Michael Emmett 
Brady and Duncan H. Pritchard, Metaphilosopy: Series in Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 18–19.
453 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 81.
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There are somewhat exotic examples of individuals who have facilities to recognize similarities 
that others usually fail to pick up.  Eric Falkenstein, in his discussion of David Eagleman's book, 
Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain, talks about the case of chicken sexers.454  Chicken sexing is 
the process of sorting male and female chicks (baby chickens).   There are a limited number of 
individuals who, by looking at the chicken's vent, can determine whether it is male or female.  How 
individuals recognize the sex of the chicken is not something that individuals can articulate.455  Some 
people then just naturally seem to have the epistemic capacity to tell which chickens are alike in terms 
of their sex, and others do not.  
Falkenstein goes on to note that even though such epistemic ability perhaps cannot be 
articulated, it is still trainable.  He describes a Japanese method of training chicken sexers. 
The student would pick up a chick, examine its rear, and toss it into a bin. The master 
would then say 'yes' or 'no' based on his generally correct observation. After a few weeks, 
the student's brain was trained to masterful levels . . . we can train our unconscious 
thoughts via methods like the chicken sexer, primarily by emulating others who are 
good.456
We may not want to accept that just because we cannot articulate how we know something that we 
know that thing unconsciously as Falkenstein seems to imply.  What is important is that even this very 
subtle ability at similarity detection is something trainable—that the virtue of the chicken sexer can be 
cultivated, and like so many other virtues, it can be cultivated by instruction from one who already has 
the virtue her or himself.  We can call this the “Chicken Sexer Paradigm.”
In the Chicken Sexer Paradigm we also have an analogy that helps us address the Faking 
454 Eric Falkenstein. “The Incredible Intuition of Professional Chicken Sexers,” Business Insider, April 26, 2012, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-incredible-intuition-of-professional-chicken-sexers-2012-3.
455 Falkenstein.
456 Falkenstein, 
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Problem that arose in Chapter One.  It will be recalled that there is a seeming aporia in virtue ethics 
given the use of moral paradigms in the cultivation of ethical virtues.  The naive presentation of virtue 
ethics is that one “finds a virtuous person, and then imitates them.”  So, if for example, you want to be 
brave, you simply find a brave person and act like they do.  But, in the beginning, one is not brave.  
One is merely imitating one with the virtue, but one does not have the virtue themselves.  It is like the 
example of the shepard we observed in the works of Miskawayh: he does not over-indulge in food and 
wine, and everyone believes that is because he possesses the virtue of temperance when in actuality he 
just has an ulcer and over-indulgence will cause him great pain.  We have a strong moral intuition that 
faking is itself a moral vice (authenticity being, it seems, the corresponding virtue).  In the case of 
shepard, we may find him accepting praise as a temperate person as subject to moral approbation 
because he is only faking temperance.  What about, however, those who are genuinely working to 
cultivate virtues, which they do not yet possess, through ethical imitation?  Here the Chicken Sexer 
Paradigm can be useful.
As the aspiring chicken sexer begins, under the instruction of a master, the epistemic virtue of 
similarity detection in this respect is absent.  The aspiring sexer lacks the epistemic virtue or faculty.  
Yet, in the effort, attempting to imitate something that may not be able to be discursively expressed 
because that virtue is desirious, she or he is genuine.  Chicken sexing is a useful example, too, since 
while one can fake being a chicken sexer, one is easily outed as faking since one will sort chicks 
incorrectly.  Using the correct numeral classifiers is likewise hard to fake.  That one is faking fluency 
will be readily apparent to anyone with such fluency.  Likewise, we might have a hunch that at least 
some ethical virtues, like bravery, can easily be faked, but when it comes down to exercising that 
virtue, the individual may practically fail to manifest it (like climbing a building to save a toddler from 
a fire, for example).  
The Chicken Sexer Paradigm shows us how to close off the problem, to to speak.  Through 
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genuine attempts at cultivation of virtue through imitation, the imitator is transformed in character 
(ethical or epistemic).  After a few weeks, the chicken sexer has the epistemic virtue of similarity 
detection in that respect.  Virtues like bravery may take longer than a few weeks to cultivate, but we 
can disguish the efforts of genuine immitation and faking through its aim.  Those who imitate in order 
to be transformed are to be praised for their efforts, while those who imitate without the goal of 
transformation are to be condemned.  
Likewise, when we consider the Malay pantun poems again we see that as the totality of 
cultural knowledge is increased, one's ability to identify the respects by which an analogy holds 
becomes greater.  In reading more Malay literature, for example, one encounters the image of the 
sandpiper again and again in the context of poverty, and as such the implications of its invocation 
become more apparent.  As one gains greater cultural competencies, one can better identify these 
respects.  What is more, one is able to make more insightful and powerful analogies.  In the first 
chapter, the old Graduate Record Exams (GRE) analogy test was mentioned.  Individuals were able to 
train for this section of the test and master it.   We recognize a normativity that determines correctness 
in the case of the GRE that strictly (“objectively”) identifies the right answer.  It is usually likewise in 
the use of language and the application of classifiers, chicken sexing, or the innumerable other areas in 
our lives, personal and professional, where a sensitivity to similarity and the ability to reason with 
similarity comes into play.  These analogies seem to have a correct answer, and perhaps while it is 
difficult to elaborate on the difference between a “sheet” and a “leaf” or some thin flat object, or what 
made one put a chick into the male box or the female box, one can still learn to properly distinguish 
between sheets and leaves and sort chicks by sex, and as reminded by Aristotle in chapter one, one can 
learn to make apt analogies.
One might be hesitant to accept this “objectively correct” notion when it comes to the 
interpretation of poetic analogies, but in that interpretative process, the qualities of the agent may be 
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just as useful in determining the aptness of an analogy or the accuracy of an interpretation.  Remember 
that virtue epistemology shifts the focus from acts of knowing to agents of knowledge.  Here, al-Shāfiʿī 
is useful.  We must consider the epistemic virtues of our interpreter who will not fall victim to 
“semantic drift” as discussed in Eco and Plato's Sophist.  Certainly, the individual immersed in Malay 
culture and poetry is a more trustworthy guide to understanding the pantun poems than is someone who 
learned Malay from a language textbook bereft of exposure to culture and literature.  There may be 
different interpretations depending on what is known and what is apparent to the individual reasoners, 
as al-Shāfiʿī concludes.  But what is important is we make the best interpretations given what we have 
at our disposal.  He writes, “If they sought it out by means of interpretation, using their intellects and 
their knowledge of those signs, after seeking assistance from God and desiring that He aid them, then 
they carried out what was incumbent on them.”457  This does not mean their interpretation is necessarily 
correct (if we reject the “pure virtue theory” of epistemology), but certainly their character as a knower 
gives credence and strength to their interpretations and the aptness of their analogies.
One should again be reminded of the idea of “similar to a degree of tolerance.”  This idea of 
“similarity to a degree of tolerance” is important, because it in part forces us to think in terms of the 
respect by which things are similar, and understanding that there may be a spectrum of similarity, 
ranging from identity (exactly similar in all respects including extrinsic negative properties if there are 
such things) to similar to dissimilar in that respect.  It also invokes the ideas that some similarities may 
be given more weight than others, a fact that Watanabe points out as probably the most important 
aspect of cognizing similarity in the informal space in which we live out our lives.  Just how a program 
like Pixy, whom we met in the first chapter, can recognize the same objects even when under different 
light conditions, so, too, can we recognize similarity even in the face of change (for example, 
recognizing the aging face of an old friend or mentor) or recognize the yellow basketball and blue 
457 Shāfiʻī and Lowry, The Epistle on Legal Theory, 212.
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basketball as more similar objects than the yellow basketball and building of the same shade of 
yellow.458  The more sensitivity one has in terms of tolerance and the contextual space, the better one is 
in a position to make apt analogies or interpret analogical reasoning correctly.  Augmented reality 
programs rely on computer learning techniques by which the light input is correctly identified as the 
object it is, and with repeated exposure to these objects, they are better at identifying what is being 
“seen.”  Likewise, a student of art can identify the artist of a painting which they have never seen 
before by recognizing stylistic similarities, or in some cases, even detect a forgery in which another has 
imitated the style of another artist.  The process may be little different from how the chicken sexer 
identifies male and female chicks or the villager learns to distinguish between gaurs, gayals and 
buffaloes.  It is an epistemic process that can be cultivated and developed. 
Another question remains, and it is in part this question I would ask you to reflect upon 
yourselves.  For all this metaphysical work, both what is presented here, and what is assumed can be 
done, the question of just what similarities really exist has never been answered.  Is the man building 
his floor out of thorny bamboo really like a sandpiper, or a human-sized robot really like a bolder-sized 
house, a dive bar really like the Hotel New International, or a tomato really like a firetruck?  I am fairly 
skeptical that the question of what similarities are “real” is one that can be answered in any non-
arbitrary way that does not fall back on a particular cultural or ideological perspective, or that 
properties can be sorted out into those that are natural and those that are not. We may be able to 
determine what metaphysical systems are possible given we do have the ability to distinguish the 
relation of similarities, and we can rule out some metaphysical theories; yet in the end, we are forced 
into ontological relativity—there may be more than one system that can adequately account for 
relations, but that does not mean all systems can.  However, the question of what similarities are real is 
458 In the basketballs being “more similar,” we are assuming the contextual space is types of object.  But if the contextual 
space was color, then it would be the yellow basketball and yellow building.  This is Douven and Decock's insight that 
similarity (and degrees of tolerance) are always relative to a contextual space.
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inextricably linked with what analogies are true.  And if we wish to form true, non-trivial analogies, we 
must keep this problem in front of our minds.
Recall again Plato's warning from The Sophist “If you are going to be safe, you must be 
especially careful about similarities, since the type you are talking about is very slippery.”   Given the 
primacy of similarity-based reasoning in all forms of knowing, the cultural and linguistic 
embeddedness of analogies should give us reason for pause when we encounter universalizing 
discourses.  Echoing Ratnakīrti, many of the most important relations in the everyday business of 
today's world—nationality, political affiliation, gender, race, ethnicity—are, in all likelihood, merely 
conceptualizations, lacking any reality beyond our own predisposition to, upon seeing similarity 
relations, to reify qualities or properties.  We forget, echoing Greenlee, that we have innumerable other 
similarities that transcend these prescribed qualities or properties.  Finally, echoing Watanabe, we 
should realize that it is ourselves who are weighting these similarities in our considerations of 
resemblance. 
This cultural embeddedness of so many of our discourses related to similarity and difference 
should at least serve as a premise for an argument encouraging and growing educational pursuits that 
develop wider analogical competencies.  We need not all become chicken sexers, but we can deepen 
our own appreciation of the world around us by cultivating the virtue of similarity sensitivity.  
By taking seriously the question analogy, we are lifted up not only into that rarified air that is 
metaphysics, but are pulled down into a serious examination of our own individual horizon.  It provides 
a consideration, too, for the value of reaching out and extending that horizon in a way that allows us to 
see analogies and to identify those similarity relations that we might not have before, whether it be 
tackling another philosophical tradition, an unfamiliar literature, or a new culture. To master Malay 
pantun poems, the intricacies of Buddhist philosophy, or Islamic jurisprudence allows us to see new 
similarities, to make new analogies, to identify relations that were obscured from us before, and to 
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increase that total field of knowledge in which we must judge the apparent truth given what we know. 
To see oneself in the eyes of a hungry child, to form an imaginary relation of similitude with 
individuals displaced by climate change, or the appreciation of the subtle analogies of a previously 
unfamiliar literary tradition—these are all worthy goals of one who seeks wisdom.  
Taking analogy seriously shows us that even if we embrace a universalized metaphysics, it does 
not give us the universe.  
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